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ii1 Introduction
The world is given but once.
Nothing is reﬂected. The original
and mirror–image are identical.
The world extended in space
and time is but our
representation.
(Erwin Schr¨ odinger)
T
HIS PAPER WILL conduct a critical investigation of the famous ar-
gument against atomism ﬁrst made by the 4th century CE Indian
Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu in his idealist treatise Vim . ´ satik¯ a
Vij˜ naptim¯ atrat¯ asiddhi (The Twenty Verses of Mind-Only).1 Although the
present exposition will be more conceptual than historical in focus, it will ﬁrst
unfold the Abhidharmic Buddhist precursors of the Mind–Only epistemology.
With the necessary background in place, I shall then attempt a rational
reconstruction of the substance of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism,
rendering it intelligible to the modern reader by transposing it into contem-
porary philosophical idiom. Finally, I will employ the analysis of atomism
and the external world in the Mind–Only school as a point of departure from
which to further probe closely related concerns of Buddhist transcendental
philosophy having to do with the nature of empirical knowledge, the power
of skeptical argument, and the status of apperception.
Before we begin, a brief clariﬁcation—the sense of the term atom as used
throughout this paper should be carefully distinguished from the so–called
“atom” of the modern physical sciences. Unless otherwise noted, I will be
1Cited henceforth as Vim . ´ satik¯ a. Roman numerals in bold (e.g. “4”) are citations of
verses (k¯ arik¯ as) from the Vim . ´ satik¯ a and Latin numerals numerals in bold (e.g. “XII”)
are citations of sections from Vasubandhu’s auto–commentary, both as given in the
translation of CARMEN DRAGONETTI and FERNANDO TOLA, Being as Consciousness.
New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004, pp. 134–153.
11.1 About Vasubandhu
using the term atom to mean a mereological atom, or indivisible, concrete
particular functioning as an elementary building block of phenomenal expe-
rience.
The theory that the world is constituted by such mereological atoms is
commonly believed to be the exclusive province of Western philosophical
tradition, beginning with the Greek atomists, but is now known to have
evolved, more or less independently from the West, within classical Indian
philosophy, and last but not least, among the Buddhist scholastics of the
Abhidharma sects.
In the Buddhist tradition, Vasubandhu occupies the unique position of
being counted as one of Abhidharma’s greatest proponents as well as one of
its foremost critics. The Vim . ´ satik¯ a is a Mah¯ ay¯ ana text and belongs to the
later, critical phase of his thought.
1.1 About Vasubandhu
Vasubandhu tends to be a somewhat enigmatic ﬁgure even to those familiar
with East Asian philosophy or the particulars of classical Indian thought.
Before going into more detail on the Vim . ´ satik¯ a’s philosophical ideas, I would
like to give some brief background on Vasubandhu’s biography and other
treatises (´ s¯ astras).
The extant biographies of Vasubandhu contain many contradictions and
legendary elements. Lamotte has noted the difﬁculty of coming to any solid
conclusions about Vasubandhu as a person: “Vasubandhu a trop v´ ecu, trop
pens´ e, trop ´ ecrit; et avant de se prononcer sur sa personalit´ e, il faudrait
avoir lu, critiqu´ e et compar´ e toutes ses oeuvres.”2
Vasubandhu was born around the year 316 CE in Purus .apura,3 at the time
the seventh most populous city in the world, located in what are now the
North–West Territories of Pakistan. The city of Purus .apura had become a
2LAMOTTE, cited in MAREK MEJOR, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako´ sa and the Commen-
taries preserved in the Tanjur. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991, pp. 6–7.
3Very little about Vasubandhu’s biography can be considered deﬁnitive. Sarao (see K. T. S.
SARAO, Vasubandhu. in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006 hURL: http://www.
iep.utm.edu/i – accessed on April 12, 2008) gives various other dates for Vasubandhu’s
birth, ranging from 270–420 CE.
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regional capital of the empire of G¯ andh¯ ara under the Kushan king Kanis .ka I,
who reigned from approximately 127 CE, and who is famous for having
erected a giant stupa, perhaps the tallest building in the world of that time,
to house the Buddha’s relics. Although the Empire of G¯ andh¯ ara was already
past its heydey by the time Vasubandhu was born, Purus .apura was still a
great center of Buddhist learning. Anacker relates that it was the birthplace
of the scholars Dharma´ sr¯ ı and the Bhadhanta Dharmatr¯ ata, both of the
Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada school of Buddhism, and that it was known as the seat of the
Pa´ scat¯ ıyas (“Western masters”) of Abhidharma.4
Vasubandhu received his initial education in the Abhidharma of the Sar-
v¯ astiv¯ ada sect. The sources are in some disagreement as to who his teachers
were—according to Param¯ artha, Vasubandhu’s 6th century Chinese trans-
lator, Vasubandhu’s teacher was a scholar by the name of Buddhamitra,5
whereas other sources say that he studied under the Sautr¯ antika teacher
Manoratha and never mention Buddhamitra. The medieval Tibetan doxog-
rapher Bu–ston relates that he was a student of the master Sa˙ nghabhadra,
a staunch defender of neo–orthodox Kashmiri Vaibh¯ as .ika scholasticism.
Whether or not Sa˙ nghabhadra actually was his teacher, Vasubandhu was
ﬁrmly grounded in the Abhidharmic doctrines of his era, though tending
already in the early phase of his thought towards a Sautr¯ antika perspective.
For this reason, the two scholars came to develop an intense rivalry and
were often pitted against each other in debate.6 Later in his career, however,
Vasubandhu had largely lost his zest for competitive debating—it is reported
that he brushed off a challenge to debate Sa˙ nghabhadra with a caustic
witticism showing that there was no friendship between the two: “Though
the lion retires far off before the pig, nonetheless the wise will know which
of the two is best in strength.”7
4STEFAN ANACKER, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor.
New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998, p. 11–12.
5SARAO, ibid.
6Viz. Anacker’s discussion of whether or not Sa˙ nghabhadra was really his teacher
(ANACKER, ibid., pp. 15–16). However, the Tibetan hagiographies of Vasubandhu are in
agreement that he was.
7ANACKER, ibid., p. 23.
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Vasubandhu’s ironic eulogy for Sa˙ nghabhadra shows that he felt him to
have been a sophistic debater lacking in the profound insight that he valued:
“Sa˙ nghabhadra was a clever and ingenious scholar. His intellective powers
were not deep, but his dialectics were always to the point.”8
This remark, however, is more than merely a matter of personal animosity.
It brings to the fore the ideological divide between the non–Mah¯ ay¯ ana and
Mah¯ ay¯ ana inﬂections of philosophical–religious thought. For Sa˙ nghabhadra,
dialectic is apologetic, whereas Vasubandhu employs it in a mainly anti–
apologetic rˆ ole. Against Sa˙ nghabhadra’s orthodox dogmatism, Vasubandhu
is a ﬁgure of transition and a creatively deconstructive thinker.
The early works of Vasubandhu are commonly classiﬁed as belonging
to the Sautr¯ antika school, e.g. the Abhidharmako´ sa (Treasury of Higher
Doctrine) and its auto–commentary.9 The later Vasubandhu is however
considered to be a Mah¯ ay¯ anist and an adherent of the idealist Mind–Only
school. The Mind–Only school is variously referred to in the literature by
the Sanskrit terms Yog¯ ac¯ ara, Cittam¯ atra and Vij˜ n¯ anav¯ ada. I am assuming
for the sake of simplicity that these names can be used interchangeably, but
some commentators assert that the terms designate philosophically distinct
ﬁliations of Mah¯ ay¯ ana thought, e.g. NAGAO, who uses Yog¯ ac¯ ara as a term
for the beginnings and Vij˜ n¯ anav¯ ada for the later evolution of the school.10
Some of the important Mah¯ ay¯ ana ´ s¯ astras of Vasubandhu’s later phase are
the Karmasiddhiprakaran . a (Discussion for the Demonstration of Action), the
Vim . ´ satik¯ a-k¯ arik¯ a (Twenty Verses of Mind-Only) and its auto–commentary,
the Trim´ sik¯ a (Thirty Verses), the Madhy¯ antavibh¯ angabh¯ asya (Commentary
on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes) and the Trisvabh¯ avanirde´ sa
(Treatise on the Three Natures). However, even his later Mah¯ ay¯ ana works
evince many Abhidharmic themes.
It has been conjectured (e.g. by FRAUWALLNER) that Vasubandhu is a
composite ﬁgure. The issue of the identity of Vasubandhu remains to this
day a major topic of controversy, but for the theses being argued here, it
8ANACKER, ibid.
9Also cited henceforth as the Ko´ sa.
10GADJIN M. NAGAO; LESLIE KAWAMURA and GADJIN M. NAGAO, editors, M¯ adhyamika
and Yog¯ ac¯ ara: A Study of Mah¯ ay¯ ana Philosophies. SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies,
1991, p. 187.
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will be sufﬁcient if the Vasubandhus of the Ko´ sa and the Vim . ´ satik¯ a are
the same author. This circumstance is fortunately not under dispute—
according to Frauwallner’s distribution, both works belong to “Vasubandhu
the Younger.”11
1.2 The Vim . ´ satik¯ a in a Nutshell
As it will not be possible to comprehensively examine all of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a’s
arguments in their minute details, I will only give a lightning tour of its key
points and excerpt the epistemological themes of Vasubandhu’s thought in
this treatise. The Vim . ´ satik¯ a is a locus classicus of the Mind–Only school, and
is written in the style of a debate, presenting the idealist thesis of vij˜ n¯ apti-
m¯ atra and defending it against various interlocutors who argue realist views:
“The goal of Vim . ´ satik¯ a is to repudiate the view that there is an external
world corresponding to the images of objects.”12
Vasubandhu indicates in I that he uses the nomenclature citta, manas,
vij˜ n¯ ana and vij˜ n¯ apti interchangeably. The translations of these terms are
respectively ‘mind,’ ‘cognition,’ ‘awareness,’ and ‘percept.’ Given that other In-
dian schools of philosophy do distinguish some of these terms quite sharply,
Vasubandhu is making a far from trivial move in simply equating their
meanings. Doesn’t it make a considerable difference as to whether one in-
terprets the doctrine of Mind–Only as mentalism (as the sole existence of
consciousness)13, or as positivism (all knowledge is based on sense experi-
ence)? Perhaps not. The treatment of these terms as exact synonyms implies
far–reaching consequences for the Mind–Only understanding of the nature
of experience and function of consciousness. The fact that Vasubandhu amal-
gamates so many different terms indicates that mentalistic vocabulary is
probably an implicit locus of philosophical synthesis.
The Vim . ´ satik¯ a begins in 1 with a succinct statement of the fundamental
principle that everything is perception–only, and that the appearance of the
non–existent external referent (b¯ ahy¯ artha) of perception can be compared to
11MEJOR, ibid., p. 10.
12BINA GUPTA, Cit Consciousness. Boston: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 72.
13DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., p. 94.
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the optical illusions seen by the taimirikas, i.e. those persons who perceive
illusory hairs or moons in their ﬁeld of vision owing to a medical disorder
of the eyes—a famous statement that epitomizes the Mind–Only idealist
view.14 Wood characterizes this view essentially as a brand of idealist phe-
nomenalism—the epistemologically na¨ ıve, common–sense apprehension of
an external world is (on that particular count) wildly inaccurate, because
people actually only perceive their own percepts.15 They are familiar only
with the phenomenal workings within their own minds.
Several caveats before we proceed with the discussion—in contemporary
scholarship, the primacy of the idealist interpretation has been at times hotly
contested, e.g. by LUSTHAUS, WAYMAN, ANACKER and KOCHUMUTTOM.
These scholars advance revisionist readings16 that in recent years have
gained an increasing amount of currency. The revisionist interpretations
generally do not take Vasubandhu to deny external objects,17 thereby placing
themselves in opposition to the “traditional interpretation” advocated by
many Western scholars such as WOOD, as well as by medieval Tibetan
doxographical accounts of the Cittam¯ atra system of tenets. I will have more
to say about the topic of these variant interpretations later on in this paper,
but for the time being, I will adopt the frame of traditional interpretation as
so not to prematurely introduce unnecessary complexities into the discussion.
Interpretive frame–shifts will be less confusing once the fundamentals are
in place.
In verse 2, Vasubandhu immediately encounters the ﬁrst objection of the
realist—if they are mere mental creations, how can objects be determinate
and deﬁnite as to time and place? After all, some of the most salient charac-
teristics of physical objects are their apparent spatiotemporal determinacy,
stability and continuity (niyama), their actuality or causally efﬁcacious func-
tioning (kr .takriy¯ a), and their public perceptibility, i.e. the indetermination
(aniyama)18 of mental continua with regard to public percepts. External
14See DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., p. 78.
15THOMAS E. WOOD, Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vij-
nanavada. Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, p. 93.
16Viz. section 3.1.1, p. 73.
17E.g. ANACKER, ibid., p. 159.
18Wood’s analysis of this point is somewhat muddled, cf. WOOD, Mind Only, ibid., p. 165.
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objects, argues the realist, are not perceived in an arbitrary fashion because
their behavior conforms to certain objective regularities and constraints—
they do not shift about unpredictably, vanish and reappear at random, or
gratuitously alter into completely different objects.
Vasubandhu does not deny that the observed world evinces such regulari-
ties. He merely questions whether they necessarily imply the metaph´ ysical19
hypothesis of an objectively existing external world, especially since this
hypothesis could be held to imply the anathematic existence of acausal ob-
jects. He agrees with the requirement that experience be subject to causal
constraint, but with an internalist twist—that the conditioning factors are
to be found in the mind alone, and not in an external world.
In accordance with Buddhism’s generally Humean notion of causality, the
phenomenal laws governing the behavior of the supposedly external objects
are no more and no less strictly necessary and universal than the inner laws
of own subjectivity. Their lawlike behaviour can be accounted for without any
appeal to a transcendentally objective realm. Vasubandhu claims that the
dream hypothesis, despite seeming counterintuitive at ﬁrst blush, ultimately
offers a better explanation for the regularities in our experience than meta-
ph´ ysical realism.
Verse 3 introduces Vasubandhu’s famous analogy of perception “as in
dreams” (svapnavat). Consciousness projects percepts as external to the
mind. The mere experience of objectivity therefore does not sufﬁce as proof
that the objects of perception exist independently.20 In the special case of
dreams, even a hard–boiled physical realist will have no difﬁculty in saying
that phenomena are perceived in absence of contact with an external world.
But Vasubandhu’s thesis is more than merely an example of argument from
illusion—he proposes that this inside–out mode of perception, far from being
19We follow Essler’s convention of distinguishing Kant’s two senses of the word
“metaphysics”—m´ etaphysics as epistemological reﬂection on the constitution and limits
of experience, and metaph´ ysics, or theorizing about trans–experiential realities. See
e.g. WILHELM K. ESSLER; GERHARD PREYER, editor, Unser die Welt. Humanities
Online, 2001 hURL: http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/
2007/4545/pdf/Essler_UDW_ccl.pdfi – accessed on June 26, 2008, p. 119.
20A. K. CHATTERJEE, The Yog¯ ac¯ ara Idealism. Motilal Banarsidass, 1975, p. 61.
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an exceptional case, is in fact the general rule. Dreaming is the paradigmatic
example for perception.
As for the question of spatial and temporal location, Vasubandhu off–
handedly dismisses the realist objection, pointing out that the spatiotemporal
determination experienced in dreams is perfectly sufﬁcient to account for the
perception of an apparently external world. In attributing the structure of
experience to purely internal substrates, and absorbing the transcendental
object into the mind, Vasubandhu makes objectivity wholly parasitic upon
subjectivity.21 In this respect, he can be rightly said to veer sharply towards
idealism.
The indetermination of mind–streams (non–exclusiveness of percepts),
Vasubandhu argues, is just as in the case of hungry ghosts (pretas), who
all see rivers of water as pus due to their identical dispositional bias of
perception.22 That sentient beings perceive a common world proves only
that their karmic propensities have the same common denominator. As an
example, Vasubandhu mentions beings whose negative karmic propensities
will eventually come to fruition as a rebirth in a mentally projected infernal
realm. Thus, Vasubandhu argues that his vij˜ n¯ apti-m¯ atra thesis is perfectly
in accordance with the accepted Buddhist moral theory of karma (which
we might characterize in the modern terminology of philosophical ethics as
having a consequentialist orientation).
To Vasubandhu, causality and lawlike regularities, being merely empirical
regulatives and therefore wholly internal to experience, do not in and of
themselves sufﬁce to offer conclusive proof of objectivity. In 4, he compares
the efﬁcacity of action (arthakriy¯ a)23 to nocturnal emission of semen. We
might unpack this rather risqu´ e example as trying to illustrate how even
wholly imaginary actions (e.g. having sexual intercourse in a dream) can
nonetheless produce pragmatic effects (the emission of semen).24
21See J. N. FINDLAY, Kant and the Transcendental Object. Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 149.
22WOOD, Mind Only, ibid., p. 97.
23The term actually means “accordance with the object,” see BIMAL K. MATILAL, Perception:
An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 1986,
p. 370.
24DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., p. 82.
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Vasubandhu expands upon this example in his ingenious hell–guardian
argument in 5, where he urges that the demonic guardians (naraka-p¯ alas)
who torture their victims are nonexistent because they themselves are not
being tortured. It is an axiomatic assumption of early medieval Buddhist
cosmology that hell–dwellers were reborn in a hellish realm in order to
experience infernal sufferings as retributions for their past actions. But
since the naraka-p¯ alas inﬂict suffering upon others rather than experience it
themselves, it follows that it is impossible for their true manner of existence
to accord with their appearance of being real, sentient beings. Vasubandhu
thus concludes that hell and its guardians are mental projections, suggesting
that the doctrine of karma logically implies his idealist thesis.25
Moreover, if hell, the worst logically conceivable case of suffering, is in-
admissible as a Moorean proof for the metaph´ ysically objective existence of
hell, then the same applies a fortiriori to all other possible states of expe-
rience. Vasubandhu even co¨ opts such realist proofs as support for his own
thesis. Hell, Vasubandhu would diagnose, is nothing other than the painful
symptom of a very severe case of Johnsonian stone–kicking.26
In response to Mach’s sardonic aper¸ cu27 about the Pyrrhonist in Moli` ere’s
Mariage forc´ e who is beaten and does not go on saying “Il me semble que
vous me battez,” but takes his beating as really received, Vasubandhu might
answer that his case against the metaph´ ysical existence of an external
world is predicated on a speciﬁcally transcendental sense of “seems talk.” In
modern terms, we might construe Vasubandhu’s position of transcendental
illusionism as advocating an internalist account of knowledge similar to the
analysis of Cohen.28 The hell–dweller argument tries to show that if the
principle of ethical consequence is to be preserved, then suffering (such as
receiving a beating)—and everything else that masquerades as the external
25WOOD, Mind Only, ibid., p. 66.
26Samuel Johnson famously objected to Berkeley’s idealism by kicking a stone and shouting
“I refute it thus!”
27ERNST MACH, Die Analyse der Empﬁndungen und das Verh¨ altnis des Physischen zum
Psychischen. Edition Classic Verlag Dr. M¨ uller, 2006, p. 30.
28See STEWART COHEN, Justiﬁcation and Truth. Philosophical Studies, 46 1984. However,
it has been argued (unconvincingly) that no Indian philosopher held any form of inter-
nalism (see MARK SIDERITS, Replies to Garﬁeld, Taber and Arnold. APA Newsletters 6
2006:1).
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world—must be a quasi–oneiric manifestation of mental causative potentials
(v¯ asan¯ as). In a dream, the dreamed tortures and terrors are experienced
as very real indeed, but upon awakening, they evaporate. The dreamer
recognizes that all of his experiences were, in truth, no more than projective
appearances of his mind’s inherent muddle.
Next, Vasubandhu gives an argument in 8 against the existence of two
types of sense–base (¯ ayatana)—sensory faculties and their external sensory
ﬁelds—asserting that external sensory ﬁelds (visibles, tangibles, audibles,
etc.) do not actually exist. Vasubandhu justiﬁes this claim by means of
a scriptural hermeneutic. He maintains that the statements regarding
the existence of the sensory ﬁelds have a merely provisional meaning as
metaphorical ﬁgures of speech set forth with the hidden (ney¯ artha) intention
of accomodating realists to the Buddhadharma.
Taught in one way, Vasubandhu argues in 10, the doctrine of the Buddha
leads to the lower understanding of the insubstantiality of the personality
(pudgala–nair¯ atmya) and taught in its deeper meaning as Mind–Only, it
leads to the higher understanding of the insubstantiality of the elements of
experience (dharma–nair¯ atmya). But aside from this hermeneutic justiﬁca-
tion, he also gives a rational line of reasoning—that the existence of external
sensory ﬁelds implies metaph´ ysical realism, which seems an acceptable
enough theory at ﬁrst glance, but is revealed upon closer examination to be
unreasonable.
Vasubandhu then proceeds in 11–15 to give an inventive reductio demon-
strating why the various forms of metaph´ ysical realism fail to be a coherent
alternative to his dream hypothesis of perception. The transcendental ob-
jects postulated by realism do not exist because it is impossible for them
to be composed of atoms. Since Vasubandhu crystallizes the dispute over
transcendental objectivity (i.e. the existence of a mind–independent external
world) around the issue of atomism, he devotes a sizeable portion of the
Vim . ´ satik¯ a to a demonstration that the metaph´ ysical existence of atoms is
unproven—a treatment which is akin to the Kantian analysis of the issue,
as we will explore in detail in Chapter 3. I shall argue that, unlike Kant,
Vasubandhu also rejects the necessity of noumenal simples to the constitu-
tion of phenomenal reality. Kant’s deep suspicion about the legitimacy of
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such a philosophical move is due to his correct intuition that it would signify
a ﬁnal departure from realism. But this is of course precisely the paradigm
shift that Vasubandhu wishes to urge.
In 16, Vasubandhu refutes the causal theory of perception and then an-
swers to a number of further realist objections against the dream theory of
experience, having to do with how recollection of objects or differences in
the dream and waking state can be accounted for. Just as those who are
dreaming do not realize the inexistence of the objects in their dreams, he
argues in XXXIII, those who lack world–transcending gnosis fail to realize
insubstantiality.
In a similar vein, Essler remarks that just as people rarely realize they
are dreaming while they are having a dream, they are likewise unaware
of the extent to which they epistemologically constitute their world when
awake.29 Such is the nature of dreaming, Mach ironizes—while in a dream,
one may reﬂect about the dream and recognize it as such by its oddities, but
one immediately puts one’s mind to rest about them.30 Vasubandhu’s com-
parison of this constitutional creativity of the mind to dream consciousness
is suggestive of the language of the M¯ an . d . ¯ ukya Upanis .ad.31 It strongly hints
at the transformative aim of the text—if it is really true that our world is
like a dream, then we can hope to awaken from it.
Since his realist interlocutor in 18 is also Buddhist, Vasubandhu is in
the position of using scriptural authority to illustrate his idea that minds
do not require the intermediation of a mind–independent external world to
inﬂuence each other. In the Mind–Only paradigm, the existence of a tele-
pathic inﬂuence directly connecting the different mind–streams is not only
invoked in order to absolve Mind–Only of solipsism or to explain anomalous
cases, but is employed as a central explanatory mechanism for ordinary
perception.32
29WILHELM K. ESSLER and ULRICH MAMAT, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005, p. 210.
30MACH, ibid., p. 207.
31GUPTA, ibid., p. 34.
32WOOD, Mind Only, ibid., pp. 171-172.
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In realism, common perceptions are accounted for by the external object,
which causally determines the sensory core of perception.33 In Mind–Only
idealism, the external object is merely a common locus item.34
In the intriguing argument of the forest–dwelling seers in 20, Vasubandhu
attempts to rebut the charge of solipsism by proposing that mental states
and perceptions exercise a direct causal inﬂuence on other consciousnesses,
as demonstrated by a scriptural example involving the extraordinary mental
powers of certain forest hermits. This causal inﬂuence places the various
minds in immediate mind–to–mind contact (paras-patah . ) with each other.
Despite that we are unaware of this contact, Vasubandhu suggests, it is the
means by which we intersubjectively constitute a folie simultan´ ee that then
appears to us as the objective world.35
In the penultimate verse 21, Vasubandhu directly addresses the other
minds problem. Not only do we not truly know other minds, we do not even
know our own. Essentially, Vasubandhu frames the other minds problem
as a special case of the more general problem of the epistemic status of the
transcendental subject, for which he offers a deeply skeptical response.36
1.3 Rationale and Method of the Investigation
Why single out Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism for further exami-
nation? The Vim . ´ satik¯ a’s argument against atomism demarcates a crucial
juncture both in Vasubandhu’s own thought as well as in Northern Buddhist
thought in general—the two non–Mah¯ ay¯ ana schools of Northern Buddhism
(the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada/Vaibh¯ as .ika and the Sautr¯ antika) commonly accept the
existence of atoms, whereas the two Mah¯ ay¯ ana schools, the Yog¯ ac¯ ara/Citta-
33MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 230.
34ALEXANDER BERZIN, Basic Features of the Gelug-Chittamatra System. hURL:
http://www.berzinarchives.com/sutra/sutra_level_5/basic_feat_
gelug_chittamatra_1.htmli – accessed on April 11, 2008.
35Vasubandhu’s paras-patah . may be compared to Husserl’s notion of the “harmony of
the monads,” or intersubjective correlation of subjective constitution systems. Husserl
regards objectivity as the ideal correlate of intersubjective experience (see EDMUND
HUSSERL; ELISABETH STR¨ OKER, editor, Cartesianische Meditationen: Eine Einleitung
in die Ph¨ anomenologie. Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995, pp. 109–111).
36DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., p. 121.
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m¯ atra (Yogic Practice/Mind–Only) and the M¯ adhyamika (Middle Way) do
not. Also, in using Vasubandhu’s argument as a mirror in which to study the
epistemological interrelation of mind and object, I will offer some contem-
porary reﬂections on two perennial themes of philosophy—empiricism and
Cartesian external world skepticism.
However, this effort runs into certain initial difﬁculties, concerning not so
much the analysis of Vasubandhu’s anti–atomist argument in and of itself—
which will prove fairly straightforward—but rather, having to do with the
hermeneutic challenges of properly assessing its signiﬁcance against the
broader backdrop of classical Buddhist thought and analyzing it in the light
of contemporary epistemology.
On the one hand, any attempt to draw out the meaning of Vasubandhu’s
argument must take account of the unique historical context and the dis-
tinctive philosophical moves generated by the Buddhist program. On the
other hand, an exegesis from a contemporary standpoint will necessarily be
grounded, at least in part, within the matrix of the Occidental philosophical
traditions, which prima facie seems very far removed from the worldview of
Indian Buddhism around the 4th century CE.
Herbert V. Guenther has often remarked on the difﬁculty of applying West-
ern philosophical categories to Eastern patterns of thought, warning that an
overly facile characterization in Western terms runs the risk of blurring or
even entirely misconstruing the distinguishing features of Buddhism.37
Extrapolating grand trends and tendencies is tricky business in any philo-
sophical context, and especially so when it comes to the history of Buddhist
thought. One must be careful not to cavalierly colonize the texts of the Other.
But a comparative analysis unavoidably requires a certain degree of creative
extrapolation and generalization.
Clearly, in the worst case, such an approach may reveal little more than the
expositor’s hermeneutic bias. Yet it would be equally na¨ ıve, in a philosophical
sense, to desist from bringing in current vocabulary and concerns in an
attempt to eliminate Western perspective from the equation.
37See HERBERT V. GUENTHER, Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy. in: HER-
BERT V. GUENTHER, editor, Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective: Collected Arti-
cles of Herbert V. Guenther. Shambhala Publications, 1977, pp. 162–163.
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Although it would be possible to restrict oneself to a purely text–immanent
interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Vim . ´ satik¯ a, such a treatment of this type
would be of little more than historiographical or antiquarian relevance.
Indeed, it would be rather difﬁcult to conceive of a philosophically relevant
study of Vasubandhu’s position on atomism that does not attempt to line him
up with Western thinkers and commensurate his ideas to familiar Western
categories.
One challenge is therefore to employ the inescapable perspectival slant
of a contemporary interpretation to good effect in bringing Vasubandhu’s
arguments to bear upon topics of interest to present–day philosophers. As B.
K. Matilal notes, contemporary writing on classical Indian philosophy must
somehow strike a balance between the reconstruction of historical views and
the critical examination of similar modern views.38 Some knowledge of his-
torical development will prove indispensable as a foundation for abstracting
the underlying conceptual structure of Vasubandhu’s line of argument and
reconstructing its main epistemological themes and issues. The project of
philosophical re-synthesis in the guise of comparative analysis requires that
the discussion ﬂuidly shift back and forth between ideo–historical exploration
and rational reconstruction.
In particular, I hope to identify some of the central philosophical features
of Buddhist thought by casting the Vim . ´ satik¯ a in an empiricist mold, juxtapos-
ing Buddhist thinkers such as Gautama ´ S¯ akyamuni and Vasubandhu with
Kant as well with Avenarius and Mach, Kant’s 19th century empiriocriticist
successors. The main reason why I do not elaborate the obvious parallels
to Berkeley or Schopenhauer is not because it would be uninstructive or
inappropriate, but because the comparisons have already been extensively
pursued elsewhere.39 Instead, I will emphasize the comparison of Mind–Only
epistemological idealism to to the post–Kantian empiriocriticist phenom-
enalism of Mach. Since Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako´ sa phase of thought
arguably already makes a Kantian turn and the Vim . ´ satik¯ a represents a
38MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 2.
39See CHATTERJEE, ibid., pp. 204–215 and JAY L. GARFIELD, Western idealism through
Indian eyes: A Cittam¯ atra reading of Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer. Sophia, 31
1998:1.
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further critical step in his development, it seems that Mind–Only might
proﬁtably be re–evaluated as a continuation of the Kantian trajectory of crit-
ical empiricism (in other words, as an epistemology of “Experience–Only”)40
rather than a reversion to the pre–Kantian idealism of Berkeley.
Another reason for reading Vasubandhu in an empiriocriticist vein is that
both Mach and Yog¯ ac¯ ara Buddhism may be said to have advocated a pure
phenomenalism. The parallel to Mach is crucial to my interpretation due
not only to his sophisticated (albeit unsystematic)41 phenomenalist point
of view, but also to his notoriously die–hard skepticism about the theory
of physical atomism, which will help to illustrate a plausible philosophical
rationale for Vasubandhu’s anti–atomism. Just as the empiriocriticism of
Mach and Avenarius may be regarded as an empiricism that has puriﬁed
itself of transcendental objectivity and ontological absolutes, the Vij˜ n¯ apti-
m¯ atra of Vasubandhu amounts to a Sautr¯ antika view that has eliminated the
external object (b¯ ahy¯ artha). I am aware that I am suggesting a deliberately
prochronistic interpretation of Vasubandhu’s views. It is by no means an
authoritative reading, but hopefully, an interesting and illuminating one.
The various philosophical ideas of the Indian ancients will be articulated
largely from the perspective of analytic philosophy, while also attending to
the unique concerns that they implicitly convey. The basic motivations of the
classical Indian traditions seem largely alien to a contemporary philosophical
audience because they were inﬂuenced by a very different historical setting
and cultural outlook.42 Like most classical Indian philosophy, Buddhist
thought of the early medieval era intimately fuses (and inevitably, often
intimately confuses) rigorous philosophical analysis with dogmatic and sote-
40In a similar vein, Siderits renders the doctrine of Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra as “Impressions–Only,”
see MARK SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Ashgate Publishing
Limited, 2007, pp. 146–147.
41In fact, Mach deliberately disdains the systematic approach and even denies that he is
a philosopher, preferring to practice a rather Rortyan strain of scientiﬁcally “edifying”
anti–philosophy (see e.g. MACH, ibid., p. 39).
42The early medieval Buddhist worldview is vastly more archaic than the contemporary
scientiﬁc one—many mythological elements and supernaturalist beliefs that moderns
would dismiss as anachronistic superstition are taken at face value, e.g. hells, demons
and magic.
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riological concerns, to a degree rarely encountered in post–Enlightenment
Western philosophy.43
Moreover, Mah¯ ay¯ ana Buddhist thinkers are almost universally mysti-
cally inclined, and Vasubandhu, a mystic of the ﬁrst water, is certainly no
exception. An in–depth exploration of Mah¯ ay¯ ana mysticism would unfortu-
nately be beyond the scope of this paper—a brief survey will have to sufﬁce.
But despite that for the purposes of this discussion, I will be singling out
the philosophical aspect of Vasubandhu’s thought (i.e. the level of rational
argument), I will not be able to avoid making some basic interpretative
allowances for its religio–mystical dimensions. The subtle interplay of philo-
sophical argument and mystical anagog´ e might seem difﬁcult to reconcile to
the modern philosophical mind. However, the lines of rational argument are
fortunately easier to discern in the Vim . ´ satik¯ a than in other writings of his
later phase, e.g. the Trim´ sik¯ a or the Trisvabh¯ avanirde´ sa.
The exceedingly condensed, epigrammatic nature of Vasubandhu’s writing
poses another interpretive challenge. In stark contrast to contemporary
Western philosophy, which tends to valorize lengthy prose expositions that
discursively expand upon their themes in exhaustive technical detail, the
Indian philosophy of that period placed a premium on brevity and poetic
elegance of expression. It had evolved a philosophical poetry, written in a
strictly metered form typical of classical Sanskrit composition. Key philo-
sophical themes were epitomized in gnomic verse and expanded upon in the
author’s auto–commentary. The most brilliant examples of this style evoke
an air of tension, paradoxicality and mystery with their austere reductions,
unexpected double–turns and double–entendre, and constant shifting of the
level of discourse.44
Part of the reason for the use of this poetic form was to facilitate memo-
rization, but another motivation is that verse can more easily convey elusive
aesthetic subtleties and multiple levels of meaning. A poem can be read as a
philosophical epitome, operating on the level of rational explanation, and on
43One notable exception that integrates philosophical analysis and mysticism is Wittgen-
stein’s Tractatus (see e.g. 6.44 in LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN; BRIAN MCGUINNESS and
JOACHIM SCHULTE, editors, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung: kritische Edition =
Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989, p. 174).
44GARFIELD, Sophia 31 [1998], ibid.
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a deeper reading, function as a mystical pith instruction, which follows the
entirely different modus operandi of deliberately perplexing the intellect so
as to induce transcendence of conceptual limitations.
The paradoxical mode of expression is an integral part of the mystical atti-
tude, and past a certain point, it deﬁes interpretative reduction to a purely
rational meaning. Vasubandhu concludes the Vim . ´ satik¯ a in 22 with a Trac-
tarian cliff–hanger—even he, the author himself, cannot fully understand
the meaning of what he has written:
It is impossible for people like me to consider it [the doctrine of
perception–only] in all its aspects, because it is not in the range
of dialectics. And in order to show by whom it is known entirely
as a scope of insight, it is said to be the scope of Buddhas.45
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Unless it is read in the context of a meta–philosophical “grand narrative” or
background hermeneutic, the technical analysis of Vasubandhu’s arguments
against atomism will seem rather dry. The deeply apophatic ﬁnale of the
Vim . ´ satik¯ a offers a hint as to where the meta–narrative ought to begin. We
will bring the hermeneutic lens of Vasubandhu as mystical proto–empirio-
criticist into sharper focus by offering some intertextual reﬂections on the
meaning of the silence of the Buddha.46
This is the silence that Gautama ´ S¯ akyamuni is said to have maintained
with regard to the famous fourteen unanswered questions (catv¯ ari–avy¯ akr .ta-
vast¯ uni) posed to the Buddha by the wandering ascetic Vatsagotra:
Whether the cosmos has a beginning, or not, or both, or neither.
Whether the cosmos has an end, or not, or both, or neither.
45ANACKER, ibid., p. 175.
46In the terms of speech act theory, the Buddha’s “silence” can be characterized as a kind
of illocutionary negation, i.e. non–assertion of a proposition that does not entail the
afﬁrmation of its opposite.
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Whether the Tathagata exists after death, or not, or both,
or neither.
Whether the mind is identical with the body or different from it.47
Although he held silence for many other reasons as well, ´ S¯ akyamuni’s
silence about these questions of a speciﬁcally metaph´ ysical nature is par-
ticularly signiﬁcant, in that it preﬁgures the later M¯ adhyamika program of
insubstantialism and null ontology.48 M¯ adhyamika develops the Buddha’s
silence about absolutes into a profoundly meontological mysticism, deploying
skeptical argument against all points of view in an attempt to demonstrate
that the most important thing the Buddha said was nothing.
The fourteen unanswered questions moreover present a fascinating paral-
lel to the Kantian antinomies of pure reason, where Kant raises aporiai49
in demonstrating that the four ideas of rational cosmology each lead to two
opposing positions that appear to be equally valid.
The ﬁrst eight unanswered questions of Vatsagotra closely approximate the
ﬁrst Kantian antinomy of pure reason, as both reduce to aporia the question
as to whether or not the world is spatiotemporally limited. The second of
Kant’s antinomies, which happens not to be among the fourteen unanswered
questions of s¯ utric tradition, has to do with whether or not the world of
experience is metaph´ ysically constituted of simple or primitive elements, i.e.
atoms. The atomists of the Abhidharma schools answer this question in the
afﬁrmative, whereas in the Vim . ´ satik¯ a, Vasubandhu categorically responds
in the negative.
As for what position Gautama ´ S¯ akyamuni himself may have taken on
atomism—although the earliest Buddhist corpus of texts, the Pali Canon,
does not mention atomist doctrines50 or offer any clues as to whether or
not the ´ S¯ akyamuni adhered to a theory of simples, in light of his silence on
Vatsagotra’s questions, one can easily picture what his response might have
47NAGAO, ibid., p. 37–38.
48CANDRAK¯ IRTI, Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara, with
commentary by Ju Mipham. Shambhala, 2002, pp. 5–6.
49ROBERT AUDI, editor, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University
Press, 1994, p. 29.
50DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., p. 100.
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been. I conjecture that he would have recognized the aporetic character of
the issue and remained silent.
Concerning his own rationale for keeping silence about the fourteen ques-
tions, ´ S¯ akyamuni does not have much to offer in the way of explanation,
aside from the famous ﬁre simile in the discourse (s¯ utra) of Vaccagotta on
Fire. It seems that ´ S¯ akyamuni intended the simile to speciﬁcally address
Vatsagotra’s questions about the post–mortem status of a monk who has
reached nirv¯ an . a, but it could also be construed, without too much of a stretch,
to apply analogously to the other questions as well:
“And suppose someone were to ask you, ‘This ﬁre that has gone
out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East?
West? North? Or south?’ Thus asked, how would you reply?”
“That doesn’t apply, Master Gotama. Any ﬁre burning depen-
dent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being unnourished—
from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any
other—is classiﬁed simply as ‘out’ (unbound).”51
Aside from the Kantian analogy, there is also a Machian parallel to the ﬁre
discourse. Mach uses examples that are strikingly similar to the s¯ utric simile
when he accuses his fellow physicists of na¨ ıvely misconstruing concepts
which properly apply strictly to sensations to refer to objective physical
quantities. In the opinion of Mach, many putative scientiﬁc problems can
be traced back to na¨ ıve category errors and unmasked as philosophical
pseudo–questions:
‘Where does the light go when it has been extinguished and
no longer ﬁlls the room?’ Such are the questions of a child. Con-
founded by the sudden shrinking of a hydrogen balloon, the child
continues to search for the large body that had still been present
just a moment ago. ‘Where does the warmth come from? Where
does it go?’ Such childish questions coming from the mouths of
51THANISSARO BHIKKHU, MN 72. Online hURL: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/
tipitaka/mn/mn.072.than.htmli – accessed on June 23, 2008.
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mature men determine the intellectual climate of the current
century.52
In view of Mach’s quintessentially positivist theory of the pseudo–problem
(Scheinproblem) and its purported root cause of metaph´ ysical thinking, one
might deduce that he would be very reluctant to acknowledge the existence
of genuine aporiai, i.e. philosophical conundrums that are fundamentally
and intrinsically intractable. Mach believes that philosophical problems are
either solved or discovered to be nonsensical and futile.53
It is certainly not too much to assume that ´ S¯ akyamuni was aware of the
existence of pseudo–problems. Therefore, we may guess that if Gautama
´ S¯ akyamuni had believed the fourteen unanswered questions to be no more
than pseudo–problems, he would have plainly said as much. Panikkar
conjectures ´ S¯ akyamuni’s silence about the questions to be not an epistemic,
but an ontic apophaticism of a metaph´ ysically avy¯ akta nature.54 In Indian
philosophy, the term avy¯ akta also carries the connotations ‘unmanifest,’ ‘all–
pervading,’ ‘formless,’ ‘non–differentiated,’ ‘indeterminate’ and ‘unexpressed.’
If understood in an ontological sense, we can see how avy¯ akta might perhaps
be comparable to Anaximander’s concept of the apeiron. Moreover, it is
worth noting that the notion of avy¯ akta can be considered in some ways a
precursor of the concept of ´ s¯ unyat¯ a, which later attained its full development
in Mah¯ ay¯ ana thought. The ontologically negative orientation of ´ s¯ unyat¯ a is a
Mah¯ ay¯ anistic reprise of the early Buddhist an¯ atman principle.55
Therefore, it may be argued that the Buddha’s silence was more than
merely a positivistic epoch´ e about the metaph´ ysicalities beyond the limits
of experience—it was the metaph´ ysical silence, or apophaticism of the cen-
terlessness and ineffability of experience itself, in its immanent immediacy.
This is, generally speaking, the M¯ adhyamika position on the issue.56
52MACH, cited in MANFRED SOMMER, Evidenz im Augenblick: Eine Ph¨ anomenologie der
Reinen Empﬁndung. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001, pp. 295–296, my translation.
53MACH, ibid., p. 298.
54RAIMON PANIKKAR, Gottes Schweigen. Die Antwort des Buddha f¨ ur unsere Zeit. Fischer
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996, pp. 47–49.
55NAGAO, ibid., p. 170.
56We must, however, concede the impossibility of a uniﬁed or deﬁnitive hermeneutic of
M¯ adhyamika—it has been variously read by commentators in the Western philosoph-
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We will not be able to conclusively establish whether ´ S¯ akyamuni’s own
understanding of avy¯ akta questions was similar to Mach’s doctrine of the
pseudo–problem57 arising from superstitions, misunderstandings, category
mistakes and misapplications of language, or whether he in fact considered
that there are some truly unanswerable philosophical questions pointing
towards a mystical reality of “metaph´ ysical silence.”
Even if the Buddha did not articulate an explicit positivism, the empiricist
tendency of eliminating metaph´ ysics and adverting to experience is evident.
Inasmuch as his silence about the fourteen questions is interpreted as a
dismissal of pseudo–problems (a wholly justiﬁed interpretation) we may
consider it to be the germ of a strong proto–positivist subtext in Buddhism.
There are quite a number of writings in early Buddhism that clearly state
empiricist viewpoints, e.g. that speculative theories which go beyond the lim-
its of experience generate confusion and vexation rather than knowledge.58
In early Buddhism, one ﬁnds—other than instances of the tetralemmatic
negation (catus .kot .i)—little direct evidence of the deeply paradoxical formu-
lations and the penchant for puzzling dialectic that were later to become
the signature style of the Mah¯ ay¯ ana schools. On the contrary—´ S¯ akyamuni
either speaks clearly or keeps silence.
Though he is known in many instances to have expressed a dislike of
philosophical debate, I do not conceive Gautama ´ S¯ akyamuni to have been
a rigorous misologist. Rather, I construe his position to have been that con-
structive philosophical inquiry and theorizing have a primarily diagnostic
or therapeutic purpose—in the language of Buddhist simile, they are rafts
that must be abandoned once one has crossed over to the further shore,59
or ladders that should be cast away after they have been climbed.60 This
ical tradition along Kantian lines (MURTI), as nihilism (WOOD and NARAIN), decon-
structivism (MABBETT), pure criticism (CHATTERJEE), skeptical mysticism (MATILAL),
anti–essentialism (GARFIELD), common–sense realism (ARNOLD) or as anti–realism
(SIDERITS), just to name a few exegeses that merit attention.
57See e.g. MACH, ibid., p. 298.
58DAVID J. KALUPAHANA, A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism. Philosophy East and West, 19
1969:1, p. 66.
59For a statement of the raft simile in the Nikayas, see MN 22.
60Viz. Wittgenstein’s famous ladder simile in 6.54 (WITTGENSTEIN, ibid., p. 178), evidently
patterned after the Buddhist raft simile.
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soteriological instrumentalism is a characteristic feature of the Buddhist doc-
trine, and, especially in the Mah¯ ay¯ ana, is extended into an epistemological
instrumentalism. This is also Vasubandhu’s interest. In the Vim . ´ satik¯ a, he
introduces concepts not as absolute truths, but solely as an expedient means
for dissolving the conceptual rigidities of the metaph´ ysical realist.61
The Buddhist skeptical mysticism was later to attain its fullest expression
in the Praj˜ n¯ ap¯ aramit¯ a corpus of scriptures and their various exegeses. The
central theme of this corpus is the wisdom (praj˜ n¯ a) of voidness (´ s¯ unyat¯ a).
The notion of ´ s¯ unyat¯ a, though already present in some writings of early Bud-
dhism, is taken up and analytically developed within the critical–skeptical
framework of the M¯ adhyamika school of philosophy, into the doctrine that
the dependently arising elements (dharmas) of empirical experience are
ineffable (anabhil¯ apya) and void (´ s¯ unya)—or to restate the same matter in
terms more appropriate to mysticism—apophatically negated. Phenomena in
other words cannot be said to have essences, core bearers, intrinsic identities,
existence as unitary objects, and so on.62 The Praj˜ n¯ ap¯ aramit¯ a radicalizes
the m´ etaphysical silence about what lies beyond the limits of experience into
a meontology of metaph´ ysical silence.
Based on this distinction of a mystical and a positivistic layer to the silence
of the Buddha,63 we can attempt to hermeneutically project the Buddhist
epistemological discourse along two parallel and mutually complementary
avenues. The “cataphatic” discourse along the via positivistica (i.e. the posi-
tivistic avenue exempliﬁed by the critically puriﬁed Abhidharmika approach)
attempts to constructively epistemologize experience, whereas the via nega-
tiva (paradigmatically, the M¯ adhyamika) tends to frame its epistemology in
terms of a skeptical and deconstructive practice.
The hypothesis that there came to be these two closely related but nonethe-
less distinct understandings of the Buddha’s silence can provide us with a
61ANACKER, ibid., p. 3.
62Cf. JAY L. GARFIELD, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: N¯ ag¯ arjuna’s
M¯ ulamadhyamakak¯ arik¯ a. Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 90, who argues the subtly
different thesis that they lack these things.
63The distinction between “mystical” and “positivistic” silence that is being developed
here aligns approximately with Siderits’ two types of interpretation of the doctrine of
emptiness, metaphysical and semantic—see SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid.,
pp. 182–183.
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model for plotting the structural dynamic of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a. We will designate
the the via positivistica’s m´ etaphysical silence about the metaph´ ysical as the
“Cartesian epoch´ e,” indicating that a bracketing of the transcendental object
is taking place. This catchprase is meant to suggest characteristic modes of
philosophical expression such as Cartesian external world skepticism, and
to hint at the notion of phenomenological epoch´ e developed by Husserl in his
Cartesian Meditations.64
The status of the transcendental subject is left untouched by the Carte-
sian epoch´ e, allowing for various modalities of metaph´ ysically negating or
asserting it that lead to weaker or stronger types of idealism. However,
we hypothesize that the weaker modes of idealism (i.e., those obtained by
metaph´ ysical negation of the transcendental subject) generally fall closer
to the centerline of the via positivistica because they make an effort to ap-
proximate a phenomenalist middle ground between realism and idealism.
By metaph´ ysically negating the transcendental subject, they are trying to
counteract their inherent tendency to gravitate towards ontological ideal-
ism.65 These are in other words idealisms trying to disguise themselves as
forms of neutral monism or pluralism.66
The metaph´ ysical silence of the Buddhist via negativa, on the other hand,
indicates the apophatic negation of the subject.67 It will simply be equated
64HUSSERL, ibid., pp. 20–21.
65Mach is an example of this position—he vigorously rejects the the transcendental ego and
defends himself against the accusation of Berkeleyan idealism by arguing that in his
system, the elements of experience depend only on each other for their existence, not
on God. See MACH, ibid., pp. 292–295. Carnap also feels that Mach is in denial about
idealism—he argues that Mach’s choice of a non–autopsychological base of constitution
(“nicht–eigenpsychische Basis”) for experience does not ﬁt into the broader picture of
his views (RUDOLF CARNAP, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998,
p. 87).
66See LEOPOLD STUBENBERG, Neutral Monism. in: EDWARD N. ZALTA, editor, The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition). 2005 hURL: http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/neutral-monism/i – accessed on
July 19, 2008.
67A brief digression on meaning and levels of language—if the term “metaph´ ysical silence”
is to indicate as intended, the manner of its use must be understood to be strictly a–
linguistic. A m´ etaphysical silence about the metaph´ ysical is a silence that can be spoken
about by moving to a higher level of reﬂection. As opposed to this, the term “metaph´ ysical
silence” is meant to indicate an absolute silence that cannot be spoken about, i.e. a silence
completely out of scope at any level of language or reﬂection (see ESSLER and MAMAT,
ibid., pp. 162–163). But we immediately observe that the previous sentence leads to
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with the terms ´ s¯ unyat¯ a, dharma–nair¯ atmya and an¯ atman. Along with
prat¯ ıtya–samutp¯ ada (dependent origination), the doctrine of an¯ atman must
count as one of the most distinctively Buddhist doctrines, the an¯ atman
doctrine may be viewed as a challenge to the primacy of transcendental
subjectivity in the orthodox Vedic philosophies (¯ astika dar´ sanas). While
there is no evidence that early Buddhism rejected any kind of metempirical
self, it is important to keep in mind that none of the arguments attempting
to warrant the opposite thesis (that Buddhism acknowleged an ¯ atman) are
substantive,68 nor is there any evidence that ´ S¯ akyamuni taught an ¯ atman
theory.69
That there is no evidence either way of course does not prove the hy-
pothesis that his doctrine of an¯ atman involved an epoch´ e of transcendental
subjectivity, but at least allows for the possibility.70 As for the empirical
reality of human existence, Buddhism almost uniformly proposes a strictly
bundle–theoretic account (with the exception of the Pudgalav¯ ada schools
of early Buddhism which maintained the ultimate reality of a personal
self). The bundle theory of personhood is also a recurrent theme of Western
empiricism—we ﬁnd it e.g. in the writings of Hume.71
In its most radical form, the the Buddhist via negativa may be construed
as amounting to a thorough epoch´ e of any and all types of subjectivity. The
substantiality of the empirical self, the Cartesian and the Kantian cogitos,
antinomy. It is therefore impossible even to say that one cannot speak of metaph´ ysical
silence, and even this is saying too much, etc. ...Diagonalization has come out to play
here. The words “metaph´ ysical silence” have no epistemologically discernable meaning,
other than that they are struck through.
68CLAUS OETKE, ”Ich” und das Ich: Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-
brahmanischen Atmankontroverse. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1988, p. 157.
69NAGAO, ibid., p. 162.
70In rough terms, we construe ¯ atman to be any self–established metempirical position
affording a “God’s eye view” of of experience (see ESSLER and MAMAT, ibid., pp. 10–11).
71In some ways, the Buddhist doctrine of an¯ atman resembles of the ideas of contemporary
analytic philosophers who have rejected the belief in a substantive self, such as Peter
Unger and Derek Parﬁt, see DEREK PARFIT, Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press,
1984 or PETER UNGER, I do not Exist. in: G. F. MACDONALD, editor, Perception and
Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with his Replies to them. Macmillan Press,
1979.
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as well as the transcendental ego of Husserl and the Tractarian notion of the
transcendental subject as world–limit, are all to be apophatically negated.72
Buddhism seeks to achieve egolessness by “dissolving” the transcendental
ego into the stream of empirical consciousness.73 After subjectivity has been
bracketed, there remains only the pure “difference” of experience without any
unitary forms of subjectivity or objectivity which could serve as a foundations
for constructing a world or a self. As it is in fact the ¯ atman which is the
source of all forms of unity74 and ontological categories falsely projected upon
experience, bracketing the ¯ atman also eliminates these false projections.
The ¯ atman and its cognates therefore become the Buddhist soteriology’s
main targets of attack. Early Buddhist scholasticism pursues the positivistic
trajectory and attempts to eliminate the subject by a reductive analysis
of the elements of experience into objectiﬁed least parts. This program
is played out as an atomistic sense–data phenomenalism. Vasubandhu,
however, puts this Abhidharmic reductionist program to an end by reasoning
against transcendental objectivity—a maneuver that brings him closer to
the Upanis .adic monism of the ¯ astika pattern, but also to the original via
positivistica of Buddhism that had been derailed by the metaph´ ysical realism
of the Abhidharmikas.
In the Western history of philosophy, we can identify the epistemology of
Mach as an example of this hypothetical Buddhist via positivistica. Mach,
though tracing the sources of his inspiration to Hume, Lichtenberg and
72These concepts are very different in their details, but they have one point in common—
none of them are given to empirical experience. Carnap’s concept of “I” in the Aufbau
must admittedly be granted a partial exemption from this general critique. Carnap
deﬁnes the “I” as the class of elementary experiences, i.e., as their common, unifying
property rather than their mere sum or collection (CARNAP, Aufbau, ibid., p. 226).
He insists that the “I” is a unity and not a mere bundle of experiences. This class
of elementary experiences would be unobjectionable from a Buddhist point of view if
assumed to be strictly extensional—as Carnap’s statement that the ego is not a primordial
fact of the given would seem to indicate. But if the “I” is taken to be an intensional class,
as his talk of unifying properties suggests, there is no means of guaranteeing that it
is the unique unifying property of all elementary experiences other than a blatantly
metaphysical act of postulation.
73GUPTA, ibid., p. 3.
74Kant would prefer to say that the unity of transcendental apperception is an a priori
condition of experience. More precisiely, it is the unitary character of both the transcen-
dental subject and the transcendental objects that accounts for the cohesive nature of
appearances, see FINDLAY, ibid., p. 7.
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William James (giving special credit to Lichtenberg’s famous correction to
the Cartesian cogito: “Es denkt”)75 was aware of the general tendencies of
Buddhist thought and held them in high esteem, as shown in one of Mach’s
letters to Fritz Mauthner.76
Nowhere does Mach propound an overtly soteriological aim in the vein of
the Buddhist nirv¯ an . a (the complete cessation of suffering and freedom from
afﬂictive states of mind) or the Pyrrhonian ataraxia (the happiness, freedom
from worry and imperturbability arising from the skeptical suspension of
belief), nor does Mach have a fully evolved apophatic mysticism as does the
M¯ adhyamika.77 His main focus as a physical scientist is a positivistic one—
employing quantitative method to investigate the functional relationships
between the elements of experience.78
If Mach is able to mentally envision the refraction angles of the color
spectrums that are generated by shafts of white light falling onto a prism, if
he can predict where the Fraunhofer lines will appear and what changes will
occur if the prism is shifted or if a thermometer touching the prism gives a
different reading, he is satisﬁed. Because he views the quantitative laws of
physics as mere regulatives of his empirical sensory intuition, he feels that
he knows everything he can expect to know.79
Early Buddhism, on the other hand, evolved in a historical setting in
which the quantitative scientiﬁc method had not yet been developed. As a
result, the aim of the Buddhist empiricism of functional relation naturally
gravitated towards acquiring moral and mystical insights into the dependent
arising of experience, which were elaborated into the characteristic doctrines
of karma and selﬂessness.
75In full, Lichtenberg’s aphorism reads “One should say, ‘There is thought,’ just as one says
‘there is a ﬂash of lightning.”’ (“Es denkt, sollte man sagen, wie man sagt: es blitzt.”).
Cited in MACH, ibid., p. 23.
76SOMMER, Evidenz im Augenblick, ibid., pp. 345–346.
77Mach does, however, relate that two or three years after reading Kant’s Prolegomena, he
had a formative mystical experience involving the uselessness of things–in–themselves.
One bright summer day, the world suddenly seemed to him as an coherent mass of
sensations, that in himself only came to cohere more strongly. MACH, ibid., p. 24.
78MACH, ibid., p. 28.
79MACH, ibid., p. 258.
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Nevertheless, as a key point of comparison to Buddhism, we have Mach’s
famous dictum “The ego cannot be saved.” Mach reﬂected upon this insight
as an ethical saving grace rather than a disaster—he believed that it would
help to value things according to their real importance and inspire a more
emancipated and altruistic way of life.80
The Machian and the Buddhist worldviews are versions of what Sommer
characterizes as the “inversion of gnosis.” If by gnosis we are to understand
a mystical knowledge of the metempirically transcendent reality of ¯ atman by
turning away from the world of empirical experience—as is the declared aim
of Upanis .adic mysticism—then the “inversion of gnosis,” its polar opposite,
would be a negative immanence mysticism that tries to attain knowledge of
dharma–nair¯ atmya by turning towards the world of experience. In inverse
gnosis, the world is no longer believed to be that which separates us from
true knowledge. Rather, it is considered that which we are separated from
by the false dualisms of an internal and an external world, of qualia and
substances, sensations and atoms.81
The hypothesis that a via positivistica was operational in the earliest
forms of Buddhism can help to account for the strong Buddhist tendencies
towards phenomenalism and epistemological idealism, which are remarkably
suggestive of the empiriocriticist views of Avenarius and Mach. The Carnap
of the Aufbau is also ﬁrmly rooted in the Machian tradition. His Vienna
Circle empiricism contends that the concept of objective reality cannot be
epistemologically constituted, and that nothing meaningful can be said either
way about the things–in–themselves (Dinge an sich).82
To recapitulate the “grand thesis” that is being staked out here:
Vasubandhu and the empiriocriticists (including most of their positivist
successors) have merely taken different on–ramps onto the same philosophi-
cal highway. Mach’s epistemology has been argued by some to be inﬂuenced
by the M¯ adhyamika.83 In this exposition we will be following up on a slightly
80MACH, ibid., p. 20.
81SOMMER, Evidenz im Augenblick, ibid., pp. 51–52.
82CARNAP, Aufbau, ibid., p. 247.
83See e.g. WILHELM K. ESSLER, On Absoluteness and Relativity: Modern Philoso-
phy in Ancient Times. Online, March 2007 hURL: http://www.vfphil.de/pdf/
essler-vortrag-delhi.pdfi – accessed on July 3, 2008, p. 2.
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different lead—the conjecture of a philosophical continuity between Mach
and Mind–Only.84 Admittedly, every interpretive scheme is eventually un-
raveled by a sufﬁciently close attention to the facts—this one is certainly
no exception to the rule. However, Indian philosophy is such a dense and
confusing topic that we will be unable to make much headway into it unless
we cut some broad aisles through the undergrowth.
Following the lead of Dharmak¯ ırti and ´ S¯ antaraks .ita, Tibetan doxographers
have traditionally rendered Buddhist doctrine as a ladder of philosophical
views, using the method of an ascending scale of analysis to move from
common–sense realism towards more rareﬁed epistemological views.85 Since
this has proven to be a useful approach, we will also be adopting it for the
presentation of Vasubandhu’s argument in this thesis.
The itinerary for the following chapters will be to tease out the unifying
strands of phenomenalism and nominalism that run throughout the differ-
ent schools and historical evolutions of Indian Buddhist epistemology. We
will explore how these themes were initially worked out into an atomist
metaph´ ysics, and in a later stage of development “empiriocritically” revised
by Vasubandhu into a non–atomistic idealism that in many respects may be
considered a chip off the block of modern empiricism. We will be focusing our
discussion mainly on the epistemological rationale for this critical turn. But
the hermeneutic background assumption for this analysis will be that the
Vim . ´ satik¯ a’s skeptical recovery of the hypothetical Buddhist via positivistica
is ultimately motivated by a profound shift—evident throughout the later
Mah¯ ay¯ ana phase of Vasubandhu’s thought—towards the via negativa. While
the m´ etaphysical higher ground of Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra—the restoration of idealis-
84An even grander thesis that won’t be argued in detail but will be present as an implicit
leitmotif is the idea that radical empiricism (via positivistica) might be integrated with
apophatic mysticism (the via negativa) into a 21st century “minimal reconstruction” of
´ S¯ antaraks .ita’s Yog¯ ac¯ ara–M¯ adhyamika synthesis—see ´ S¯ ANTARAKS . ITA and JAMG¨ ON
MIPHAM, The Adornment of the Middle Way. Shambhala Publications, 2005. Regarding
Mah¯ ay¯ ana synthesis, see also IAN CHARLES HARRIS, The Continuity of Madhyamaka
and Yog¯ ac¯ ara in Indian Mah¯ ay¯ ana Buddhism. E.J. Brill, 1991, p. 4, who argues ad
extenso against the widespread scholarly view that the Indian M¯ adhyamika and Yog¯ a-
c¯ ara present two radically opposed sets of doctrines.
85 ´ S¯ ANTARAKS . ITA and MIPHAM, ibid., p. 34.
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tic phenonemalism86—may the ﬁnal rung of Vasubandhu’s epistemological
ladder, it is not his ultimate position, but rather, a provisional antidote
(pratipaks .a) to substantialism—a raft to be abandoned after it has been used
for its intended purpose.87
Before we can explore Vasubandhu’s strategy for regaining the Cartesian
epoch´ e and fully draw out the empiriocriticist parallels to the Vim . ´ satik¯ a’s ar-
gument contra atomism, it will be advantageous to examine the Abhidharmic
context of its thought. We cannot expect to reasonably form an opinion on
Vasubandhu’s arguments without a careful reading of his realist opponents.
86While the characterization of Mind–Only as a species of phenomenalism will prove to be a
useful approximation, it should be taken with a grain of salt. In its anti–reductionism
and its tendencies towards ﬁctionalism about sense–data, the transcendental illusionism
of Mind–Only oversteps the margins of phenomenalism.
87Harris opines that the strongly idealistic ﬂavor of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a is mainly attributable to
the use of a provisional mode of discourse and goes on to contend that the treatise does not,
as is commonly assumed, expound a doctrine of of the sole existence of the mind (HARRIS,
ibid., p. 173). Kochumuttom lends additional support to the hypothesis that Yog¯ ac¯ arins do
not believe consciousness to be the absolute mode of reality (THOMAS A. KOCHUMUTTOM,
Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of
Vasubandhu. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989, p. 226), though I think he is wrong
about Yog¯ ac¯ ara being a form of realism (viz. section 3.1.1, p. 77).
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I am sitting with a philosopher in
the garden; he says again and
again “I know that that’s a tree,”
pointing to a tree that is near us.
Someone else arrives and hears
this, and I tell them: “This fellow
isn’t insane. We are only doing
philosophy.”
(Ludwig Wittgenstein)
I
N THE TRADITIONAL and modern commentarial literature, the epistemo-
logies of the two Abhidharmika schools are universally described as
being realistic or substantialistic. While the Mah¯ ay¯ ana schools can be
viewed as idealist and skeptical variations on the basic Buddhist themes of
phenomenalism and nominalism, the non–Mah¯ ay¯ ana schools of Abhidharma
comprise their realist inﬂections. However, given that the nature of realism
is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy, what exactly is meant
by this claim? A brief review of realism is in order.
2.1 Realism and Atomism
Although there are many different philosophical senses of realism, in the
present context, we are only interested in the sense of realism that concerns
the everyday world of macroscopic physical objects and its constituents. As
we shall see, the position of the Buddhist atomists may be construed as an
attempt to formulate an ontologically realist epistemology that deconstructs
common–sense realism about ordinary objects—as opposed, for example, to
the atomism of the Indian Ny¯ aya–Vai´ ses .ika school, which attempts to defend
their objective existence.
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Realist claims can be grouped into two broad types—(1) the existence
dimension involves claims that physical objects exist extramentally, as do
the facts pertaining to them, whereas (2) the independence dimension has
to do with claims that physical objects are independent of beliefs, linguistic
practices and conceptual schemes. Realisms vary considerably in their degree
of ontological commitment, but as a general rule of thumb, the more na¨ ıve
(i.e., pre–critical) the realism, the larger its ontological menagerie.
Chatterjee ventures that all forms of realism must have atomistic onto-
logies because they are necessarily committed to some form of pluralism
or other.1 Non–atomistic systems of thought such as absolute monism (e.g.
Advaita Ved¯ anta) or subjective idealism (e.g. Cittam¯ atra) can evince realistic
tendencies, but according to Chatterjee do not qualify as unreserved realism.2
Clearly, realism implies a commitment to an ontology of some cardinality,
but why should it necessarily restrict itself to a denumerable ontology? In
fact, it needn’t, and realism often employs more powerful ontologies. But for
the purpose of this investigation, we will deﬁne the atomistic hypothesis, in
general terms, as the view that the ontological constitution of matter, stuff,
hyl´ e (or whatever else one wishes to call it) is ultimately discrete.
It is also important to distinguish realisms employing foundationalist
theories of epistemic justiﬁcation, which due to their epistemic atomism are
prone to lead to an atomistic ontology, from those forms of realism employing
a coherence theory of justiﬁcation, which are holistic, i.e. epistemically non–
atomistic, and therefore far less likely to lead to an ontological atomism.3
If and when epistemological atomism slips into ontological atomism, as
it almost invariably does (though we will see that there are exceptions to
the rule), then atomism entails realism. The reverse case—that realism
entails atomism—only holds for foundationalist varieties of realism with
denumerable material bases of constitution.
Moreover, we can categorize realisms into two types, according to whether
they adhere to a two–term or a three–term theory of knowledge.
1CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 65.
2CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 66.
3MICHAEL WILLIAMS, Problems of Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 117.
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The deﬁning characteristic of the two–term theory is that bare perceptual
evidence is inherently veridical in a quite strong sense. For the purposes of
the present investigation, we will deﬁne two subtypes—(1) direct realism
and (2) sense–datum realism. Direct realism (1) holds that physical objects
themselves are directly apprehended, i.e. when we say we see a tree, we are
not merely seeing sense–data—we are seeing the tree itself as an integral
whole.4 In sense–datum realism (2), we are directly seeing the sense–data,
which are accorded intrinsic credibility—one’s awareness of a sense datum
is immediate and infallible. Sense–data are moreover held to be ontological
ultimates. Thus, the evidentially given sense–data are immune to skeptical
assault and constitute objectively true foundational knowledge.5
Representational realism (the three–term theory) holds that the “veil of
perception”—a representation, aspect or sensation—intervenes between the
perceiving consciousness and the object.
A metaph´ ysical realism is any position that has not yet overcome the
category of the Ding an sich or the transcendental objectivity. The “tran-
scendental realist” (to use Kant’s terminology) believes that he directly
experiences absolute reality. But the way we are deﬁning it here, realism is
metaph´ ysical even if the transcendental object is never experienced in itself
(as is the case in critical realism) because some degree of objective backing is
still held to be required as a condition of the possibility of phenomenal expe-
rience. Critical realism relies on the transcendental reduction to distinguish
which parts of experience are supplied by the mind from the parts that are
given in sensory intuition.
2.2 Early Buddhist Phenomenalism
The view of pure or radical phenomenalism can be characterized in several
ways: (1) epistemically, that things are just as they are known to be in
experience and that there is nothing metaph´ ysical to be said about them—
4“The tree with its grey, hard, rough trunk, its many twigs moving in the wind, with its
smooth, shiny, soft leaves initially appears to us as an indivisible whole.” (MACH, ibid.,
p. 84, my translation.)
5WILLIAMS, ibid., pp. 105–106.
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(2) ontologically, that there is no real difference between phenomena and
their essences, or even that phenomena are essenceless—or (3) semantically,
“that propositions asserting the existence of physical objects are equivalent in
meaning to propositions asserting that subjects would have certain sequences
of sensations were they to have certain others.”6
In other words, radical phenomenalism holds that physical objects are in a
real sense constituted strictly by the sense–data of perception (and not vice
versa), and that propositions about physical objects reduce to propositions
about clusters of sensations or sensibilia. Knowing is grounded in the
evidence of the senses, which is foundational and immediate. The bare
sensations are self–disclosing (and in the case of Mind–Only, self–cognizing).7
Familiar objects such as material bodies, objects, wholes have only a nominal,
conceptually imputed existence. In reality, they are merely bundles of sensory
perceptions that are construed as objects. Phenomenalism therefore disputes
the claim that objects exist independently of sensory awareness. If no such
awareness were to exist, all existence claims about entities would be false.8
In what must be acknowledged as one of the “great texts” of early Buddhist
epistemology, the Bahiya Sutta,9 we ﬁnd a paradigmatic example—Gautama
´ S¯ akyamuni advises the bark–cloth–wearing ascetic on how to train himself
in a phenomenalistic mode of awareness. B¯ ahya, who is an advanced con-
templative, receives only a very brief instruction, to the effect that his sense
of ego will disappear as soon as he succeeds in correctly taking account of
just his naked sensory impressions and thoughts and no more than that:
In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference
to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the
sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized. That is
how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only
the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to
the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the
6AUDI, ibid., p. 576–577.
7MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 6.
8MATILAL, ibid., p. 15–16.
9The Bahiya Sutta is from the Udana of the Pali Canon, one of the oldest strata of Buddhist
scripture.
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cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no
you in terms of that ... 10
Read as an example of “inversion of gnosis,” this s¯ utra is a classic demon-
stration of the an¯ atman perspective in operation. Bahiya is being instructed
to bracket his subjectivity.11 Whereas for Husserl, phenomenological re-
duction involves only the suspension of empirical subjectivity, the epoch´ e
of an¯ atman is more far–reaching in that it entails a suspension of even
the transcendental subjectivity. The changing acts of knowing are purely
empirical and do not refer back to an unchanging transcendental knower.
Knowing exhausts itself in the known. All traces of subjectivity are dissolved
by the projection of consciousness into experience in its momentariness and
concreteness. The transcendental subjectivity’s construction of superim-
posed noemata is brought to a halt and the thusness of the experiential ﬂux
revealed.
Mach arrives at a somewhat similar view of things in Analyse der Empﬁnd-
ungen, albeit not by a contemplative route but by a speculative thought
experiment. After its semantic scope is successively expanded until it en-
compasses the totality of phenomena, he imagines that the ego is ﬁnally
dissolved. It is recognized to be a provisional concept, having at best a
merely pragmatic utility—rather than a veridical representation of some
metaph´ ysical absolute underlying or overlooking the functional fabric of sen-
sations that is revealed in the ﬁnal analysis to be truly fundamental—colors,
sounds, warmths, pressures, spaces, times, etc.:
The contradistinction of ego and world, between sensation or
appearance and thing then drops away, and now it is merely a
matter of the interrelationship of the elements α β γ .... A B
C ...K L M ...., of which this contradistinction had been only a
partially applicable and incomplete expression.12
10THANISSARO BHIKKHU, Ud 1.10 Bahiya Sutta. hURL: http://www.accesstoinsight.
org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.1.10.than.htmli – accessed on June 21, 2008.
11Cf. ESSLER and MAMAT, ibid., pp. 143–145, who read this s¯ utra as an instruction on how
to bracket the object.
12MACH, ibid., pp. 10–11, my translation.
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As does the Buddhist theory of the elements of experience (dharmas),
Mach advocates a form of sensation pluralism.
The Rohitassa Sutta of the Nikayas shows evidence that early Buddhism
rejected cosmological world–concepts in favor of a phenomenalistic micro-
cosm or body–world constituted by the totality of sense–impression at any
given moment:
Yet it is just within this fathom–long body, with its perception
and intellect, that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origina-
tion of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of
practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos.13
The s¯ utric doctrine of the microcosmos of the “fathom–long body” is again
strikingly paralleled by the Machian notion of the K¨ orperwelt—a clever
double-entendre capturing how the world appears from the perspective of
common–sense realism—as a “world of bodies,” i.e. the totality of physical
objects—as well as how it appears from the less intuitive but epistemologi-
cally more sophisticated point of view of phenomenalism—as a “body–world,”
i.e. the logical space of sensibilia comprised by the human body.
In keeping with Buddhism’s soteriological pattern of inverse gnosis, the
macrocosm is not only reduced to the mind–body microcosm, but the latter
comes to be contemplated in its empirical aspect of functional ﬂux and
dispersive difference, as aggregates or bundles (skandhas) lacking any kind
of real inner unity.
This phenomenalizing reduction of the macrocosm to the microcosm is an
important prototype in early Buddhism of the later Mind–Only program
of subjective idealism. Vasubandhu’s refutation of Abhidharmic realism
in the Vim . ´ satik¯ a arguably represents an attempt to urge a return to this
earlier ideal type of non–atomic phenomenalism—a revival with a twist. In
verse 16 of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a, we rediscover the Bahiya Sutta’s grand theme (in
the seeing, only the seen) iterated in an idealistic inversion—in the percept,
only the perception (pratyaks .a):
13THANISSARO BHIKKHU, Rohitassa Sutta - AN 4.45 (PTS: A ii 47). Online hURL: http:
//www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.1.10.than.htmli – accessed
on June 21, 2008.
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The awareness of perception is as in dreams. When it exists,
the object of perception does not exist.14
Nominalism Buddhist doctrine has a characteristic tendency to analyze
perception and knowledge in terms of particulars, and does not accept the
existence or instantiation of abstract entities such real wholes or universals,
as do other dar´ sanas (e.g. Ny¯ aya). In the context of the theory of perception,
Matilal describes nominalism as the view that we are directly aware of
sensible quality–particulars. These qualities do not exist apart from their
instantiations, and their instantiations do not exist independently of our
sensation of them.15
The development of nominalist views about perception is closely connected
with the articulation of an ontological nominalism in the context of the Bud-
dhist “bundle theory” of the body–world and its associated “no–ownership”
stance on personal identity. In the Milindapa˜ nha, the monk N¯ agasena’s
famous dialogue with King Menander, N¯ agasena maintains that under anal-
ysis, he does not exist as a person, and that his name “N¯ agasena” is therefore
a strictly nominal designation for the psycho–physical bundles, just as the
conceptual label “chariot” is is applied to a phenomenon that does not with-
stand a decompositional analysis. Since there is no more to the chariot than
its parts, and none of the chariot’s parts are the chariot, N¯ agasena conveys,
in reality there is no such thing as a chariot.
Siderits submits that N¯ agasena’s argument is proposing a kind of mereo-
logical reductionism.16 Examining a number of different readings of the
chariot dialogue, Oetke makes the case that the argument is semantically
underdetermined. He believes that it is far from clear precisely what philo-
sophical argument N¯ agasena is trying to make.17 However, he for some
reason misses the parallels drawn by Kapstein to instances of the chariot
simile in the Kat .ha Upanis .ad18 as well as in Plato’s Phaedrus. In this light,
14WOOD, Mind Only, ibid., p. 100.
15MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 6.
16SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., pp. 53–55.
17OETKE, ”Ich” und das Ich, ibid., pp. 170-172.
18See Kat .ha Upanis .ad III.3–4 in BETTINA B¨ AUMER, Upanishaden: Befreiung zum Sein.
Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1994, p. 216—the ¯ atman is likened to the lord of the chariot,
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I conjecture that purely deconstructive intent offers a plausible reason for
why N¯ agasena’s argument seems underdetermined. Instead of advancing
any constructive thesis of his own, he is merely attempting to subvert a
classic Upanis .adic example of ¯ atman theory, i.e. to demonstrate that in
actual fact, the example shows the opposite of what its proponents intend it
to illustrate. Kapstein, however, argues that N¯ agasena’s chariot argument
is proposing a logical constructivist view of personal identity, and contends
that it represents a possible precursor to Vasubandhu’s argument against
atomism.19
The logico–epistemic tradition of Yog¯ ac¯ ara worked out a more technical
elaboration of this nominalism in the so–called apoha (exclusion) theory
presented by Dharmak¯ ırti in the Pram¯ an . av¯ arttika. Here, universals are
interpreted as absences or eliminations—e.g., the class of trees is deﬁned as
the mere exclusion of non–trees,20 which is another way of saying that trees
are merely whatever is labeled as a tree, without committing to ontological
proliferations such as an underlying universal of “tree–hood,” an extensional
set of all trees, and so forth. In articulating the relation of abstract concept
to concrete particular along strictly linguistic lines, i.e. one of naming
or conceptual imputation, the Buddhist apoha theory avoids trading in
metaph´ ysicalites such as instantiation, exempliﬁcation or inherence.
These examples are only to illustrate that ontological nominalism, or
the principle that existence, reality and actuality are in the proper sense
attributed only to particulars (if at all), is a deeply rooted aspect of the
Buddhist philosophical pattern.
As we will later see in more detail, the “sense–data mosaic” theory of
experience is one of severals ways that the Buddhist phenomenalism has
been integrated with nominalism.
insight to the charioteer, the body to the chariot itself, thought to the reins, the senses to
the horses, and the objects of perception to the chariot’s track.
19MATTHEW KAPSTEIN, Mereological Considerations in Vasubandhu’s “Proof of Idealism”.
in: Reason’s Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought.
Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 88–91.
20Cf. SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., p. 220.
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The Rise and Fall of Sense–Datum Atomism A realistic sense–data nomi-
nalism allows for two possible accounts of the nature of physical objects—a
regressive or a progressive theory. The regressive theory (that the physical
object gives rise to sense–data) leads to representationalism, the progressive
theory (that the physical object is a construction from sense–data) leads
to phenomenalism, or presentationalism.21 The aim of Vasubandhu’s argu-
ment against atomism in 11–16 will be to demonstrate that neither of these
accounts work in a realist mode.
To ﬁll in some philosophical substructure for Vasubandhu’s delivery of this
coup de grˆ ace to metaph´ ysical realism, we will brieﬂy survey Indian atomism,
reviewing the Vai´ ses .ika doctrine and theorizing about the possible rationale
for the development of Buddhist atomism. Following the path of reasoned
eclecticism, we shall then construct two Weberian “ideal types” or models
of Abhidharma synthesized from four streams of commentary—(1) mod-
ern Western scholarship of Indian Abhidharma (mainly STCHERBATSKY,
FRAUWALLNER and VON ROSPATT), (2) Gelug doxography and contempo-
rary commentary (HOPKINS, BUESCHER), (3) other modern philosophical
reconstructions of Abhidharma (notably MATILAL, CHATTERJEE, GRUPP
and GUENTHER), and (4) historical review of atomism in Western philosophy
(PYLE).
The main focus of the discussion will be to investigate the Abhidharmic
evolution of the concept of substance in the light of its critiques of time
and perception. We will illuminate how this critical dynamic forced an
initial shift from a progressive to a regressive theory of mind–independent
physical objects, setting the stage for Vasubandhu’s abandonment of even
the regressive theory.
The philosophical ground covered by this evolution is roughly equivalent
to the trajectory leading from Hume through Kant to Mach.22 On an ideo–
historical time scale, this is no mean achievement. But the argument we
are making here is stronger. We are setting out to retrace this trajectory
21MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 232.
22Sometimes this continuity of empiricist thought is referred to as the “Hume–Mach tradi-
tion,” see e.g. GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT, The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays.
Brill Academic Publishers, 1993, p. 56.
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as it is reﬂected in the philosophical voyage of a single thinker—in the 4th
century CE.
2.3 The Origins of Buddhist Atomism
We will have to leave the questions of where the doctrine of atomism ﬁrst
originated—in ancient India or in Greece—and whether there was any ex-
change of ideas between these cradles of philosophy for others to answer.
Democritus, the ﬁrst known Greek atomist, can be dated to approximately
460 BC, whereas Kan .ada, the probable originator of atomism in India, lived
possibly a century or so earlier. However, for the purposes of our investiga-
tion, it will sufﬁce to point out that ancient India was home to numerous
atomist doctrines. The theory of atomism (paraman . uv¯ ada) emerged in the
¯ astika schools of Indian philosophy (e.g. Vai´ ses .ika) as well as in the n¯ astika
schools (e.g. Jainism).
Vai´ ses .ika Atomism Kan .ada’s atomism, set forth in his Vai´ ses .ika S¯ utra,
was one of the most inﬂuential doctrines. Pace Kan .ada, every physical object
is constituted by a ﬁnite number of paraman . us—immutable, eternal, self–
subsistent, indestructible, and individually distinct atoms.23 These atoms
have a spherical shape and touch each other. Vai´ ses .ika proposes a theory
of atomic permanents, like the atomism of the Jains, who also believed that
eternal and immutable atoms ﬂowed through events.24
The Vai´ ses .ika doctrine of permanents somewhat resembles the view of
Democritus, who submits a reductionist material constitution theory. Dem-
ocritus believes that the objectively existing compound bodies to be aggre-
gates of atoms, which are eternal, true units, and characterized by solely by
primary qualities. Atoms and the empty space they are located exist eteˆ ei
23M. HIRIYANNA, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass, 1995, pp. 86ff.
24L.C. JAIN and G.C. PATNI, Exact Sciences from Jaina Sources Vol. 2: Astronomy and
Cosmology. Rajasthan Prakrit Bharti Sansthan, Jaipur; Sitaram Bhartia Institute of
Scientiﬁc Research, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 6–7.
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(in reality), whereas colors and other sensible qualities exist only nomˆ oi (by
convention).25
The early Vai´ ses .ika atomism of Kan .ada later came to be elaborated by
V¯ atsy¯ ayana, a contemporary of Vasubandhu, who speculated that atoms are
absolutely imperceptible, i.e. inﬁnitesimal. Composite entities are integral
wholes in their own right, inhering in the conglomerate (pin . d . a) of their
atoms but having different qualities from them. The discrete atoms serve as
the material base of constitution in which the real integral wholes can inhere.
The perception of the integral whole (avayavin) takes place simultaneously
with the perception of certain of its parts, e.g. even though one sees a tree
in aspect, one can be said to be seeing the whole tree. In V¯ atsy¯ ayana’s
mereology, atoms are never found in isolation. Two atoms (or least parts)
cohere into a dyad–atom (dvyan . uka) or least whole of atomic size, and all
further combinations are formed from these dyad–atoms.26
This strange construction is motivated by the difﬁculty that a least part is
spatially partless and therefore unable to be spatially adjoined to other least
parts. The dyad–atom is held to solve this problem because it has parts and
can connect to other dyad–atoms in the usual fashion.27
Buddhist Atomisms The Buddhist atomistic doctrines are considered by
some to be among the most difﬁcult atomist theories, their many subtleties
and contradictions being a source of much polemical debate within Indian
philosophy.28 I will not be able to fully explore all of the aspects and issues
related to the various differentiations of atomism among the many Buddhist
sects. Within the compass of this thesis, I will therefore restrict myself to a
survey of the most basic doctrines and developments.
In the fold of Indian Buddhism, atomist doctrines can be found in the
Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada system of tenets, as well as in the early Sautr¯ antika (in Gelug
doxography, the school of “Sautr¯ antika Following Scripture”) and late Sau-
tr¯ antika (“Sautr¯ antika Following Reasoning”) systems. All three atomist
25ANDREW PYLE, Atomism and its Critics: From Democritus to Newton. Thoemmes Press,
1997, p. 100ff.
26ANACKER, ibid., pp. 128–129.
27MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 380.
28DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., p. 100.
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systems of Buddhist thought each in different ways hypothesize that the
familiar physical objects of the external world are somehow constituted
by ultimate simples. They maintain that all ultimate truths can be classi-
ﬁed either as partless simples, as absences, or as cessations, and that all
conventional truths reduce to their ultimate constituents.
A distinguishing feature of the Buddhist schools versus non–Buddhist
doctrines of atomism can be found in their rejection of the realists’ inherence
(samav¯ aya) theory of wholes. In fact, the Buddhist positions reject all
theories of constitution with the exception of mereological summation.
In modern analytic philosophy, the strongly reductionist stance that there
exist only partless entities is commonly referred to as mereological nihilism.29
More precisely, the Vaibh¯ as .ika and early Sautr¯ antika atomisms can be char-
acterized as varieties of impure physicalistic mereological nihilism (atoms
are physical and interact with each other), whereas the late Sautr¯ antika
position can be classiﬁed as a pure mereological nihilism.30
The position of mereological nihilism maintains that only elementary
building blocks without proper parts have real existence—all seemingly
discrete and integral wholes such as macroscopic objects in fact exist only as
nominally designated aggregates or conglomerates, i.e. no differently than
scattered mereological sums of atoms.31
Interestingly, there is not much controversy among commentators in that
the epistemologies of all three types of Abhidharma scholasticism are con-
sidered to be different inﬂections of the same underlying hybrid theme of
pluralistic atomism and reductionist realism.
Why and how did Buddhism initially articulate the doctrine of atomism?
As we have already pointed out, the earliest strata of Buddhist writings
exhibit no evidence of such doctrines. Therefore, the atomist doctrine was
almost certainly a later addition and not an actual historical teaching of
29JEFFREY GRUPP, Mereological nihilism: quantum atomism and the impossibility of
material constitution. Axiomathes, 16 2006, p. 245.
30GRUPP, ibid., pp. 286–287.
31Armies and forests are stock examples of scattered mereological sums, see also JADUNATH
SINHA, Indian Realism. Motilal Banarsidass, 1999, p. 198.
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Gautama ´ S¯ akyamuni (though Mah¯ av¯ ıra, the contemporaneous founder of
Jainism, almost certainly did teach atomist doctrines).32
There are three possible lines of explanation for the development of
Buddhist atomism—(1) a physical atomism that was borrowed from non–
Buddhist dar´ sana, (2) a phenomenalist origin in minimal sensory magni-
tudes, and (3) a nominalist or mereological origin. According to the phe-
nomenalist line of explanation (2), which we construe as an epistemological
hypothesis about limit–constructs of sensation, the atoms are the sensations
at the absolute threshold of vision, hearing, touch, etc., i.e. the “pixels” of
a sensory ﬁeld. While the 19th century psychophysics of Fechner was the
ﬁrst attempt to scientiﬁcally measure such thresholds and quantitatively
determine functional relationships between stimuli and sensations,33 it is
not unreasonable to assume that the pre–scientiﬁc epistemologists of early
Abhidharma were well aware of the existence of sensory limits. The nomi-
nalist line of explanation (3) is best construed as a mereological hypothesis
about limit–constructs of composition where the Buddhist whole–part nomi-
nalism (the whole is unreal, its parts are real) comes to be radicalized into a
mereological nihilism (the whole is unreal and only its self–subsistent least
parts are real).
2.4 The Vaibh¯ as .ika School
In its living details, the Vaibh¯ as .ika doctrine of atomism has a much richer
and messier philosophical texture than the abstract type we are presenting
here. The Vaibh¯ as .ika stance on perceptual experience may be described
as a form of physicalistic sense–datum positivism. They believed that it
was possible to separate the objective constituents of perception from the
epistemic object and developed a theory of atomic substance (dravya).34 Their
theory of atoms (paraman . uv¯ ada) proposes a direct realism operating over an
32See ESSLER and MAMAT, ibid., pp. 16–16.
33SOMMER, Evidenz im Augenblick, ibid., p. 54.
34HERBERT V. GUENTHER, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma. Shambhala
Publications, 1976, p. 190.
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ontology that hybridizes all three types of atomism—physical, phenomenalist,
nominalist and physical.
The Vaibh¯ as .ika account of perception is strongly presentationalist in
ﬂavor. Extramental objects present themselves directly to an observing cons-
ciousness–moment, without intervening representational synthesis. In other
words, when observing a macroscopic object, one actually directly observes
its atomic constituents in aggregate. Vaibh¯ as .ika believes that these percepts
are as real as the perception itself, and that the external world is directly
grasped in non–conceptual perception.35
The atomist doctrine of the Vaibh¯ as .ika sect passed through three major
phases of ideo–historical development.
The mature doctrine of atomism as presented in Vasubandhu’s Ko´ sa may
be traced back to the Mah¯ avib¯ as¯ a, an encyclopaedic compendium of the
Abhidharma of the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada schools, dating to the 1st or 2nd century CE.36
However, the ﬁrst recorded mentions of a Buddhist doctrine of atomism must
be credited to Dharma´ sr¯ ı, the author of the Abhidharmas¯ ara. This massive
synthesis of extant Abhidharmic doctrine was the ﬁrst commentarial work
to forge the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada doctrines into a system of scholastic thought. The
Abhidharmas¯ ara was to remain the paradigmatic model for such compendia
even up until the era of Vasubandhu and Sa˙ nghabhadra.37 It has been shown
that the systematic presentation and structure of the Abhidharmako´ sa is
derived in large part from the Abhidharmas¯ ara.38
Vasubandhu’s Ko´ sa and Sa˙ nghabhadra’s contemporaneous but consider-
ably more voluminous Ny¯ ay¯ anus¯ ara (a polemic rejoinder to the Ko´ sa in
120,000 verses) form the apex of the classical Abhidharma of the ´ Sr¯ avaka-
y¯ ana, or non-Mah¯ ay¯ ana schools of Buddhist thought. Further developments
of Abhidharma were to take place mostly in the context of Mah¯ ay¯ ana system-
35MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. xiii.
36DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., p. 100.
37ERICH FRAUWALLNER, Die Entstehung der buddhistischen Systeme. in: Nachrichten der
Akademie der Wissenschaften in G¨ ottingen I. Philologisch-Historische Klasse. Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1971, p. 124.
38FRAUWALLNER, ibid., p. 122.
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atizations, e.g. the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Vasubandhu’s half–brother,
Asa˙ nga the Yog¯ ac¯ arin.39
2.4.1 Time, Space and Atom in Vaibh¯ as .ika
Although some commentators characterize Vaibh¯ as .ika as having a theory of
atomic permanents, this is somewhat too simplistic. Anacker notes that for
Dharma´ sr¯ ı, atoms are momentary, though they may form “series,”40 or causal
chains of momentary events. Time is also atomized into a series of discrete
instants, but the duration of these moments is so brief that the illusion of
continuity is generated, as is the case with the frames of a motion picture
following in rapid succession.41 The atomizing approach has the greatly
attractive feature of not having to account for the genidentity of macroscopic
physical objects,42 as under analysis, the appearance of a physical object
persisting in time simply explodes out into the causal chain of momentary
instants of its atomic decomposition.
The Vaibh¯ as .ika are known as Sarv¯ astiv¯ adins due to their canonical tenet
that “everything exists” (sarvam asti), meaning the existence of entities in
past, present and future. The epistemological rationale for this principle
is the wish to defend a form of externalism—because knowledge is always
knowledge of the real, the intentional objects of epistemically valid cognitions
must somehow exist.43
The Ko´ sa offers up a number of other arguments in favor of the sarvam
asti thesis, including causal and moral rationales such as that past entities
39ASANGA, Abhidarmasamuccaya. Asian Humanities Press, 2001.
40ANACKER, ibid., p. 126.
41The discrete concept of time was simply taken for granted—there is no evidence that
any of the Sarv¯ astiv¯ adin sects believed time to be inﬁnitely divisible, see ALEXANDER
VON ROSPATT, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1995,
p. 98.
42See KURT LEWIN, Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie und Entwicklungsgeschichte.
in: ALEXANDRE M´ ETRAUX, editor, Werkausgabe. Volume 2, Klett-Cotta, 1983, also
MARTIN BECKER, Zum Begriff der Genidentit¨ at - Eine Untersuchung der Wissenschaft-
stheoretischen Schriften von Kurt Lewin. Master’s thesis, Johann Wolfgang Goethe
University, Frankfurt am Main, 1998.
43DAVID BASTOW, The Mah¯ a-Vibh¯ as¯ a Arguments for Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada. Philosophy East and
West, 44 1994:3, p. 490.
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must exist in order for present effects to be brought about, and that future
entities must exist or else actions would not have consequences.
Time As the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada Abhidharma continued to evolve, it became
increasingly aware of the problem of time. The concept of an immutable
entity migrating through the stages of time was no longer acceptable,44 as
eternal substances were held to be contrary to the fundamental Buddhist
doctrine of transience (anityat¯ a). Due to this doctrinal concern, the Vai-
bh¯ as .ika Abhidharmikas were under pressure to evolve more sophisticated
accounts of substance and time.
All elements of experience (dharmas), including atoms, persist in the
three periods of past, present and future. In modern terms, the sarvam
asti principle may be described as a “block universe” account of space–time,
as it affords equal ontological status to all moment–entities regardless of
their time.45 The Vaibh¯ as .ika advanced four major accounts of temporality,
credited to the encyclopaedists of the Mah¯ avib¯ as¯ a who originated them:
Dharmatr¯ ata, Ghos .aka, Vasumitra, and Buddhadeva.46
The Ko´ sa attributes to Dharmatr¯ ata the time theory of “change of ex-
istence” (bh¯ ava–parinam . a), turning on a substance–existence account of
change. The existence (bh¯ ava) of an element is an accident that can arise
and cease, whereas the substance (dravya) is eternal. This view is immedi-
ately dismissed as a guise of the previously refuted non–Buddhist S¯ am . khya
system.
Ghos .aka is attributed with the view of “change of aspect” (laks .an . a–pari-
nam . a), which asserts that entities have three temporal aspects or qualities
(laks .an . as)—pastness, presentness and futurity. A future entity is merely
an entity that is appearing under its future aspect and hiding its past and
44ERICH FRAUWALLNER; ERNST STEINKELLNER and SOPHIE FRANCIS KIDD, editors,
Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems.
State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 192.
45See SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., p. 116, A. CHARLENE MCDERMOTT, The
Sautr¯ antika Arguments against the Traik¯ alyav¯ ada in the Light of the Contemporary
Tense Revolution. Philosophy East and West, 24 1974:2, p. 194.
46THEODOR STCHERBATSKY, The Central Conception of Buddhism. New Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1988, p. 78.
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present aspects. The Ko´ sa rejects this theory, reasoning that it implies a
contradictory compresence of past, present and future in the same entity.
Frauwallner observes that the last two theories, the views of Vasumitra
and Buddhadeva, account for time exclusively in terms of external connection,
most likely in an attempt to avoid the difﬁculties inherent in Dharmatr¯ ata’s
and Ghos .aka’s substance–oriented theories of time.47
Buddhadeva proposes a relational theory of time, where temporality is
accounted for as a change of contingency (apeks . ¯ a–parinam . a). Change is
governed by a tenseless binary relation between entites (dharmas), such
as “x is earlier than y,” that imposes a partial order upon them.48 An
examination of the Ko´ sa’s refutation of the theory of Buddhadeva reveals
it to be identical to the classic McTaggart argument against the reality of
time. If events are ordered by a two–term relation into what amounts to a
McTaggart B–series, then each event comes to have all of the McTaggart A–
determinant properties—the present moment is also future because it is later
than another moment, and past because it is earlier than a later moment.
The Vaibh¯ as .ika deployment of McTaggart argument against temporal order
drops a strong hint about the developmental trajectory of Abhidharmika
views on the reality of time.
The theory of Vasumitra is described as “change of position” (av¯ astha–pari-
nam . a).49 The Ko´ sa’s explanation and critique of the four Vaibh¯ as .ika theories
of time concludes that the theory of Vasumitra is the correct view.
Frauwallner conjectures that the positional theory is a conglomerate of
two contradictory theories of temporality—each proposed by a scholar named
Vasumitra—which were conﬂated in later doxography. He points out that
the abacus analogy50 used to show the intent of the theory logically excludes
the ideas of efﬁciency and change.51
47FRAUWALLNER, Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philo-
sophical Systems, ibid., p. 189.
48STCHERBATSKY, ibid., p. 80, see also MCDERMOTT, ibid., p. 196.
49STCHERBATSKY, ibid., p. 78.
50An abacus bead acquires a different place–value depending on the position it is placed
in—units, tens, or hundreds.
51FRAUWALLNER, Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philo-
sophical Systems, ibid., p. 190.
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But the assumption that Indian Buddhist doxographers conﬂated two
different Vasumitras is scarcely credible, especially not when it comes to such
a central theme in the Vaibh¯ as .ika philosophy of time. It is more reasonable
to hypothesize that the conglomeration of seemingly contradictory views was
a synthesis attempted by a single scholar.
The general scheme of Vasumitra’s synthesis as I conceive it is that of
strongly reductionist reformulation of the concept of time in terms of change
and causality. Temporality itself is effective action in the inﬁnitive, and
the tenses past, present and future are the modal positions of this “causal
arrow.” An entity is real iff it is effective, which holds for any of the following
three cases: its efﬁciency is actually being discharged (present),52 if it is
possible for its efﬁciency to be discharged (future), or if it is not possible for
its efﬁciency to be discharged (past). The temporal position of a future or
past entity in other words depends on whether it is possible or impossible
for the entity to discharge an effect. Moreover, the position is considered to
be external to the entity, rather than a property or accident of it—in other
words, it is the entity’s modal context. Past and future entities are held to
exist de re.
Thus, Vasumitra’s “temporal eliminativism” reﬁnes the philosophically
na¨ ıve eternalist account of time taken over from the Vai´ ses .ika atomism
into a considerably more sophisticated modal account which explains how
entities can meaningfully be said to exist in past, present and future without
resorting to metaph´ ysicalities such as absolute time and eternal existence.
Vasumitra’s account is still straightfowardly realist, but it does away with
the dimension of time.
A present entity is a real actuality, past and future entities are possible
and impossible real actualities, respectively. The concept of substance is
identiﬁed with function, and the coming into appearance of an element is
explained as the presence of the necessary conditions for its function. In
this, we see the idea being reﬂected that the criterion of reality is efﬁciency
(arthakriy¯ ak¯ aritva)—a basic Abhidharmic theme which is agreed upon all
the way through to Cittam¯ atra and beyond. The debate on this issue can
52In this case, it is said to have actuality (k¯ aritra).
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now be crystallized around the Vaibh¯ as .ika and Sautr¯ antika defense of an
externalist version of this principle.
So far from being a mistaken and inconsistent conﬂation of separate
theories, as Frauwallner uncharitably claims, Vasumitra’s theory should be
considered a novel and signiﬁcant development in the Abhidharmic critique
of time.
Nonetheless, there remains a major philosophical tension in the theory
of Vasumitra. Why is it that we only ever experience the present, if the
past and future are essentially equally real?53 One way that Sautr¯ antika
attempts to resolve this tension is to retain Vasumitra’s modal account of
time but abandon modal realism about the past and future, thus arriving at
its characteristic doctrine of momentariness (ks .an . ikav¯ ada), about which we
will later have more to say.
Space The Vaibh¯ as .ika system asserts that atoms are partless, that there
are intervals of empty space (interstices) between atoms, and that the sub-
stance–atoms do not touch when aggregated.54 This is also asserted by some
Sautr¯ antikas, e.g. by Sam . gharaks .ita.55
However, the Sautr¯ antika critic Ya´ somitra maintains that in the Vai-
bh¯ as .ika view, substance–atoms are without the quality of impenetrability
or resistance (pratigh¯ ata), which entails the quality of covering or spa-
tial extension (avarn . a–laks .an . a).56 Obstruction is an emergent quality of
the aggregate–atom (sam . gh¯ ata–paraman . u), as is spatial extension. The
sam . gh¯ ata–paraman . u is argued by the Vaibh¯ as .ika to be both extended and
partless.
The Vaibh¯ as .ika substance–atom resembles the view of Hume, in that
Hume also takes perception to be ultimately constituted of simples or minima
sensibilia: “A single visual atom, in itself, has no extension, but combinations
53STCHERBATSKY, ibid., p. 80.
54JEFFREY HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound: Jamyang Shayba’s Great Exposition of Bud-
dhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Snow Lion Publications, 2004,
p. 225.
55HOPKINS, ibid., p. 402.
56JOHN B. BUESCHER, Echoes from an Empty Sky - the Origins of the Buddhist Doctrine
of the Two Truths. Snow Lion Publications, 2005, p. 77.
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of atoms do. The perception of an object composed of two or more atoms
is complex, since it is a perception with more than one spatial part.”57
According to Ayer, Hume contends that the impression of any physical
extension must be compounded of a ﬁnite number of mathematically point–
like sense impressions, which are concrete objects. Because these objects are
partless, they are the smallest conceivable sense–data.58
Vaibh¯ as .ika scholasticism deﬁnes space (¯ ak¯ a´ sa) in purely negative terms
as absence of obstructive contact and enumerates it as one of the three
uncompounded phenomena. But unlike the other Buddhist tenet systems,
Vaibh¯ as .ika considers space to be existent (sat),59 a partless, permanent
substantial entity,60 and inﬁnitely divisible.61
Clearly, the Vaibh¯ as .ika system proposes the existence of absolute space,
though it still lacks an explicit notion of what one would call in the term-
inology of modern mathematics an intrinsic geometry or metric, a difﬁculty
which we will return to later on in Chapter 3.
Atom A substance–atom (dravya–paraman . u) is an irreducible sensation–
unit of a certain sensory type, i.e. it is visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, etc.
These sensibilia are metaph´ ysically real qualities and are objectively present
in the world. In this respect, the Vaibh¯ as .ika atomism can be characterized
as phenomenalistic, i.e., derived from the notion of minimal perceivable
magnitudes. But the idea of atoms being located in absolute space necessi-
tates that they be somehow smaller than physiological minimal perceivable
magnitudes.
The visual features of an object, e.g. a tree, should otherwise be indepen-
dent of the viewer’s distance to it, which is clearly not the case—the closer we
move to the tree, the more visual detail we are able to resolve. But why are
the Vaibh¯ as .ikas willing to sacriﬁce the purity of a phenomenalistic atomism
of sense–minima in order to preserve a notion of absolute space? Perhaps
57K´ ARANN DURLAND, Hume’s First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His Distinctions of
Reason. Hume Studies, XXII 1996:1, p. 121.
58A. J. AYER, Hume. Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 48.
59BUESCHER, ibid., p. 79.
60HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound, ibid., p. 224.
61BUESCHER, ibid., p. 181.
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they feel that they are making a reasonable concession to realism. To ensure
that “the things we really see when we say we see a tree” are not solipsistic
ﬁctions, they need to have an objective existence—and this requires a tran-
scendentally objective space (¯ ak¯ a´ sa) to serve as an observer–independent
frame of reference.
Matilal points out an instructive comparison of Vaibh¯ as .ika to the view of
Ayer, who “recommends that we conceive of perceptible external objects as
being literally composed of the ultimate particles of physical theory, these
being imperceptible, not in principle, but only empirically, as a consequence
of their being so minute.”62
According to the Vaibh¯ as .ika, a dravya–paraman . u never occurs in isola-
tion. It is always a part of an aggregate–atom, or basic cluster of atomic
sensory properties (sam . gh¯ ata–paraman . u). These aggregate–atoms are only
perceptible in collection, although they each appear individually to the sense–
consciousness.63
The Sarv¯ astiv¯ adin neo–orthodoxy of Sa˙ nghabhadra, as critiqued in the
Ko´ sa64 and defended in the Ny¯ ay¯ anus¯ ara, speciﬁes that each aggregate–
atom consists of a total of at least sixteen substance–atoms—each of the four
sensory atoms of color, odor, taste and tangibility being accompanied by its
own set of four general elemental atoms.
These four fundamental elements (mah¯ abh¯ utas) which, like all Buddhist
elements, are more like force than substance,65 function as the intensive
magnitudes of their associated aggregate–atom. The earth element repre-
sents the qualities of solidity, hardness and repulsion; the water element
represents cohesion and attraction; ﬁre corresponds to temperature and air
to motion.
Every aggregate–atom contains one atom each of these four. Earth, water,
ﬁre and air are always present in equal proportion—the difference lies only
in their perceptual intensity. A tiny point of light can shine dimly or brightly,
steel needles are more intensely felt than the touch of a brush, etc.66
62MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 12.
63BUESCHER, ibid., p. 127.
64ANACKER, ibid., p. 127–128.
65STCHERBATSKY, ibid., p. 13.
66STCHERBATSKY, ibid.
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Another variant of the Vaibh¯ as .ika atomic theory is offered by the scholar
D¯ ıpak¯ ara. According to this theory, the aggregate–atom is formed of a
minimum of seven substance–atoms. We may hypothesize that one atom is
located in the center of the aggregate’s cubic spatial “receptacle” and the six
other atoms are positioned at the cube’s vertices. The minimal aggregate–
atom comprises one atom each of the fundamental elements (which together
constitute the aggregate–atom’s tactile properties), and one substance–atom
each of color, odor, and taste.67
The most important points to keep in mind about this bewildering multi-
plicity of Vaibh¯ as .ika atomic theories are that the atoms are held to have
spatial extent and to be separated by interstices. Also, the shape (sam . sth¯ ana)
of a visual atom is held to be an ultimate and can be perceived independently
of color.
The Vaibh¯ as .ika system of tenets is unmistakeably phenomenalistic—all
that exist are sensory qualities and their intensities. An eternal substance as
is proposed by the S¯ am . khya is denied by the Vaibh¯ as .ika (with the exception
of Dharmatr¯ ata). Moreover, Vaibh¯ as .ika presents a full–blown reductive
account of sensation, where the likeness of a macroscopic physical object
is simply identiﬁed with the spatial arrangement of a vast number of ele-
mentary sensation–particulars or microscopic tropes.68 In other words, this
assembly of spatiotemporally determinate, mind–independent micro–tropes
is what we actually have commerce with when we think we are perceiving
a macroscopic physical object. The world is built up out of the epistem-
ically and ontologically ultimate bits and pieces given in immediate sensory
experience.
Therefore, although the Vaibh¯ as .ika are considered by Buddhist doxog-
raphy to be a substantialist school, the somewhat paradoxical situation
obtains that the Vaibh¯ as .ika substances are equivalent to the sense–data
themselves.69 Substance is completely identical to trope—a sense–datum
requires no further substrate. In this particular respect, the Vaibh¯ as .ika
mosaic theory is closer to the hypothetical “original ﬂavor” of early Buddhist
67ANACKER, ibid., p. 128.
68See SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., p. 115.
69STCHERBATSKY, ibid., p. 12.
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phenomenalism than its critical reﬁnement, the Sautr¯ antika, which moves
away from the phenomenalizing idea of the simple as a sensory ultimate in
favor of a progressive account of the constitution of physical objects.
Though in many ways a compromise with physical realism, the Vaibh¯ as .ika
system is by deliberate design far too reductionistic to qualify as a truly
“na¨ ıve” physical realism such as Ny¯ aya–Vai´ ses .ika, which asserts the real
existence of wholes, universals and actions.
The Vaibh¯ as .ika propose a quintessentially Buddhist solution to the qualia
problem. Their atomizing, objectivizing phenomenalist reductionism simply
denies that sensations have any intrinsic subjectivity in the ultimate view.
To Vaibh¯ as .ika, “raw feels” such as minute ﬂashes of color, tactile pin–pricks
etc, are wholly public, mind–independent and objective. Vaibh¯ as .ika argues
the notion that sensation–atoms are somehow private to the perceiving
consciousness to be an egological error.
2.4.2 Critical Review of Vaibh¯ as .ika Presentationalism
In the debate on time in the ﬁfth chapter of Vasubandhu’s auto–commentary
to the Ko´ sa, the Sautr¯ antika takes the Vaibh¯ as .ika to task over the sarvam
asti thesis and the notion of k¯ aritra. Among other criticisms, the Sautr¯ antika
interlocutor denies the intelligibility of the Vaibh¯ as .ika’s claim that past and
future entities exist in the same sense as present entities. That Vasumitra’s
theory should pose many difﬁculties in this regard is unsurprising, as in the
terminology of modern logic, assertion of the existence of past and future
entities would entail quantiﬁcation into modal context. The Sautr¯ antika
also argues against the Vaibh¯ as .ika ideas that future existents come into
appearance by entering the scope of the present, and that the time of an
entity is something separate from the entity itself. In analogy to A. N.
Prior’s ideas about the logic of time, the Sautr¯ antika would simply eliminate
the metaph´ ysical distinctions between the temporal status of an entity, its
function, and its intrinsic nature.70
70MCDERMOTT, ibid., p. 197.
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Later on in the debate, the Sautr¯ antika presses the Vaibh¯ as .ika to concede
that the intentional object (vis .aya) of a cognition can be a Meinongian71
absistent (Gegebenheit): “Thus it is that both existence and non–existence
may be objects of cognition.” If cognitions about irrealia are not admitted,
he reasons, many absurdities result—such that if one desires not to hear
an unpronounced word, one would be compelled to actually pronounce the
word in order to satisfy externalism about intentionality. However, if the Vai-
bh¯ as .ika yields to some version of Brentano’s thesis of intentional inexistence,
then it becomes much more difﬁcult for him to resist the Sautr¯ antika’s
ﬁctionalism about past and future entities.72 As against existence in past,
present and future, the Sautr¯ antika is advancing a version of Augustine’s
view that “the present of things past is in memory; the present of things
present is in intuition; the present of things future is in expectation.”73
There are problems in reconciling the Vaibh¯ as .ika of objective sense–data
with phenomenalism—it is difﬁcult to conceive of a reasonable account
of the existence of unsensed sensibilia that does not make liberal use of
counterfactuals. If we lock a blue ball into a lightproof black box, surely it
is ridiculous to say that the ball is blue even inside the box where there is
no light and nobody can see it—what we mean is something of the sort that,
given the same perceptual conditions inside the box as outside, if we were
able to see the ball, it would be blue.
Ayer cogently observes that there are no empirical means of settling the
question as to whether or not sense–data can exist while they are not being
apprehended.74 Another Ayerian objection to the Vaibh¯ as .ika position would
be that that a phenomenalist who speaks of sensibilia as having a distinct
existence in space and time has not fully carried out his program—his so–
called sensibilia are merely physical objects in disguise.75
71Sinha remarks that it is misleading to compare the Sautr¯ antika representationalism with
contemporary forms of realism, but nonetheless draws a rough parallel to Meinong, see
SINHA, ibid., p. 222-223.
72STCHERBATSKY, ibid., pp. 83–91.
73AUGUSTINE, cited in MCDERMOTT, ibid., p. 196.
74A. J. AYER, The Terminology of Sense-Data. in: Philosophical Essays. Macmillan Press,
1954, p. 75.
75A. J. AYER, Phenomenalism. in: Philosophical Essays. Macmillan Press, 1954, p. 165.
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Pyle raises the concern that a theory of perception predicated upon a mereo-
logical nihilism about compound bodies cannot be realist in the strict sense—
if the existence of compounds is denied, the explanandum of the atomic
theory is lost and the atomic theory of perception must be construed as an
“error–theory” about why we hold mistaken views when we see macroscopic
objects.76 However, this objection is not really a problem for the Vaibh¯ as .ika
since he intends to propose an error–theory of perception.
Ya´ somitra’s critique of the Vaibh¯ as .ika atom concept in his commentary of
the Ko´ sa is an anticipation of Vasubandhu’s critique in the Vim . ´ satik¯ a: “In
the Abhidharmako´ sa and in Ya´ somitra’s commentary, the Sautr¯ antikas—
who refused to accept that conglomerate atoms were without parts—then
pressed the Vaibhasikas. They asked them how it could be that if none of
the substance atoms were extended in space and if none of them offered any
resistance, how could many together do this? How could one put together
many atoms that took up no space and obtain something with any extension
at all?”77
Although atoms are said to be directly observable, they are not evident to
ordinary perception, like houses, pots and trees. The atom therefore remains
a metaph´ ysical construction, and if it is admitted that the existence of atoms
is only known by inference (anum¯ ana) to the best explanation, then who is
to say that there cannot be some other, better explanation for phenomenal
appearances? This Mind–Only critique will form a part of Vasubandhu’s
argument against the Vaibh¯ as .ika position later on in Chapter 3. For the idea
that atoms are observables only collectively but not individually comes very
close to a causal theory of perception.
As Matilal puts the Mind–Only argument—“If the so–called atoms gen-
erate perceptions out of their own power, why are they not also grasped in
such perceptions?”78 But as ultra–nominalists, the Vaibh¯ as .ika have no other
choice but to defend a doctrine of homeomeria.79 Vaibh¯ as .ika encounters the
difﬁculty that it wishes to maintain on the one hand that the atomic sensa-
76PYLE, ibid., p. 108.
77BUESCHER, ibid., p. 77.
78MATILAL, Perception, ibid., pp. 368–369.
79In Greek atomism, homeomeria refers to the doctrine that the atoms constituting a
substance must themselves have the salient observed properties of that substance.
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tions are sensed directly, yet on the other hand claims that they are sensed
only in aggregate. The Vaibh¯ as .ikas assert that an isolated minute particle is
not an object of a sense–consciousness, nor is it the composite as a whole, as
composites are merely imputed collection–generalities (gan . a–samanya).80
In this critique, which will be the critique of Vasubandhu, we ﬁnd a
close afﬁnity to Mach’s rejection of atomism due to his skepticism about im-
perceptible entities: “All his life, Mach was never able to make friends with
the atomistic corpuscle theory. In discussions, whenever anybody presumed
the existence of atoms as a matter of course—and we may assume that this
happened quite frequently—he irascibly interjected: ‘Have you ever seen
one?’ (‘Hams ans g’sehn?’)”81
The purpose of physics, according to Mach, is not to determine the funda-
mental ontological constituents of reality, but rather, to explore and describe
the functional relationships between the elements given to experience. To
Mach, it would be an unforgivable case of m´ etaphysical confusion to conﬂate
sensations (the “given” or sensory core of experience) with atoms (ontological
ultimates).
The Vaibh¯ as .ika account of shape is deeply counterintuitive. Why is it that
individual atoms come to be attributed with a substantial shape which is
however imperceptible, whereas the perceptible shape of macroscopic objects
is held to be merely conceptually imputed? Wouldn’t it be more reasonable
to argue that perceptible shapes are real and imperceptible shapes are
imputed?
Finally, realistic presentationalism is uncomfortably vulnerable to argu-
ment from illusion—how to say, for example, that a stick partly submerged
in a glass of water only appears to be bent?82
A radical phenomenalist of the Machian stripe argues that there is really
no such thing as illusion, or rather, that it is not possible to draw a meta-
ph´ ysical distinction between illusion and veridical perception.83 For him,
80BUESCHER, ibid., p. 130.
81SOMMER, Evidenz im Augenblick, ibid., p. 78, my translation.
82CHATTERJEE, ibid., pp. 53–56.
83See MACH, ibid., p. 8. Like Mach and the Mind–Only, Carnap also conveys that the reality
problem, or distinction between illusion and veridical perception is a purely empirical
one, see CARNAP, Aufbau, ibid., pp. 237–238.
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the entire issue of illusion is a pseudo–problem of the metaph´ ysical realist—
whenever we speak of illusion, we can be sure that something metaph´ ysical
is cooking. Similarly, wherever the epistemic reductionist may go, the hob-
goblins of emergent properties and behaviors follow not far behind.
“Illusion” is unreal—or so we believe. It is an explanation for what is
happening when the synthetic activity of sensory perception generates some
epistemically ungrounded percept. Except for deceiving us, the illusion
is causally inert. “Emergence,” however, is quite real—or so we suspect.
It is our account for what is happening when dynamic interaction of a
physical system generates some ontologically irreducible property. Here, a
radical phenomenalist not committed to realism will argue that illusion and
emergence are philosophical enantiomorphs. As soon as we draw a meta-
ph´ ysical divide between the epistemic subject and the object, the problem
of illusion rears its ugly head on the side of the subjective constitution of
experience and the problem of emergence arises on the side of the objective
constitution.
The Vaibh¯ as .ika will insist that it is all a matter of ﬁnding the “predeter-
mined breaking point” between the subject and the object. He will argue
that there cannot be such a thing as an illusion of a tree, because “tree” is
merely a linguistic and conceptual convention imputed to some patches of
color that we see. But how to account for the fact that these colored blobs
are spatiotemporally correlated with certain tactile sensations of roughness
when we attempt to touch the trunk of the tree? The things that we are
seeing and the things that we are touching, the Vaibh¯ as .ika explains, are
the same things—our sensory awareness is making direct contact with the
visual and tactile sensation–atoms are objectively located in space and exist
independently of our awareness. When we close our eyes, where do the col-
ored blobs go? They don’t go anywhere, the Vaibh¯ as .ika avers—they are still
out there in space, but our sensory awareness simply loses contact with them.
But this account is badly vulnerable to argument from hallucination—where
do the pink rats go when one closes one’s eyes?
To preserve external world realism, the Vaibh¯ as .ika must concede the
possibility of illusion and attempt to explain it as an error of perceptual
synthesis. Without perceptual synthesis, it is difﬁcult to account even for
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cases of “veridical” perception. For example, the problem of inferring a
visual object’s shape from its two–dimensional projection does not admit
to a unique solution. This intractable problem is converted into a solvable
one by adding hard–wired assumptions about how the world is usually put
together. Sensory illusions arise in cases where these a priori assumptions
are violated.84
But perceptual synthesis is exactly what the Vaibh¯ as .ika direct realist
account of perception wishes to deny—it argues that in non–conceptual
perception, we see things as they actually are, and that we are only making
a conceptual imputation (praj˜ n¯ apti) when we think we see a gross physical
object.
2.5 The Sautr¯ antika School
An important feature of the philosophical program of the Sautr¯ antika school
as we construe it here is to attempt to reconcile the basic principle of empiri-
cism (that knowledge arises from experience and is limited to the realm of
experience) with the discovery of the synthetic character of empirical knowl-
edge, i.e. the realization that its constitution is dependent upon categories
and assumptions not present in immediate experience.
In this regard, its representationalist epistemology closely accords with
the familiar Kantian program of critical realism, which posits that it is
necessary to make a priori posits that are epistemically prior to the content
of experience; but that such m´ etaphysics is only possible if it is strictly
limited to the deduction of the conditions of possible experience.
Of all the schools of Indian philosophy, the Sautr¯ antika was the only one
to take such a Kantian turn.85 The reason for this unique ideo–historical
development can only be that Sautr¯ antika was attempting to address the
same philosophical challenge as Kant—the need to critically reformulate
empiricist realism in such a way as to avoid surrendering realism about a
mind–independent world.
84STEVEN PINKER, How The Mind Works. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997, p. 212.
85GUPTA, ibid., p. 168.
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Chatterjee observes that Sautr¯ antika is not so much a new philosophy as
the critical analysis of the implications of the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada realism. “The Sau-
tr¯ antika must be understood as Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada itself, aware of its own logical
basis. They are not two schools, but two phases of the same metaphysical
pattern.”86
Though Sautr¯ antika must also be considered an Abhidharmic school, its
critical turn of the Abhidharmic pattern forced some important doctrinal
points of difference to the Vaibh¯ as .ika concerning the understanding of Abhi-
dharma. The dogmatic presentation of the original seven texts of Abhid-
harma dating approximately to the 2nd century BCE as the revealed word
of the Buddha needed to be called into question. The Sautr¯ antika strategy
for resolving this dilemma was to argue that while Abhidharma existed, it
was in fact diffused throughout the s¯ utras.87 The Sautr¯ antikas held that the
independent set of seven core scriptures known as the Abhidharma could not
lay claim to being categorically valid word of the Buddha (buddhavacana)
taking precedence over interpretations conforming to the s¯ utras in case of
any conﬂict between the two.88
Having liberated themselves in this way from the straitjacket of dogmatic
scholasticism, the Sautr¯ antika epistemologists were able to articulate two
important doctrinal innovations over the system of the Vaibh¯ as .ikas—the
theory of presentism and the causal theory of perception.
Della Santina remarks that the Sautr¯ antika emphasis of of the rˆ ole of
conceptualization, or discrimination (vikalpa) is connected to their critique
of the Vaibh¯ as .ika category system. Synthesis now begins to ﬁll in for many
factors of experience that were previously claimed to be objective realities:
“They rejected the independent, objective reality of many of the factors
the Vaibhashikas accepted, ascribing these dharmas to the functioning of
discrimination or imagination. This goes some way toward the standpoint of
86CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 3.
87BUESCHER, ibid., pp. 26-27.
88ANACKER, ibid., p. 152.
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the Mind–Only school, which eventually denied the objective reality of all
objects and afﬁrmed the sole reality of mind.”89
Like Kant, Sautr¯ antika has become aware of the synthetic activity of the
mind—however the vikalpa is construed as a synthesis of the unreal rather
than the real, in keeping with the Buddhist principle of nominalism.
Generally speaking, the division of the two truths according to the two
means of valid knowledge or epistemic grounding (pram¯ an . as) recognized
by the Sautr¯ antika school relegates direct sensory perception or evidence
(pratyaks .a) to the level of phenomenal (sam . vr .ti) truth and inference or
rational demonstration (anum¯ ana) to the noumenal (param¯ artha) truth.
In Sautr¯ antika, the real is given only to reason, and the correspondence
(s¯ ar¯ upya) between internal cognition and external cause is the criterion of
truth.90
2.5.1 Time, Space and Atom in Early Sautr¯ antika
Time Even though the Sautr¯ antika claims itself to be a reconstruction of
the original s¯ utric teachings of the Buddha, the Sautr¯ antika doctrine of
momentariness does not ﬁgure in earlier Buddhist writings and must be
considered a proper innovation of the Sautr¯ antika system.91 In Sautr¯ antika,
momentariness is not conﬁned to phenomenal appearances—even ultimate
truths such as substances are held to be in ﬂux.
Von Rospatt traces the conceptual evolution of the instant (ks .an . a) from the
momentary interval to the time–atom (irreducible duration) to the completely
durationless present in great detail, and summarizes his ﬁndings as follows:
The usage of ks .an .a in the sense of momentary entity documents
that the change in the conception of the term ks .an .a was brought
to its logical conclusion. Starting out with the basic meaning of
“very short time,” the ks .an .a came to be understood—reﬂecting
an atomistic conception of time—as “the shortest unit of time,”
89PETER DELLA SANTINA, The Philosophy of Mind-Only. in: The Tree of Enlightenment.
Online hURL: http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/˜dsantina/tree/i – accessed on
April 12, 2008.
90See SINHA, ibid., p. 35 and STCHERBATSKY, ibid., p. 56.
91VON ROSPATT, ibid., p. 15.
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the length of which came to be equated with the duration of
mental entities (or transient entities in general) as the briefest
conceivable events.”92
The Sautr¯ antika view of momentariness as lack of temporal persistence
can be traced to Vasubandhu’s deﬁnition in the Ko´ sa, as von Rospatt explains:
To be ks .an . ika (i.e. momentary), that is to be endowed with such
a ks .an . a, then entails according to Vasubandhu to perish imme-
diately after having originated. Rather than deﬁning ks .an . ika
as “being of momentary duration,” Vasubandhu in this way spec-
iﬁes the nature of this momentary existence and thus excludes
alternative conceptions such as that of the Sarv¯ astiv¯ adins.93
The idea that a ks .an . a has a certain fundamental thickness differing from a
psychic addition94 may hold true for the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada view of momentariness,
but is not borne out by Sautr¯ antika sources.
Von Rospatt enumerates ﬁve modes of deduction that the Sautr¯ antikas use
in support of their doctrine of momentariness. The momentariness of mental
entities (1) is one indication. The Sautr¯ antika also attempt (2) to infer the
momentariness of all conditioned entities from the momentariness of the
mind, and (3) to deduce momentariness from change and (4) destruction.
Finally, they adduce (5) the experience of momentariness itself.
Presentism is a doctrine unique to the Sautr¯ antika school (and to Mind–
Only, which inherited many Sautr¯ antika doctrines). It is not to be found
in classical and medieval Western philosophy, with the exception of the
Cyrenaic school.95
Since Sautr¯ antika does not admit the existence of past and future en-
tities, all that remains of the temporal sequence of past, present, and fu-
ture is the principle of continuous, universal ﬂux (sam . t¯ ana)—a dynamic
92VON ROSPATT, ibid., p. 110.
93VON ROSPATT, ibid., pp. 106-107.
94JASON BROWN, Microgenesis and Buddhism: The Concept of Momentariness. Philosophy
East and West, 49 1999:3, p. 263.
95JEFFREY GRUPP, The R-theory of Time, or Replacement Presentism: The Buddhist
Philosophy of Time. Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies, 6 2005, pp. 92–93.
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but durationless “momentary now” or “eternal present” where phenomena
are continuously in the process of arising or perishing, but never actually
persist for any length of time whatsoever. The present moment is a “van-
ishing present”—both streaming and standing, like the Jamesian “specious
present”96 or Husserl’s “immanent temporality.”97 Husserl writes that the
subjectively constituted concreta arise from the immanent temporality as
the lowermost streaming ground of concreteness.98 The Sautr¯ antika theory
of time may be conceived as a form of “replacement presentism,” as argued
convincingly by Grupp.99
It is important to emphasize that Sautr¯ antika not only rejects the exis-
tence of temporal continuants, but eliminates even instantaneous existence.
Phenomena and elements (dharmas) can therefore never be found as com-
plete existents in the present—one only ever ﬁnds their arising or perishing.
Garﬁeld points out that in M¯ adhyamika, even the domain of conventional
phenomena cannot be resolved into constantly arising, constantly ceasing
momentary phenomena that have inherent existence.100 In contrast to this
N¯ ag¯ arjunian doctrine of total ineffability, the Sautr¯ antika system asserts
a considerably more ontological view—that there is individual arising and
ceasing of ultimates, although the individual entity is always in ﬂux.
Space Unlike the Vaibh¯ as .ikas, some Sautr¯ antikas do not regard the ex-
periential constituent of phenomenal space (¯ ak¯ a´ sa–dh¯ atu) as a substantial
entity (dravyasat).101
The Sautr¯ antika view advanced by Vasubandhu in the Ko´ sa, construes
shape as a derivative property of color.102 As Sellars trenchantly observes,
the notion of shape as existing only “by way of idea” is a Berkeleyan one.103
But in Sautr¯ antika, not all spatial properties are conceptually imputed—e.g.
96JAMES, cited in GRUPP, ibid., p. 56.
97GUPTA, ibid., p. 173.
98HUSSERL, ibid., p. 66.
99GRUPP, Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 6 [2005], ibid., p. 53.
100GARFIELD, The Fundamental Wisdom, ibid., p. 274.
101MEJOR, ibid., p. 31.
102See BUESCHER, ibid., p. 83 and STCHERBATSKY, ibid., p. 11.
103WILFRID SELLARS, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Collections of Philosophy, 6 1976
hURL: http://www.ditext.com/sellars/kti.htmli – accessed on July 15, 2008.
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distance is still held to be an ultimate. The account of sam . sth¯ ana as purely
a mental conception rather than a substantial and real property in the Ko´ sa
may be a possible precursor to Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism,104
as it shows the beginnings of a critique of space.
Aside from shape, the Sautr¯ antika are also beginning to whittle away
at the spatial interval of the atomic interstice: “The Sarvastivadins–
Vaibhasikas held the view that there are intervals between the atoms of
the conglomeration, while the Sautr¯ antikas maintained that there are no
intervals and yet the atoms do not touch each other.”105
One explanation would be that the Sautr¯ antika held this view chieﬂy
for apologetic reasons. If they had declared outright that the atoms touch
each other, they would have been dismissed as having the view of a non–
Buddhist school, the Vai´ ses .ika. This is the way Vasubandhu seems to deal
with this issue in the Ko´ sa. He argues that the Sautr¯ antika themselves
admit that it amounts to as much as touching: “Quoting an authority, Bhad-
hanta, Vasubandhu says that although the atoms do not touch, when they
are situated in the closest, gapless proximity we can say in words, ‘they
touched’.”106
Matilal advances the explanation that the Sautr¯ antika are claiming a
potential or latent tangibility of the atoms which is actualized when they
are in conglomeration, just as the latent visibility of individual atoms is
actualized when they are perceived in aggregate.107
A third explanation would be that Sautr¯ antika held the interstice between
two atoms to be mathematically inﬁnitesimal, in other words, smaller than
any possible measure. This would account for for their claim that atoms
can have the seemingly contrary properties of not touching, yet not being
separated.
Atom The Sautr¯ antika understanding of the two truths—the phenome-
nal (sam . vr .ti and the noumenal (param¯ artha) truth—bears afﬁnities to the
104RICHARD KING, Vijnaptimatrata and the Abhidharma Context of Early Yogacara. Asian
Philosophy March 1998.
105GUENTHER, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, ibid., pp. 181–183.
106MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 362.
107MATILAL, ibid., p. 361.
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Cartesian dualism of the 19th century, where the atom (res extensa) is the
fundamental entity of the external world and sensation (res cogitans) are the
fundamental entities of the internal world, i.e. the sensory minima brought
about by the impingement of atoms upon the sensory organs. The external
mosaic of atoms is connected to the inner world of perception by way of the
sensation, the smallest physiological unit, which covers up but at the same
time reveals the external world.108
In Sautr¯ antika, the phenomenal or conventional truths are sensibles and
the ultimate truths are intelligibles, i.e. the noumenal structures that are
deduced to objectively back the perceptual ﬂux of experience. The ultimate
constituents of external objects are believed to be inferable from the “repre-
sented” forms in our awareness.109 Atoms are momentary (ks .an . ika) and are
given only to inference (anum¯ ana) as purely logical constructs. We are led to
deduce their existence by a causal inference, as the atomic data must have
caused the gross appearance (pratibh¯ asa) in consciousness. But though this
seems like an a posteriori reasoning at ﬁrst glance, it is actually an a priori
one. One is not drawing conclusions from the empirical to the empirical, but
from the empirical to the noumenal. The atom is reasoned to be a necessary
precondition to empirical knowledge.
Sautr¯ antika thought does not have a concept directly corresponding to the
Kantian notion of a priori. But inasmuch as we are justiﬁed in reconstruct-
ing Sautr¯ antika along Kantian lines, the atom would have to be a wholly
transcendental construct deriving from a priori consideration.
One supporting argument for the a priori interpretation is that the Sau-
tr¯ antika atom is imperceptible in principle. In Sautr¯ antika, ultimate truths
are sui generis and reachable only by transcendental reasoning, not by a
decompositional analysis of empirical phenomena. The Tibetan doxographer
Ngawang Belden offers the example that in Sautr¯ antika, a patch of blue is
not established as a composite of external particles separate from the aspect
of blue, nor is the aspect of blue a composite of external particles.110 The
Vaibh¯ as .ika atom, on the other hand, can at least in principle be isolated by
108SOMMER, Evidenz im Augenblick, ibid., p. 53.
109MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. xiii.
110BUESCHER, ibid., p. 129.
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empirical decomposition. It is only too minute to be individually registered
(though we have already discussed the problems with this view).
Sautr¯ antika epistemology has been compared to the representational
realism of Locke.111 Its atomic theory is also similar in many ways to the
theory of Epicurus, who also adverts to a rationally apprehended world
of atoms for causal explanations of the phenomena appearing in sensory
awareness.112
Clearly, Sautr¯ antika resonates to a reasonable degree with Kantian critical
realism, although the Buddhist and Kantian accounts differ considerably as
to their forms of construction and categories.113
In the following, we will therefore pursue the Kantian line of interpreta-
tion and construe the Sautr¯ antika’s inferential knowledge of the noumenal
realm (param¯ artha–satya) to have the form of necessary a priori posits—
even though there are problems with this interpretation due to anum¯ ana
not having the proper technical meaning. The postulation of a necessary
presupposition to knowledge would be arth¯ apatti, which is not among the
Sautr¯ antika’s allowable pram¯ an . as.
Why does the Sautr¯ antika system need atoms at all? The doctrine of
atoms was carried over from Vaibh¯ as .ika, just as the Vaibh¯ as .ikas in turn
had most likely inherited the doctrine from the Jainas and Vai´ ses .ikas. Also,
perhaps it was considered that appearances required a substance account
of causal origination in order to avert the conclusion that they are being
generated ex nihilo. Finally, if the Sautr¯ antika causal theory of perception
(that mental representations are the effects of external objects) is to support
an externalist reference of the intentional object (vis .aya), it requires that
there be objective causal vectors for effective action.
Mind (citta) in Sautr¯ antika moreover possesses the feature of svasam-
vedana (self–reﬂexive awareness, i.e., transcendental apperception)—but
in other key respects, it is not transcendental, as the moment–to–moment
arising of mind is governed by empirical causality.
111See SINHA, ibid., p. 35 and DELLA SANTINA, ibid..
112PYLE, ibid., p. 129.
113GUPTA, ibid., p. 168.
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One difﬁculty with the Kantian analogy is that dravya does not conform to
Kant’s notion of substance. For Kant, the schema of substance is persistence
through time, and we have already shown that Sautr¯ antika does not admit
dravya to possess any temporal persistence whatsoever. The Sautr¯ antika
concept of dravya would more accurately correspond to the Kantian notion of
noumenon or Ding an sich, i.e. a thing as is apart from sensible or empirical
intuition. But this reading, too, immediately breaks down, as the Sautr¯ ant-
ika atom is in ﬂux, whereas the Ding an sich is atemporal.
Nonetheless, the existence of atoms, i.e. of intelligible simples, is given to
reason by a kind of transcendental inference, as a merely empirical analysis
would never sufﬁce to establish atoms as the nonempirial objects which they
are by deﬁnition intended to be. They comprise the ﬂux of momentary atomic
stimuli that causally induces tactile, visual, aural etc. sensations—from
which, in turn, the mind synthesizes its phenomenal representations by way
of a process of conceptual elaboration (vikalpa). In Sautr¯ antika thought,
vikalpa generally assumes the rˆ ole of synthesis, albeit an imaginatively
contrived and therefore “unreal” one.
Also, if atoms are purely intelligible but not sensible, Sautr¯ antika must
rigorously separate the category of substance into r¯ upa (variously construed
as phenomenal materiality, Gestalt, or as the constituent of a perceptual
datum which presents itself as objective)114 and dravya (the transcendentally
intuited substance, that which is inferred by transcendental reasoning to be
the objective basis for perception). If a dravyasat lacks temporal persistence
or sensible materiality, why even call it a substance? For an existent to be
intelligible may mean no more and no less than that it is a logical posit,
albeit a necessary and true one. But what remains unexplained is why such
a logical datum should exist independently of its being posited.
2.5.2 Atomism in the Late Sautr¯ antika Phase
Gelug scholarship distinguishes between the Followers of Scripture and
Followers of Reasoning.115 The late phase of Sautr¯ antika is known in the
114GUENTHER, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, ibid., p. 189.
115HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound, ibid., p. 10-11.
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Gelug doxography as the subschool of “Sautr¯ antika Following Reasoning.”
This sub–division of the Sautr¯ antika school following the main system of
Dign¯ aga and Dharmak¯ ırti postulates as its atomic entity the point–instant
or unique, unanalyzable unrepeatable particular (svalaks .an . a).116
Chatterjee characterizes the svalaks .an . a as an “attributive atom,” which
he holds to be the atom in its truest sense. Grupp translates the svalaks .an . a
as “abstract atom.”
Dharmak¯ ırti’s svalaks .an . a may be compared to Carnap’s concept of elemen-
tary experience (Elementarerlebnis) in that they both explode the stream
of experience out into unanalyzable particulars.117 However, the similarity
ends there. For Carnap, the Elementarerlebnisse are derived by an abstrac-
tive process (the procedure of quasianalysis) and employed as constitutional
elements, not asserted as metaph´ ysical realities. Atoms are products of
abstraction—the stream of experience is not intrinsically atomized in this
way.118 For Dharmak¯ ırti, the svalaks .an . as are the minimal concrete partic-
ulars or “givens” of perception that the real splits itself into. As Goodman
points out, a system taking concreta as atomic cannot allow qualities as
atomic parts of such concreta.119 This difﬁculty is resolved by the theory
that phenomenal qualities are merely superimposed on the svalaks .an . as as
subjective constructions.120 The svalaks .an . as do not constitute anything, as is
the case for the Elementarerlebnisse of Carnap’s system. Moreover, the Sau-
tr¯ antika Following Reasoning assert these as external (mind–independent)
objects,121 which Carnap does not.
The svalaks .an . a nonetheless signals a ﬁnal departure from the realism of
the “substantive atom,” the latter being much closer to the common–sense
view.122 The Sautr¯ antika system of Dign¯ aga and Dharmak¯ ırti postulates
partless and extensionless naked particulars in a strictly instrumental fash-
ion, as a provisional stepping–stone to the fully–ﬂedged Yog¯ ac¯ ara view. The
116MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 366.
117MATILAL, ibid., p. 358.
118CARNAP, Aufbau, ibid., p. 93.
119NELSON GOODMAN, Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett Publishing Company, 1978, p. 9.
120CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 63.
121HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound, ibid., pp. 10–11.
122CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 64.
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“attributive atomism” is later in origin than Vasubandhu’s Vim . ´ satik¯ a and is
unaffected by his anti–atomist argument, for reasons that will be explained
later.123
However, there is by no means a unanimous consensus that Dharmak¯ ırti
divides time into inﬁnitesimal or point–like instants. Oetke argues that this
view is unproven, and that Dharmak¯ ırti’s views on the structure of time
(whatever they may be) have no bearing on his formal proofs of momentari-
ness in the Sattv¯ anum¯ ana.124
2.5.3 Critique of Sautr¯ antika Representationalism
Passing now to criticism, one difﬁculty with representationalism is that it
does not fully accord with radical phenomenalism. The phenomenalizing
stance as expressed in the Bahiya Sutta would seem to demand a two–term or
even a one–term account of perception. If in the seeing there is only the seen
(etc.), then the perceived must be identiﬁed either with the representational
aspect of perception (as is the case in Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra) or with the aggregate
of the compositional constituents of perception (as in Vaibh¯ as .ika)—it is not
possible to have it both ways.
Chatterjee argues that the three–term theory is an unstable account of
knowledge. Its correspondence theory of knowledge presupposes a presenta-
tive account, which, however, renders the correspondence theory superﬂu-
ous.125
Also, the novel Sautr¯ antika doctrines of evanescence and ﬂux ﬁt poorly
with the doctrine of atomism inherited from the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada tradition. The
Sautr¯ antika have some difﬁculties in reconciling atomicity to ﬂux, as the
discrete nature of atoms would seem to break the continuity implied by
absolute ﬂux.126
If the doctrine of momentariness is made to apply to atoms, as it must be,
then the atom ceases to be a static entity and becomes a wholly dynamic
123Viz. section 3.2.6, p. 103.
124CLAUS OETKE; ERNST STEINKELLNER, editor, Bemerkungen zur Buddhistischen Dok-
trin der Momentanheit des Seienden: Dharmak¯ ırtis Sattv¯ anum¯ ana. Arbeitskreis f¨ ur
Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1993, pp. 22–23.
125CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 55.
126BROWN, ibid., p. 273.
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stimulus. It ﬂashes into and out of existence, but does not actually persist
for even the most inﬁnitesimal moment. To use a mathematical metaphor,
the atom’s process of arising and perishing might be compared to a Cauchy
sequence which, though converging in the reals, fails to converge in the
rationals. Despite approaching an ideal limit (the idealization of the atom
qua static existent) there is never in fact any such static entity to be found at
any point of time during the atom’s process of real arising and perishing.127
In this reconstructively puriﬁed Sautr¯ antika view, ﬂux and atomism are
reconciled in the concept of the atom as a fundamental ﬂux–unit, a discrete
pulse of effective action (not unlike the quantum of modern physics). As
a key rationale for their radical dynamization of the atomic concept, the
Sautr¯ antika offer that a static entity is by deﬁnition incapable of acting.
Vasubandhu points out that the dynamic, instantaneous nature of the
atom–stimulus poses a severe difﬁculty for the Sautr¯ antika’s causal account
of perception—by the time the percept, i.e. the representation is registered
in awareness, the stimuli that have caused it have already evanesced. Under
the assumption of an externalist, i.e. a correspondence theory of represen-
tation, the percept comes to be a representation of the unreal. However,
if one is willing to revert to internalism to preserve the veridicality of the
representation, then why not also adopt an internalist account of causation
and dispense with the noumenal object? The internalist account of reference
and knowledge is simply good empiricism, as Vasubandhu might aver. A
coherent account of perception does not require external bases of knowledge
(¯ alambanas). This will be the nucleus of his argument against the causal
theory of perception in verse 16 of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a.
Although the early Sautr¯ antika epistemology is already remarkably ad-
vanced, we still ﬁnd in it some vestigial notions inherited from the Vaibh¯ as .ika
direct realism, such that these discrete pulses must possess deﬁnite spatio-
temporal locations. As we will later see, all of these notions are to become the
object of Vasubandhu’s critique of atomism. However, in early Sautr¯ antika
we also ﬁnd notions proper to critical realism, such that the discrete pulses
127As is also the case with Kant and Carnap, the Sautr¯ antika system may be said to take
time as its norm of categories, see CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 65 and WILHELM K. ESSLER,
JOACHIM LABUDE and STEFANIE UCSNAY, Theorie und Erfahrung. Alber, 2000, p. 135.
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are momentary stimulus–atoms which are themselves imperceptible, but
produce percepts by impinging upon the sensory faculty. In the late Sau-
tr¯ antika of Dign¯ aga and Dharmak¯ ırti, the corpuscular concept is done away
with—ﬁnally the atomist doctrine, now fully purged of all substantialist
vestiges, has matured into “attributive atomism.”
Thus, we can reconstruct the evolution of the atomic concept in the Ab-
hidharmika schools along roughly the following lines: In the Vaibh¯ as .ika
presentational theory of knowledge, the atom is a physical sensation–atom
or trope, i.e. a discrete, particular instance of a sensory quality. In early Sau-
tr¯ antika representationalism, although the atom’s noumenal substantiality
has not been eliminated entirely, it is hidden from phenomenal perception.
What was formerly a sensation–atom or unitary sensum is now a discrete
sensory stimulus, the necessary existence of which is deduced by (transcen-
dental) inference.
The Abhidharmic reductionism attempts to epistemologize the early Bud-
dhist teaching of the phenomenalistic elimination of references to self and
subjectivity by reducing the physical world described by ordinary language
of covering truth (sam . vr .ti–satya) to the purely phenomenal world described
by the sense–datum language of ultimate truth (param¯ artha–satya) But
whether this program actually plays out as intended is another question.
In a parallel to Quine’s classic critique of reductionism as set forth in Two
Dogmas of Empiricism,128 Oetke strongly argues that this phenomenalizing
reduction of ordinary experience to “protocol language” is infeasible.129
Moreover, the Abhidharmic theory of synthetic wholes as purely nominal
entities raises the possibility of similarly nominalizing the parts. Saying
that the whole is a synthesis (vikalpa) superimposed on the parts by purely
subjective constructive imagination (kalpan¯ a) bears the risk of reverting into
idealism, because it might be that the subjectivity is constructive enough to
posit the parts as well.130
128WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism. in: From a Logical Point of
View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays. Harvard University Press, 1971.
129OETKE, ”Ich” und das Ich, ibid., 236–237.
130CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 72.
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In fact, this will be the thrust of Vasubandhu’s argument in the coming
chapter. He will argue that the hypothesis of transcendentally objective
atoms is unwarranted and superﬂuous. This, he will say, is ﬁrstly because the
gross appearance (pratibh¯ asa) is all that is required for empirical purposes,
and secondly, because it is not proven that we constitute perception of gross
physical objects from transcendentally objective atoms given in experience.
The example of Sautr¯ antika illustrates an Avenarian point—any empiri-
cism made aware of its a priori foundations but insisting on realism in-
evitably produces a characteristic diplopia of inner experience and outer
reality, which raises the problem of how these two realms interrelate.
There are two very closely related modes of thought that attempt to resolve
the bifurcation of internal and external world that Avenarius famously
problematized as “introjection”—phenomenalizing idealism (the route taken
by Vasubandhu) and empiriocriticism—the new turn of Mach and Avenarius
after Kantian critical realism which reasons against the metempirical status
of the synthetic a priori.
703 The Anti–Atomist M´ etaphysics of Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra
I once heard the question
seriously discussed, ”How the
perception of a large tree
could ﬁnd room in the little
head of a man?”
(Ernst Mach)
T
HE TASK CUT OUT for this chapter will be to argue, by conducting
a detailed analysis of the relevant arguments in verses 11–16 of
the Vim . ´ satik¯ a, that Vasubandhu really did intend his refutation of
the external object to operate as a critique of transcendental objectivity. In
other words, by undercutting the epistemic justiﬁcation of the metaph´ ysical
realist’s existence claims for such putatively external objects, he aims to
demonstrate that the existence of objects ontologically independent from our
own mental representations is not established.
Some modern revisionists regard Mind–Only epistemology as a phe-
nomenological realism that focuses its attention on the ﬂux of experience
and chooses not to concern itself with metaph´ ysicalities. It is entirely correct
to point out that for Mind–Only, things–in–themselves are philosophically
gratuitous. In point of fact, Mind–Only generally refrains from engaging
in ontological theorizing. Yet this minimal analysis does not go nearly far
enough—for if a philosophical position which is non–materialistic, excludes
all extramental elements from the constitution of experience, insists on
viewing the world strictly in epistemological terms, and maintains that
experience of the given moment is noematically constituted solely by the
generative activity of transcendental subjectivity does not deserve the label
of idealism, then what does?
Any reading of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism will inevitably
be inﬂuenced by one’s expectations about the position that he is attempt-
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ing to establish. A critical review of some of the more popular interpre-
tations of Mind–Only will help to triangulate the epistemological intent
of Vasubandhu’s argument and set our prochronistic parallels to empirio-
criticism on a ﬁrmer footing.
The Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra eliminates the object term of the three–term theory
of perception advanced by Sautr¯ antika and returns to a two–term theory
of perception. However, it does not quite come out to direct realism, as
Mind–Only bars all epistemological means of access to the noumenal realm
(param¯ artha–satya). It conﬁnes ordinary perception (pratyaks .a) and rea-
soning (anum¯ ana) to the egological sandbox of the conceptually constructed
nature of experience (parikalpita–svabh¯ ava).
3.1 Readings of Mind–Only
When discussing the Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra school, it is useful to keep three dis-
tinctions in mind—(1) the schools “Following Scripture” and “Following
Reasoning,” (2) the N¯ aland¯ a and the Valabh¯ ı schools, and (3) the True and
False Aspectarian readings.
Tibetan doxography distinguishes the Yog¯ ac¯ ara of Asa˙ nga and Vasubandhu
(“Following Scripture”) from the later school of Dign¯ aga and Dharmak¯ ırti.
(Following Reasoning). In this exposition, we will unfortunately have to
restrict ourselves to a discussion of the doctrine of Vasubandhu—the logico–
epistemological idealism of Dign¯ aga and Dharmak¯ ırti will be largely kept
out of consideration, as will the Sino–Japanese reception history of the
Mind–Only school.
Within the schools of interpretation that evolved from the early Yog¯ ac¯ ara
of Asa˙ nga and Vasubandhu, we must distinguish the N¯ aland¯ a school, most
prominently represented by Dharmap¯ ala, and the Valabh¯ ı school, repre-
sented by Sthiramati.1 There are several notable differences in interpre-
tation between these two schools, of which we will mention only one—the
ontological status of the mental representation in terms of the Yog¯ ac¯ ara
three–nature model. For Sthiramati, the aspect (ak¯ ara) or noema is relegated
1ERICH FRAUWALLNER, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. Akademie-Verlag, 1969,
pp. 396ff.
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to the conceptually constructed (parikalpita) nature of experience, whereas
Dharmap¯ ala holds it to be a part of the other–dependent (paratantra) nature.
In according to the ak¯ ara a causally effective mental reality that is not
imaginary conceptual construction, the N¯ aland¯ a school comes to be much
closer to a Berkeleyan idealism than the Valabh¯ ı school, for which the ak¯ ara
is unreal, and ultimately seen to “dissolve” back into the interdependent
functional ﬂux of the paratantra nature.2
The third distinction, the distinction between True and False Aspectarian-
ism as drawn by Tibetan doxography, will be covered later when we review
the traditional interpretation of Cittam¯ atra.
3.1.1 Revisionist Interpretations of Mind–Only
The revisionist line of interpretation generally insists on reading Mind–Only
not as metaph´ ysical idealism. Rather, it is held to be a phenomenologically
oriented species of pluralist realism. Instead of being concerned with the
way things are qua metaph´ ysical realities, all that matters to Yog¯ ac¯ ara is
the way phenomena are perceptually and mentally constituted. It is in other
words an attempt to reformulate the basic program of Buddhist empiricism
in terms of a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of the activities of
the mind. If it is to be considered idealism at all, it is at best a form of
epistemological, but certainly not of ontological idealism.
The most inﬂuential modern proponents of this phenomenological inter-
pretation are WAYMAN, ANACKER, KING and LUSTHAUS. Some revisionist
scholars claim that Yog¯ ac¯ ara accepts an external world and urge a critical
realist interpretation (notably WAYMAN and KOCHUMUTTOM).
Wayman Wayman alleges that the proponents of the idealist interpretation
support their thesis by a selective reading of the textual evidence, bending
statements that indicate Yog¯ ac¯ arin belief in objective r¯ upas (forms) and
other mind–independent elements.3 But under the premise that Cittam¯ atra
is not an entirely fresh creation, but in many respects an evolution of an
2In this soteriological state, experience is said to shine forth under the transcendently void
aspect of the perfected (parinis .panna) nature.
3ALEX WAYMAN, The Yog¯ ac¯ ara Idealism. Philosophy East and West, 15 1965, p. 65.
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earlier critical realist scholastic system of the Sautr¯ antika, it shouldn’t be
surprising to ﬁnd that it still preserves many overtly realist elements that
have not yet been reformulated or reinterpreted to fully harmonize with
idealism. Given the nature of Mind–Only as a major locus of synthesis for
Buddhist philosophical doctrine, it would in any case unreasonable to assume
that Cittam¯ atra positions are always univocal. It is only natural for the
overarching exegetical theme of idealism to be unraveled into a kaleidoscopic
multiplicity of perspectives upon closer and more critical readings of the
text. A deconstructive hermeneutic uses exegetical themes as prisms for
fracturing the text and opening up its inner interpretive space for many
meanings old and new. One has to wonder whether a project like Wayman’s
which seems to pursue the hermeneutically rather na¨ ıve goal of uncovering
the hitherto hidden “true meaning” of a text really deserves the compliment
of revisionism.
Wayman is not alone in giving a strongly critical realist rendering of Citta-
m¯ atra—Lindstrom, for example, even goes so far as to make the remarkable
assertion that the point of Yog¯ ac¯ ara “is in fact to assert, not deny, ‘the
mind–independence of the material sphere.’”4
I will attempt to show, by a rational reconstruction of Vasubandhu’s argu-
ment against atomism derived from the internal evidence of the text, that
quite the opposite is true. Moreover, it is reasonable to construe Mind–Only
as a species of idealism on the external evidence of the arguments that its
Advaitin and M¯ adhyamika critics have lined up against it. One may of
course always argue that the historical critics of Mind–Only have universally
misconstrued it, but this amounts to contending that only a proponent of
Mind–Only can understand the system well enough to properly critique it.
This argument can safely be dismissed.
Lusthaus Lusthaus insists that the mainline ontological idealist reading
of Yog¯ ac¯ ara is predicated on a fundamental misinterpretation of the term
vij˜ n¯ apti-m¯ atra. He argues that correct interpretation implies no more than
4JEFF LINDSTROM, Imaginations of the Unreal: Modern Interpretations of Yogacara’s ”Ide-
alism”. 2002 hURL: http://individual.utoronto.ca/jlindstrom/coursework/
yogacara_essay_2001_12_19.htmi – accessed on July 10, 2008.
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a realist phenomenology, the idealist features of which are conﬁned to a
strictly epistemological sense—in other words, any ontological sense of the
term is precluded:
Why has Yog¯ ac¯ ara been misinterpreted as idealism? The com-
mon way of interpreting m¯ atra so as to valorize ‘consciousness’
is striking since those same interpretors never impute such im-
plications to m¯ atra on the many other occasions it is used by
Buddhists or Yog¯ ac¯ arins. For instance, the closely allied term
praj˜ n¯ apti–m¯ atra (“only nominally real”) has never led a modern
interpretor to speculate that Language is the metaphysical reality
behind the world of experience; on the contrary, those prone to
idealist interpretations tend to privilege ineffability and yearn for
a realm beyond language and conceptions.5
Naturally, since anybody would agree that the term “only nominally real”
doesn’t indicate that language is the metaph´ ysical reality behind the world
of experience, Lusthaus wants us to agree, mutatis mutandis, that vij˜ n¯ apti-
m¯ atra (in his words, “nothing but noetic constitution”) doesn’t indicate noetic
constitution to be a metaph´ ysical reality behind the world of experience. By
this analogy, he wants us to believe that an ontological reading of the term
vij˜ n¯ apti-m¯ atra is wildly implausible.
But in order for this analogy to carry his argument, Lusthaus relies on a
deliberately misleading implication. The fact that unless we are speciﬁcally
discussing nominalism about propositions, we typically don’t take the term
“only nominally real” to be making a metaph´ ysical proposition about language
has nothing to do with the fact that we may very well believe it to be making
a m´ etaphysical statement about the relationship of language and object. If
we say, for example, that a tree is only nominally real, we are obviously
talking about the referent of the term “tree,” not about the term “tree.” Not
to belabor the issue ad nauseam, but given that the desire to minimize or
eliminate ontological commitments is such a crucial philosophical motivation
5DAN LUSTHAUS, The Crux of the Yogacara Project. August 2004 hURL: http://www.
bu.edu/religion/faculty/bios/Lusthaus/yogacara\%20crux.pdfi – accessed
on July 3, 2008.
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of nominalism, if we all of a sudden make out “nominalism talk” to be about
something other than ontology, then there isn’t much left for it to be talking
about!
Lusthaus is right to point out the importance of epistemological idealism.
But is he really justiﬁed in ruling out ontological readings of vij˜ n¯ apti-m¯ atra?
Perhaps he is—if, somewhere, he offers a better argument for it than the one
we have just discussed.
One can certainly credit Mind–Only epistemology with the intent to be
non-metaph´ ysical. Carnap makes the perspicacious observation that realist,
idealist and phenomenalist epistemologies coincide to the extent that their
constitution theories of experience are ontologically neutral.6 This obser-
vation can help lay to rest a large portion of the perennial vexation about
whether Mind–Only is realism or idealism or phenomenalism—to the extent
that it happens to be non–metaph´ ysical, all three terms equally apply.
Therefore, we have no doubt that Lusthaus is on to something important
about Mind–Only. Also, we are not disputing anything that Lusthaus has to
say about its Sino–Japanese history of reception. But what if Vasubandhu’s
position in the Vim . ´ satik¯ a does, after all, lapse at some point into meta-
ph´ ysics? This is in fact what Cittam¯ atra’s Indian and Tibetan M¯ adhyamika
critics oppugn it for.7 Should we ever catch such a lapse, it would come as no
surprise to ﬁnd that it is an idealist one. If epistemological idealism refuses
to let its metaph´ ysics in through the front door, it may simply enter through
the back.
Some scholars conjecture that the early phase of Yog¯ ac¯ ara was mainly
phenomenological in orientation, whereas its later developments came to be
more ontological. Nagao, for example, notes that the early Yog¯ ac¯ ara of the
Asa˙ nga–Vasubandhu era considered the question of an external reality to be
a problem of the realist’s ontology, and thus, a problem which was not their
concern.8 However, it would be a mistake to conclude that they therefore
desisted from external world skepticism.
6CARNAP, Aufbau, ibid., pp. 249–250.
7Viz. section 4.1, p. 115.
8NAGAO, ibid., p. 187.
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Lusthaus is more circumspect about the issue of the external world than
Kochumuttom. He hedges his bets—while he does not actually say outright
that he believes Mind–Only to be critical realism, he conveys this opinion
obliquely: “To the extent that epistemological idealists can also be critical
realists, Yog¯ ac¯ ara may be deemed a type of epistemological idealism ...”9
Against the view of Lusthaus, I am arguing that the intent of Vasubandhu’s
refutation of atomism is not compatible with critical realism—since if the
transcendental object is bracketed out of the constitution of experience,
critical realism is left behind for good. But as Kant recognized, this is a
dangerous philosophical move to make. An epistemological idealism without
an objective world cannot hold the middle ground and is inexorably pulled
towards an ontological idealism. Once we lose the solid transcendental sea–
bed on which to drop our “reality anchors,” our world of experience becomes
driftwood on the deep of idealism—or to use a more empiricist ﬁgure of
speech, we become sailors on Neurath’s raft.10
But the Vim . ´ satik¯ a has several levels of meaning. Vasubandhu’s soterio-
logical subtext is that once we wake up to the fact that we are empirical
explorers ﬂoating on Kon Tiki, we should steer the raft towards the far-
ther shore. The anagogic reason why the Vim . ´ satik¯ a is force–feeding the
realist with the epistemological idealism of Cartesian epoch´ e is to lead him
even further into skepticism—not because it wants to take a last stand on
any kind of idealism. However, if the indication of being prone to idealist
interpretations of Cittam¯ atra is to “privilege ineffability and yearn for a
realm beyond language and conceptions,” as Lusthaus alleges, then surely,
Vasubandhu the mystic stands guilty as accused.
Kochumuttom In Kochumuttom, we ﬁnd a very systematic and generally
quite convincing Kantian revisionist reading of Vasubandhu. He makes the
argument that Vasubandhu does not deny the noumenon or Ding an sich
outright, but merely claims that it can never be directly given in experience
unless in the condition of enlightenment.11 Generally speaking, this is a per-
9LUSTHAUS, ibid., p. 2.
10ESSLER, LABUDE and UCSNAY, ibid., p. 27.
11KOCHUMUTTOM, ibid., pp. 118–119.
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fectly accurate interpretation, but what this really boils down to upon closer
examination is that Vasubandhu is a critical realist only in the soteriological
sense. There can be no doubt that Vasubandhu believes in an ineffable
noumenal nature (anabhil¯ apya–¯ atma) beyond phenomenal experience—the
true nature of minds known to the enlightened ones.12 But ﬁrst of all, if this
is Vasubandhu’s noumenon, it is nothing like a Kantian idea of pure reason.
The only rationale for calling it a noumenon is that Vasubandhu avers it to
be beyond ordinary experience. Because it is beyond knowing as we know it,
it does not supply any kind of ontological or epistemic grounding, nor can it
be rationally intuited. Vasubandhu already shows his true colors in verse 1
of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a, where he likens the perception of external objects to seeing
cataract–hairs. He is trying to communicate that all the while, we are staring
into the face of the ineffable noumenon, but simply fail to realize it because
we are ignorantly ﬁxated on the obscurations of ordinary experience. This
example goes to show in the context of a Mah¯ ay¯ ana mysticism in full bloom,
Vasubandhu’s belief in an ineffable noumenon is insufﬁcient to establish
that he is a critical realist when it comes to the epistemology of ordinary
experience—in fact, it establishes the very opposite.
Let us examine what Kochumuttom has to say about Vasubandhu’s argu-
ment against atomism:
Nowhere during the discussion does he say that there is no
extra-mental world. Instead he has thrice said that “an atom is
not obtained”. The term translated here as ‘is obtained’ is sidhyati.
To be sure, this term does not mean ‘to exist’ (asti). Therefore, to
translate the above sentence as “an atom does not exist” would
be a gross mistake. The usual meanings of the term sidhyati
are ‘to be obtained (in experience),’ ‘to be given (in experience)’
or ‘to be proved to be true’ etc. So Vasubandhu’s main criticism
against the atomic realism is that the atoms are neither given
in experience nor proved. Therefore he does not really say that
there are no atoms at all, although he is not prepared to admit
12In Mah¯ ay¯ ana terminology, the anabhil¯ apya–¯ atma is more or less synonymous with
´ s¯ unyat¯ a, see CHANDRADHAR SHARMA, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Motilal
Banarsidass, 2000, p. 86.
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that things–in–themselves which are ineffable, could be conceived
in terms of atoms.13
There isn’t much to ﬁnd fault with in this discussion. It shows that
Vasubandhu is rightly very wary of making metaph´ ysical assertions involv-
ing the existence or nonexistence of objects beyond phenomenal experience.
All he says—and all he needs to say—is that atoms are neither given in
phenomenal experience nor proven to constitute experience.
However, if it is really true that Vasubandhu may read as accepting non–
atomic Dinge an sich in the Kantian sense, something is conspicuously
missing from Kochumuttom’s interpretation. Why doesn’t Kochumuttom
supply a reasoning that establishes the necessity for Vasubandhu of some-
thing transcendentally objective as the condition for the function of the
categories (such as is done by Kant in his thesis of the second antinomy
of pure reason)? The conclusion to be drawn from this question is that if
Kochumuttom doesn’t have any such reasoning to show, then there simply
isn’t anything to be shown.
Additionally, there is a systematic difﬁculty with Kochumuttom’s read-
ing of Cittam¯ atra as a variation on Kantian critical realism. If Vij˜ n¯ ana-
v¯ ada and Sautr¯ antika are both critical realisms, then what exactly does
Vasubandhu stand to gain by refuting the Sautr¯ antika theory of perception
in the Vim . ´ satik¯ a?
The fact that Kochumuttom cannot sufﬁciently substantiate the necessity
to Vasubandhu’s epistemology of the Ding an sich despite that Vasubandhu’s
reasoning is generally Kantian is a key justiﬁcation of the empiriocriticist
reading we are attempting here. Kochumuttom agrees that Vasubandhu
neither afﬁrms nor denies the existence of mind–independent atoms in an
ontological sense. This is reason to conclude that Vasubandhu is developing
the Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra epistemology in Cartesian epoch´ e.
3.1.2 The Traditional Interpretation of Cittam¯ atra
According to the traditional line of interpretation, Cittam¯ atra is
metaph´ ysical subjective idealism. The view that the goal of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a is
13KOCHUMUTTOM, ibid., pp. 179–180.
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to deny the existence of a mind–independent external world is backed more
or less uniformly by the classical Indian and Tibetan commentarial tradi-
tions (see e.g. HOPKINS, BLUMENTHAL, or ´ S¯ ANTARAKS . ITA), and by many
modern scholars such as WOOD, TOLA and DRAGONETTI, CHATTERJEE,
GUPTA, MATILAL and NAGAO.14
Arnold points out that Yog¯ ac¯ ara has reduced the Abhidharmika list of
categories to mental events,15 which may be taken an indication of a Yog¯ a-
c¯ ara view that the mind is epistemically prior to the psycho–physical complex
of experience. If it weren’t for the mind, in other words, there would be no
sort of experience whatsoever. Wood, as we have already seen, argues
that the Mind Only Principle frames Cittam¯ atra as a species of ontological
idealism.16 Matilal contends that Yog¯ ac¯ ara idealism sets out to demonstrate
the inconsistency of the realist account of the external world.17
Tibetan doxography unanimously reads Cittam¯ atra as a critical reﬁnement
of Sautr¯ antika which puriﬁes it of the extraneous and self–contradictory
category of the external object. As Mipham states: “The Sautrantikas,
who assert the theory of the mental aspect, are like the Chittamatrins.
The sole difference lies in the assertion or denial of the existence of the
external object.”18 Furthermore, the Mind–Only view resembles Sautr¯ antika
in accepting their doctrine of momentariness.
On this understanding, the Cittam¯ atrin reveals himself to be a Sautr¯ ant-
ika who comes to realize that he has been cast out of the phenomenalistic
garden of Eden into the physical world for having eaten of the forbidden fruit
of metaph´ ysical realism. Vasubandhu’s offensive against the external object
(b¯ ahy¯ artha) is an attempt to rectify this situation by ejecting the Ding an
sich from the epistemological constitution of experience.
King argues that the “phenomenalism” of the Yog¯ ac¯ ara school is clearly
in conﬂict with the Sautr¯ antika epistemology about the issue of being able
14See e.g. GUPTA, ibid., p. 72.
15DAN ARNOLD, Madhyamaka. in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. hURL: http:
//www.iep.utm.edui – accessed on April 12, 2008.
16WOOD, Mind Only, ibid., pp. 171–172.
17MATILAL, Perception, ibid., pp. 359–360.
18CANDRAK¯ IRTI, ibid., pp. 196–197.
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to make veridical statements about a mind–independent external world.19
We will later return to this point of conﬂict and argue it more strongly—the
attack on Sautr¯ antika externalism is in fact one of the centerpieces of the
Vim . ´ satik¯ a’s philosophical program.
3.1.3 Distinguishing True and False Aspectarianism
In Indian philosophy of mind, the debate between idealism and realism
revolves around the issue of whether consciousness is formless or has a
form. Realistic theories (such as those of the Ny¯ aya and M¯ ım¯ am . s¯ a schools)
generally hold that consciousness is formless, whereas idealistic theories
(such as Mind–Only) generally argue that consciousness has a form. This
theory of the mind provides justiﬁcation for their thesis that external objects
are forms of consciousness.20 In an attempt to get a better philosophical
grip on the the precise sense in which the Mind–Only view denies external
objects, we ﬁnd this debate between idealism and realism being carried out
even within Mind–Only, where it centers on whether the sensible forms or
aspects of consciousness are true or false.21
The True and False Aspectarian views differ as to how far they press the
skeptical assault on ordinary experience. Nonetheless, they are in agreement
in maintaining that if one subjects ordinary experience to a transcendental
analysis, one will discover what seemed at ﬁrst to be the external world
and its objects to be mere mental representation (vij˜ n¯ apti-m¯ atra) lacking
extra–mental referents. They both assert (in slighly different ways), that
phenomena are mere conceptual imputations (praj˜ n¯ aptisat) lacking sub-
stantial existence (dravyasat). However, according to Gelug doxography,
both True and False Aspectarian views assert phenomena to be established
as the substantial entity of the mind.22 Tsongkhapa attempts to resolve
this discrepancy by arguing that because the Mind–Only sense of the term
praj˜ n¯ aptisat is less rareﬁed than the M¯ adhyamika sense,23 the Mind–Only
19KING, Asian Philosophy 1998, ibid.
20GUPTA, ibid., p. 45.
21See HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound, ibid., pp. 415ff.
22HOPKINS, ibid., p. 416.
23Cf. section 4.1, p. 114.
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view is realized under more subtle M¯ adhyamika analysis to entail substan-
tial establishment as mind.24 We may think of such hermeneutic maneuvers
as we wish, but they do underscore the necessity of carefully distinguishing
the assertions made by a given philosophical system from meta–philosophical
interpretations of these assertions—which is admittedly usually much easier
said than done.
True Aspectarianism This interpretation of Mind–Only as “realistic ide-
alism” denies external objects transcendentally but accepts them on an
empirical level, i.e. as conventional/pragmatic truth. Following the Kantian
distinction of transcendental and empirical externality, True Aspectarianism
denies the transcendental externality or substantiality (dravyatva) but not
the empirical externality of objects (i.e. their r¯ upa), or their spatiotemporal
determinacy (niyama). Their supposed externality is illusory in a strictly
transcendental sense—but not, however, in an empirical sense. True Aspec-
tarianism is roughly what Kant’s transcendental idealism would amount to
without the Ding an sich.
The True Aspectarian position entails a rejection only of dravya, not of
r¯ upa. The concept of r¯ upa may perhaps be best understood under a phe-
nomenological reading as hyl´ e or material Gestalt of perception,25 whereas
dravya is a metaph´ ysical term signifying transcendentally objective sub-
stance.
True Aspectarianism is still foundationalist because it holds that state-
ments about sense–data (e.g. observations) do not require justiﬁcation. It
adopts an idealist position with regard to transcendental reality but a phe-
nomenalist empiricism with regard to empirical reality: “The Yog¯ ac¯ ara is an
idealist only transcendentally; in empirical matters he has no quarrel with
the realist. All philosophical issues lie between the conﬂicting interpretations
of the facts and not the facts themselves.”26
24JEFFREY HOPKINS, Absorption in No External World: 170 Issues in Mind Only Bud-
dhism (Dynamic Responses to Dzong-Ka-Ba’s the Essence of Eloquence). Snow Lion
Publications, 2006, pp. 311–312.
25GUENTHER, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, ibid., p. 189.
26CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 74.
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False Aspectarianism The “anti–realist idealism” of the False Aspectarian
reading radicalizes the Cartesian skepticism of the True Aspectarian view
in holding the external object to be illusory even in the empirical sense.
It surrenders the last remnants of realism about the external world to
skeptical doubt in rejecting the typical notion of traditional sense–datum
theory that raw sensations are incontrovertible. Even the qualia themselves
(e.g. the perception of blue as blue) are held to be polluted with innate
ignorance (avidya).27 The desired rock–bottom certainty is to be reached not
in sense–data or evidence, but only in the pure self–reﬂexive apperception.
In contesting even the validity of empirical evidence, False Aspectarianism
no longer qualiﬁes as phenomenalism sensu stricto.
The False Aspectarian position that all perception—true to the spirit
of Brentano’s famous dictum “Wahrnehmung ist Falschnehmung”—is tout
court erroneous is closer to the position of the M¯ adhyamikas and Advaitins,
who both regard awareness as formless (nirak¯ ara) in and of itself. False
Aspectarianism is a case in point that the formlessness of consciousness
need not entail realism about external objects—it can just as well lead to a
radically ﬁctionalist view.
Regarding the nature of the mind, False Aspectarianism is much closer
to the Advaita position, as in False Aspectarian interpretation, “raw feels”
are mistaken and “consciousness is ultimately clear like a crystal.” The false
aspects are extrinsic to self–awareness, which is in itself aspectless, veridical
and nondually self–knowing.28 The False Aspectarian view gravitates even
further in the direction of transcendental subjectivity, as it is not the tran-
scendent, egoless and pure subjectivity that infects the mind with mistaken
qualia, but the egological consciousness.
The False Aspectarian anti–realism about sense–data is partially vindi-
cated by ﬁndings of contemporary psychophysics. For example, Pinker points
out that outdoors, a lump of coal reﬂects more light than does a snowball
does indoors. The absolute luminance of the “black” lump of coal is higher
27HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound, ibid., p. 418.
28JAMES BLUMENTHAL, The Ornament of the Middle Way: A study of the Madhyamaka
Thought of Santaraksita. Snow Lion Publications, 2004, p. 187. This view is epitomized
by the crystal simile of consciousness presented in the Sam . dhinirmocana S¯ utra, see
NAGAO, ibid., p. 72.
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than the “white” snowball. Nonetheless, the coal is seen as black and the
snowball is seen as white, because our visual system determines the light-
ness of an object by its relative luminance, i.e. it takes into account the
luminance of its surroundings.29 On a similar note, Mach observes that a
bright surface seems brighter next to a dark surface than next to one brighter
than itself.30 Thus, although perceived qualities such as color and brightness
seem to be absolute and independent, they are actually inﬂuenced by their
surroundings.
In the exposition Madhyamak¯ alam . k¯ ara (Ornament of the Middle Way),
´ S¯ antaraks .ita critiques the False Aspectarian view, arguing that it is fraught
with inconsistencies.31 However, it is admitted that in its assessment that the
phenomenal qualia are ungrounded, the False Aspectarian position better
approximates M¯ adhyamika than the True Aspectarian interpretation.32
According to Tsongkhapa, the True and False Aspectarian positions boil
down to being different ways of reading Cittam¯ atra texts, i.e. the Vim . ´ satik¯ a
and other Mind–Only ´ s¯ astras potentially allow for both a True Aspectarian
and a False Aspectarian interpretation.33 While it is tempting to categorize
the N¯ aland¯ a school as True and the Valabh¯ ı school as False Aspectarian,
Tibetan doxographers don’t classify them along those lines. In fact, they
seem to allow that N¯ aland¯ a as well as Valabh¯ ı school texts can be read both
ways.
Vasubandhu’s Aspect—True or False? Is the Vasubandhu of the
Vim . ´ satik¯ a a True or a False Aspectarian? Possibly neither—if our hy-
pothesis that the doctrine of Mind–Only is only an interim position is
true.34 In his argument against solipsism in 21, he concludes that since
29PINKER, ibid., pp. 7–8.
30MACH, ibid., p. 8.
31See the discussion of the eight absurda of False Aspectarianism in BLUMENTHAL, ibid.,
pp. 127–134, also the analysis of the absurda in ´ S¯ ANTARAKS . ITA and MIPHAM, ibid.,
pp. 246–261. Unfortunately, the topic is too complex to review here—we will have to leave
it at Mipham’s exhortation that “there is nothing more important than these arguments
in the whole of Shantarakshita’s system.”
32 ´ S¯ ANTARAKS . ITA and MIPHAM, ibid., p. 249.
33HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound, ibid., p. 311.
34This reading of Vasubandhu is (more or less) along the lines of ´ S¯ antaraks .ita’s Yog¯ ac¯ ara–
M¯ adhyamika synthesis to the effect that True Aspectarian Cittam¯ atra is the correct
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one knows other minds as one knows one’s own—under the inﬂuence of
avidya—one cannot have direct knowledge of one’s own mind. This arguably
rules out the possibility of the transcendental subjectivity knowing itself
in self–reﬂexive awareness or by any a priori means.35 Here Vasubandhu
is ﬁghting ﬁre with ﬁre. Having closed the escape route to metaph´ ysical
realism, Vasubandhu urges that the Cartesian epoch´ e with its unpalatable
consequence of solipsism (as either subjective or absolute idealism) can
only be broken by an even stronger skeptical epoch´ e. In other words, he
is implicitly submitting ´ s¯ unyat¯ a for consideration. If Vasubandhu really
intends to complete the Vim . ´ satik¯ a on a note of absolute skepticism—and I
think he does—then this vanishing point of the text is where its reading
must be projected from in order to make sense.
But in order to lead his realist interlocutor to the vanishing point,
Vasubandhu must ﬁrst trap him under the bell jar of Cartesian epoch´ e.
This, then, is the philosophical task that Vasubandhu has cut out for himself
in his argument against atomism.
3.2 Argument against Atomism
Mereological nihilism claims that wholes themselves do not exist, only their
constitutive elementary parts. Vasubandhu now takes the Buddhist ultra–
nominalism to its logical conclusion in repudiating even the elementary
parts. The argument is a fundamental critique of realist conceptions of the
part–whole relation. In his Ko´ sa auto–commentary, Vasubandhu has pressed
the Sautr¯ antika critique of least–part substances persisting in time as far
as possible. Now, in a change of tack, he brings under ﬁre the notion of
substances extended in space.
view of empirical truth (sam . vr .ti–satya) and M¯ adhyamika is the view of the ultimate
truth (param¯ artha–satya).
35Neither does Mach believe in privileged access to one’s own mind and sensations—he
writes that he does not draw any essential distinction between his own sensations and
those of others (MACH, ibid., p. 294). His suggested solution to the other minds problem
is that since all knowledge of sensations is empirical, there is no metaphysical divide
between self and others. Mach and Vasubandhu are in agreement about the facts of the
matter and differ only as to the interpretation. To Mach, the situation is life as usual—to
Vasubandhu, it is an existential wake–up call.
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Schmithausen points out that Vim . ´ satik¯ a contains modes of expression
which betray an unmistakeable Sautr¯ antika inﬂuence.36 There is therefore
good reason to assume a continuity of philosophical agenda with the Sau-
tr¯ antika substance critique. King’s assessment that Yog¯ ac¯ ara criticizes
atomism merely on experiential grounds37 is too weak, as we have seen
in the previous chapter that only the Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada realist phenomenalism
admits atoms to be within the realm of experience—Sautr¯ antika does not.
I shall be using TOLA and DRAGONETTI38 as the reference translation
for the following reconstruction. However, the translations of ANACKER,39
WOOD,40 KOCHUMUTTOM41 and FRAUWALLNER42 are also taken into consid-
eration. Also, I will be making frequent reference to KAPSTEIN’s discussion
of mereological considerations in Vasubandhu’s argument,43 as well as to the
insightful analyses of SIDERITS,44 CHATTERJEE,45 and MATILAL.46
3.2.1 The Scheme of the Argument
The structure of Vasubandhu’s argument is apagogic, as is typical for proofs
of idealism. He attempts to disprove the realist interlocutors’ claims that
external objects exist and are composed of transcendentally objective atoms
given either directly in phenomenal experience or demonstrably constitutive
of it.
Opponent Lineup Vasubandhu is arguing against three metaph´ ysical real-
ist opponents, each of whom propose a slightly different version of atomism.
All three maintain mereological atomicity, but only the Vaibh¯ as .ika and the
Sautr¯ antika are mereological nihilists.
36SCHMITHAUSEN, cited in HARRIS, ibid., p. 172.
37KING, Asian Philosophy 1998, ibid.
38DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., pp. 142–147.
39ANACKER, ibid., pp. 167–171.
40WOOD, Mind Only, ibid., pp. 99–100.
41KOCHUMUTTOM, ibid., pp. 174–182.
42FRAUWALLNER, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, ibid., pp. 373–375.
43KAPSTEIN, ibid., pp. 181–204.
44SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., pp. 159–169.
45CHATTERJEE, ibid., pp. 62–67.
46MATILAL, Perception, ibid., pp. 359–362.
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The Vai´ ses .ika maintains that physical entities are real and directly given
to experience. He proposes a direct realist account of perception with a
foundational ontology of physical atoms in conglomeration.47
The Vaibh¯ as .ika position ventures that physical entities are conceptually
imputed to coalesced collections of phenomenalistic atoms. Though the
collections are only nominal, the atoms are real quality–particulars directly
given to experience. Vaibh¯ as .ika proposes a presentationalist account of
perception based on a foundational ontology of substantial sensation–atoms
that appear in collection.48
In the Sautr¯ antika view, phenomenal experience is held to be unreal
(vikalpa), but has underlying realities that are given to reason as necessary
conditions to experience. The Sautr¯ antika representationalism commits to a
foundational ontology of momentary stimulus–atoms.49
Object of Refutation The object of Vasubandhu’s refutation is not the em-
pirically external or outer object (as such objects also also appear in dreams)
but the mind–independent object, i.e. the category of the Kantian transcen-
dental object (which does not appear in dreams). For the atomistic realist,
the existence of such external objects is established by the existence of their
atomic constituents.
But Vasubandhu argues that by modus tollens, since the existence of
atoms cannot be proven, physical objects (or more technically, the outer
¯ ayatanas, i.e. the mind–independently existing sense–ﬁelds or logical spaces
of sensibilia) likewise fail to be established as truly external.
Vasubandhu’s line of reasoning may be roughly reconstructed as follows:
The dream hypothesis of perception adequately accounts for experience and is
consistent with empirical evidence. Vasubandhu has already established the
internal consistency of his thesis against the realist interlocutor’s objections
in verses 2–10. Given that Vasubandhu’s model is basically equivalent in
skeptical strength to a Cartesian scenario, it cannot be falsiﬁed by any
47Viz. section 2.3, p. 39.
48Viz. section 2.4.1, p. 49.
49Viz. section 2.5.1, p. 62.
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empirical evidence we will ever have. At this point, two closely linked
objections may be brought into play:
(1) Williams relates the famous argument of O. K. Bouwsma that an
illusion is no longer illusory if there is no conceivable way to distinguish it
from reality. An illusion that is utterly undetectable as such by any empirical
means can no longer be said to be deceiving us in any practically relevant
sense.50 But under a True Aspectarian interpretation, this objection does not
pose a problem to Vasubandhu, as he may argue that experience is illusion
only in a transcendental sense.
(2) By Popper’s falsiﬁcation principle, the dream hypothesis is not an
empirical theory because it does not have the capability of being proven
false by contradicting empirical evidence. Vasubandhu can, however, safely
dismiss this objection as irrelevant because he doesn’t claim that the dream
hypothesis is an empirical theory—he is proposing it as a metempirical
account of experience.
Method of Refutation Since Vasubandhu is arguing from the position of
Cartesian epoch´ e, he m´ etaphysically brackets the transcendental existence
of the external world while realism metaph´ ysically asserts it. Therefore the
entire burden of proof in this argument lies on the realist. For realism to be
true, the existence of the external world must therefore be established by
transcendental reasoning.51
What could the realist’s transcendental reasoning establishing the exis-
tence of an external world look like? The reasoning must have two steps,
analysis and constitution. The analysis (i.e., the completion of Kant’s so–
called “regressus of decomposition”) is necessary otherwise the metaph´ ysical
realist can’t be certain that he has constituted from ontological ultimates.
The step of constitution cross–checks the analysis to ensure that the atoms
thus determined can actually account for the appearances of things.
Vasubandhu opens the argument by setting up a destructive trilemma
in 11. The putatively external physical object must either itself be (1) a
50WILLIAMS, ibid., p. 107.
51For metaph´ ysical idealism to be true, the existence of the mind must be so established—
but for now, this point is not being challenged by the realist.
883.2 Argument against Atomism
unitary, unanalyzable whole, or a composite that can be analytically reduced
to (2) a collection of isolated atoms (sam . gh¯ ata), as maintained by the Vai-
bh¯ as .ika, or (3) a conglomerate of atoms (pin . d . a), as held by the Vai´ ses .ika.
The cases (2) and (3) resolve into a dilemma between spatially differentiated
and point–like atoms.52
Vasubandhu will go about the argument by showing that if simples are
held to be spatially differentiated, then the analysis is incomplete, and if
they are claimed to be truly partless (i.e. point–like), then they are inca-
pable of constituting phenomena. After (2) and (3) have been eliminated by
this reductio, he will close by debunking position (1), the ﬁnal horn of the
trilemma.
3.2.2 Against Spatially Differentiated Simples
The argument in 12 is directed against the Vai´ ses .ika realist doctrine
of minute but spatially extended spherical atoms that touch each other.
Vasubandhu argues that it is impossible for spatially differentiated objects
capable of direct contact with each other to be least parts (i.e. truly partless
simples). This is because truly partless objects by deﬁnition cannot partially
touch each other in space—they either touch completely or they do not touch
at all. And they touch completely only if they precisely overlap each other,
i.e. occupy the exact same location or spatial “receptacle.” Because spatially
adjoining objects can only touch in parts, partless atoms cannot come into
contact or be in connection (sam . yoga) with each other.53
Mereological Argument This reading exploits the intuition of the meta-
ph´ ysical realist that space is absolute, which implies that objects do not
52Incidentally, we ﬁnd a very similar dilemma in the theory of classical electrodynamics,
having to do with the size of the electron. If the electron is considered to be a rigid,
extended particle, it will be necessary to posit some additional, unknown force that helps
it to keep its shape, as the charges composing it will tend to naturally repel one another.
However, if it is held to be point–like, the back–reaction of the electron’s own charge
upon itself diverges against inﬁnity. The problem of the inﬁnite divergence of the point
charge was not satisfactorily resolved until the 20th century, when theoretical physics.
saw the development of renormalization theory. Modern particle physics experiments
indicate that the electron is in fact a point–particle.
53CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 72.
893.2 Argument against Atomism
modify the geometrical structure of the space that they occupy. Vasubandhu
assumes that even if it were possible to superimpose several objects of exactly
identical shape into the same space, that the size of the objects would remain
unchanged by this operation.54 The Vai´ ses .ika in fact admits that his binary
least whole (dvyan . uka), is of exactly atomic size because the constituent
atoms cannot touch each other in parts. But according to the Vai´ ses .ika, the
dvyan . uka formed in this manner is now a real parts–possessor—a whole
over and above its parts.
There are, however, two problems with this view. First of all, two parts
are only enough to constitute joining in two spatial dimensions. In order
to arrange spheres in a three dimensional cubic lattice (as is probably the
Vai´ ses .ika proposal),55 a minimum of six parts is required, as each atom
contacts six others. This does not pose a major difﬁculty for the Vai´ ses .ika, as
he may easily revise his concept of least whole, and argue that it comprises
six least parts rather than two.
Vasubandhu would of course argue that this revision doesn’t do anything
solve the underlying issue. This leads us to the second problem, which is that
mereological parts can only join by occupying the same spatial receptacle.
Least wholes cannot contact each other in parts as this would entail the
spatial overlap of the contacting parts—and if this were to occur, the six
atoms surrounding the center atom in the cubic lattice would collapse into
it. All composite wholes would have the same size as a single atom, which
Vasubandhu holds to be absurd. This is the “standard interpretation” of the
argument as presented e.g. in Gelugpa doxography.56
54Of course, there are physical theories that dispense with the Newtonian assumption of
absolute space. In Einsteinian relativity theory, for example, space has a variable metric,
while the underlying space–time metric remains invariant. Vasubandhu’s reasoning
assumes that the realist is proposing a spatially extended atom in absolute space—which
is of course what Vasubandhu’s realist opponent is doing. The Vai´ ses .ika position he is
arguing against is not sophisticated enough to have a subjective or relative concept of
space.
55Close–packings of spheres in three–dimensional Euclidean space do not tessellate. The
notion that the atomic lattice should have the spatial receptacle of an atom as its unit
cell could be a possible reason why the Vai´ ses .ika may be proposing that atoms join in a
cubic lattice.
56HOPKINS, Maps of the Profound, ibid., p. 403.
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Here we observe that Vasubandhu is controversially assuming that connec-
tion (sam . yoga) entails overlap, which is not generally the case. Connection is
a topological concept, whereas overlap is mereological.57 If the two concepts
are taken to be equivalent, then topology amounts to a model of mereology.
Vasubandhu, being a Buddhist ultra–nominalist, is arguing just this. The
gravamen of his case against the realist is the objection that an individual
substance qua ontological ultimate must be construed as a bare mereo-
logical concept. Due to his Sautr¯ antika roots, Vasubandhu has a critical
concept of space and considers topological primitives such as connection and
shape to be vikalpa. To him, these conceptual constructions are unreal and
therefore not appropriate to the realm of ontology. Once we have accepted
the ultra–nominalist premise that ultimate ontology is bare mereology—as
Vasubandhu is urging—then his argument against atomism simply runs its
course without further obstacles.
Since his two Buddhist opponents, the Vaibh¯ as .ika and the Sautr¯ antika
are both committed to mereological nihilism, they have no other choice but to
go along with the unwelcome consequences of this position that Vasubandhu
is about to draw for them.
The Sautr¯ antika position will be scrutinized later—for now, Vasubandhu
is going to score points against the Kashmiri Vaibh¯ as .ikas, who submit in XX
that the mereological argument has no impact on their position.
The Vaibh¯ as .ikas explain that because they do not maintain the existence
of connections between the partless substance–atoms that constitute the
aggregate–atom (we recall that according to their view, the substance–atoms
are separated by interstices). They argue that only these aggregate–atoms
(or cohesive “molecular” groups) are connected among themselves, since they
have parts. Vasubandhu off–handedly dismisses this theory in 14 with the
observation that the aggregate is a nominally designated mereological sum.
Therefore, it cannot be a parts–possessor or be admitted to have any physical
57See ACHILLE VARZI, Spatial Reasoning and Ontology: Parts, Wholes and Locations. in:
M. AIELLO, I. PRATT-HARTMANN and J. VAN BENTHEM, editors, Handbook of Spatial
Logics. Springer-Verlag, 2007 hURL: http://www.columbia.edu/˜av72/papers/
Space_2007.pdfi – accessed on June 28, 2008.– chapter 1, 33–35.
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properties (such as connection, covering, resistance and obstruction) that its
individual atoms lack.
Otherwise the aggregate–atom becomes a real conglomerate (pin . d . a), which
would be the position of the Vai´ ses .ika.58 Being an ultra–nominalist, the Vai-
bh¯ as .ika is forced to accept this consequence. Vasubandhu emphasizes that
the aggregate–atom’s inability to connect is due its purely nominal status,
not due to the partlessness of the substance–atoms—this is an issue that he
deals separately later on in the argument.
The Vai´ ses .ika, on the other hand, is still very much alive and kicking. He
is not willing to accept the idea that the atom is a bare mereological least part
and retables an amended version of his proposal. Substance–atoms are not
quite bare mereological least parts, he argues. They occupy receptacles and
therefore have spatial extent. Two atoms join through mereological overlap
(ﬁlling the same receptacle) to form a binary (dvyan . uka).59 Topological
connection is a property of integral wholes, not of least parts. The dvyan . uka,
being an integral whole, can now topologically connect as it pleases.
However, Vasubandhu evidently thinks there is something deeply wrong
with the idea that a mereological least part can possess spatial extent. Thus
far, we have examined his “mereological argument” against the Vai´ ses .ika.
But later on in 14 and XXIII, he offers a more general “geometric argument”
intended to knock down the notion that an atom extended in space (i.e. occu-
pying a spatial receptacle) can be an indivisible unity (ekatva). Vasubandhu
unfortunately does not specify the argument in depth. He says only this
much—a unity in which there is a “division according to the sections of the
space” is not logically possible. In the following, we will examine two possible
readings for this argument—the Zenonian and the Kantian model.
Zenonian argument from complete divisibility The argument of complete
divisibility (essentially a reformulated version of Zeno’s metrical paradox of
58MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 362.
59The Vai´ ses .ika can’t afford to argue that point–like atoms combine into a spatially extended
dvyan . uka. Since the dvyan . uka is physically divisible, such a view would entail the
unacceptable consequence that matter loses its spatial extent when broken out into
ultimates.
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extension),60 was ﬁrst described by Aristotle, but later attributed to Zeno by
Simplicius.61
If a body is completely divisible, then it must be divisible into parts that
do not have any magnitude (else these parts would have spatial magnitude
and therefore be incompletely divided). A complete division leaves either
extensionless point–parts or nothing whatsoever. Zeno concludes that if
nothing whatsoever remains after the division of a body, then the body is an
illusion—ex nihil nihilo ﬁt. And if only extensionless points remain, the sum
of their extensions is zero, and therefore the body will be unextended. By
consequence, if in reality, the body is no larger than a single point–atom, the
appearance of an extended body would be illusory.
Against this, the Vai´ ses .ika will convey that the indivisibility of the atom
is a merely physical one. It applies only to its physical substance and not
to its spatial extent. The thesis being stated here is that for an entity
to be a mereological least part, it is necessary and sufﬁcient for it to be
physically indivisible. This counter–argument is reasonable enough to derail
the Zenonian analysis, and it is not immediately obvious as to what might
be wrong with it.
We can observe that by insisting on the necessity of a limit to physical
division, the Vai´ ses .ika is maintaining a position that resembles Kant’s thesis
of the second antinomy of pure reason, which now leads us to examine the
second interpretive model for Vasubandhu’s geometric argument.
Kantian antithesis In the thesis of the second antinomy, Kant argues that
composites are decomposable, and, more controversially, proposes the ne-
cessity of mereological atomicity—decomposition must entail reducibility to
minimal parts. Every real composite must be reducible to a bottom level of
self–subsisting simples. For if the operation of decomposition were to possess
the property of closure (i.e. every composite entity yields only further com-
60PYLE, ibid., p. 1ff.
61NICK HUGGETT, Zeno’s Paradoxes. in: EDWARD N. ZALTA, editor, The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy. Winter 2006 hURL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2006/entries/paradox-zeno/i – accessed on July 3, 2008.
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posite entities under decomposition), nothing would remain if all composite
entities were to be analyzed away, which Kant claims to be absurd.
The antithesis of Kant’s second antinomy attempts to show that composites
cannot have minimal parts. Kant’s case is based on the following premises—
(1) composition is an external relation of substances and is possible only
in space, (2) every part of a composite must occupy a sub–receptacle of
the composite’s receptacle, (3) these sub–receptacles are themselves spaces.
Therefore the receptacles of the simples are spatial. However, according
to Kant, because space is external relation of substances, or rather, an
inner mode of representation in which certain perceptions are connected to
each other,62 a receptacle cannot be a space unless it contains a manifold
or composite of substances in external relation to each other. But if the
receptacle of a simple substance contains a composite, this implies the
absurdity that the simple is a substantial composite.63
Furthermore, Kant thinks that it is inconsistent for one and the same
space to have two distinct limit–concepts—the extensionless geometrical
point and additionally, the physically indivisible but geometrically space–
ﬁlling physical point.64
Perhaps the Vai´ ses .ika position that the atom is “absolutely imperceptible”
may be seen as an attempt to get a grip on this discrepancy by letting the
physical extent of the atom converge against the spatial limit–concept.65
Supposing the atom is held to be geometrically divisible but physically
62IMMANUEL KANT; WILHELM WEISCHEDEL, editor, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Volume 2,
Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1980, p. 381 (A 378). For a discussion of Kant’s
relational theory of space, see also MALTE HOSSENFELDER, Kants Konstitutionstheorie
und die Transzendentale Deduktion. Walter de Gruyter, 1978, p. 60–61.
63KANT, ibid., p. 421 (B 463), see also STEPHAN SCHMAUKE, Wohlth¨ atigste Verirrung:
Kants kosmologische Antinomien. Verlag K¨ onigshausen & Neumann, 2002, pp. 63–64.
64KANT, ibid., p. 425 (B 469). Here the realist might consider a multi–space scheme similar
to the one proposed by Carnap in Der Raum (see MAURO MURZI, Rudolf Carnap (1891-
1970). in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. hURL: http://www.iep.utm.edui –
accessed on July 4, 2008), where the regresses of sensory divisibility, physical divisibility
and geometric divisibility each terminate at the limit–concepts for their respective spaces.
Geometrical divisibles need not be physically divisible, and physical indivisibles can be
much smaller than minima sensibilia. But such a scheme would of course represent an
unacceptable departure from the notion of an absolute space.
65There is another problem with the inﬁnitesimal atom—it fails to preserve the Vai´ ses .ikas’
assumption that composites must decompose into a ﬁnite number of entities.
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indivisible, one may ask whether its shape is physical or geometrical. If it is
both, then absurdly, the atom’s shape is divisible and indivisible. Finally, if
the atom’s shape is merely geometrical, then the atom has turned out to be a
synthesis of a substance with a geometric shape—and a simple, by deﬁnition,
may not be a synthetic whole.
Kant remarks that the antitheses of the antinomies are typical of empiri-
cist views.66 If Vasubandhu’s argument is anything like the antithesis of
the second antinomy—and I think it is—then it should be fair enough to
characterize his position as a kind of empiricism.
We will not be able to establish here whether Kant’s attempt to prove that
a substance cannot have both spatial extent and simplicity satisfactorily
accomplishes the work cut out for it.67 Vasubandhu probably intuits—for
reasons much similar to those of Kant—that there can be no such thing
as a mereological least part that occupies a receptacle. Would he then
also agree with the thesis of the second antinomy? On Kapstein’s reading,
Vasubandhu argues both the thesis and the antithesis of Kant’s second
antinomy: “Vasubandhu, on the other hand, aims to demonstrate that the
atomic theory is both false and necessary.”68
But Kapstein’s explanation of what Vasubandhu is up to here is muddled.
Vasubandhu is not aiming to establish the necessity of the atomic theory—he
is merely attempting to demonstrate that the realist’s atomic theory leads to
antinomy. The “necessity” of the atomic theory is the realist’s position, not
Vasubandhu’s.
What of the possibility of “exotic space?” The realist need not assume that
space is continuous—he may argue that it is discrete (as was ﬁrst proposed by
Zuse).69 Or he could argue that the metrical structure of three–dimensional
Euclidean space is a property that only emerges at the scale of macroscopic
objects. Continuity and metric could be macroscopic epiphenomena of some
66KANT, ibid., p. 444 (B 495).
67Clearly, the added leverage (if any) of Kant’s antithesis argument over Zenonian argument
from divisibility can only derive from additional considerations apart from the geometric
properties of space itself—such as the conditions of its epistemological constitution.
68KAPSTEIN, ibid., p. 186.
69See KONRAD ZUSE, Rechnender Raum. Vieweg, 1969. However, it is rather unlikely that
a stick-in-the-mud realist would try to save his metaph´ ysics with a computer theory of
reality, as generally speaking, such theories are dead ringers for idealism.
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more exotic type of space at a microscopic level, e.g. a space that comes
in discrete chunks, that has more than three dimensions, etc.—as is often
assumed in modern theoretical physics.
However, if the realist were to travel down this route, he would effec-
tively be arguing that space has hidden properties not accessible to sensible
intuition—a very slippery slope for a direct realist like the Vai´ ses .ika.
3.2.3 Against Point–like Atoms
The treatment of point–like atoms as a possible case is a hermeneutic interpo-
lation to make the proof easier to follow. The terms “point” or “point–like” are
not explicitly mentioned by Vasubandhu—the k¯ arik¯ as and auto–commentary
only discuss the atom qua “unity” (ekatva). This assumption is supported
by the interpretation of Siderits, who also ventures that Vasubandhu is
examining the case of point–like atoms.70
Vasubandhu’s arguments in 14 are directed against the idea that phenom-
enal appearances cannot be constituted from point–like atoms. He argues
that atoms must be spatially differentiated in order to account for certain
visual phenomena such as light and shadow or extended surfaces.71
Since Vasubandhu has already established that true atoms cannot not
have spatial differentiation, the argument that point–like atoms cannot
account for appearances completes the reductio against atoms.
Shadow Terminator Argument This argument is against the Vai´ ses .ika
opponent, who wishes to dodge Vasubandhu’s arguments against spatially
extended atoms by proposing point–like atoms in lieu of his original theory
that atoms are inﬁnitesimally sized spheres. Vasubandhu’s objection is
predicated on the Vai´ ses .ika’s physicalistic belief that light is a kind of in-
corporeal substance or luminous ﬂuidum72 (unlike the understanding of the
phenomenalizing Buddhist schools, who analyze light strictly as intensity
70SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., p. 163, cf. KAPSTEIN, ibid., p. 190, who opines
that it is highly questionable that Vasubandhu entertained the idea of point–like atoms.
71ANACKER, ibid., p. 169.
72KARL H. POTTER, editor, Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies: Buddhist Philosophy
100-350AD. Volume 8, Motilal Banarsidass, 2002, pp. 267–268.
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of visual sensation or stimulus). The Vai´ ses .ika deﬁne shadow as absence of
illumination.
Vasubandhu contends that for a matter–atom to be able to cast shadow
on other objects, it must obstruct the ﬂuidum, which it can only do if it is
bisected by a shadow terminator (a line dividing the illuminated from the
shadowed section of the atom). But a truly point–like matter–atom cannot
have a light and a shadow side. It is incapable of obstructing the luminous
ﬂuidum, any more than a dam can hold back water without an upstream
and a downstream face.73
The realist protests that even if individual atoms are uniformly light or
shadow, this does not logically exclude the possibility that a conglomerate of
atoms could be bisected with a shadow terminator, dividing uniformly light
from uniformly dark atoms.
In response, Vasubandhu inquires whether is it being admitted that an
agglomeration (pin . d . a) is something other than the atoms themselves. Is
the realist in other words willing to admit conglomerates of atoms into his
foundational ontology? The realist objector is forced to answer that they can’t
be admitted—to do so would defeat the whole point of having a foundational
ontology. However, if the conglomerate is not admitted as an entity in its own
right, then the realist’s objection is scuttled. How is it that the conglomerate
as a whole can obstruct light if none of its atoms are able to? One would
expect it to be totally transparent.
Of course, this line of reasoning does not take into account the modern
physical theory of point–like particles that can act at a distance by way of
ﬁeld effects. But this poses no problem for Vasubandhu because none of his
realist opponents adhere to such a view.
Displacement Argument Here Vasubandhu argues that if atoms are inca-
pable of obstructing each other, they lose the ability to spatially displace each
other and collapse into the same spatial location when connected. Possibly,
Vasubandhu is playing on the geometrical intuition that an extensionless (i.e.
point–like) atom with no internal structure can make direct contact with
73SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., p. 164.
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another such atom if and only if they both occupy the exact same geometrical
point. In this particular edge case, topological connection coincides with
mereological overlap.
The displacement argument applies equally to the Vai´ ses .ika and the Vai-
bh¯ as .ika atomisms. The Vaibh¯ as .ika’s aggregate–atoms cannot connect, nor
can their non–obstructing partless atoms. The Vaibh¯ as .ika of course agrees
that atoms do not connect to each other. But if atoms are unconnected,
individually partless and non–obstructing (i.e. point–like), the Vaibh¯ as .ika is
unable to account for how they might constitute physically resistant or visu-
ally opaque surfaces in sum. He is reduced to abiding by the unconvincing
hypothesis that individual substance–atoms have latent properties that are
actualized only when they are perceived in collection. This is unsatisfactory
because it is not admitted that an individual atom may be perceived in
isolation—hence, the cases of latent properties and “insensible sensibilia”
coincide. Talk of latent properties does nothing to alleviate the real problem
at hand.
3.2.4 Against Integral Wholes
After Vasubandhu has thoroughly laid waste to the idea that atomism is
compatible with a two–term theory of perception, the Vai´ ses .ika is back with
a new proposal predicated instead on the integral whole (avayavin). He
objects that since Vasubandhu’s reasoning against atoms and conglomerates
has left the phenomenal characteristics (such as form–color) of the external
sense–ﬁelds untouched, why not simply admit percepts (i.e., integral wholes)
as external?74
The Vai´ ses .ika contends that the whole is an object of valid knowledge.
If the whole is known by any means of valid knowledge, it is useless to
consider the alternatives as to how it exists in the parts. He pleads the
common–sense realist standpoint that abstract speculation cannot override
valid experience of unities. The perception of the unitary whole does not
depend on the perception of atoms, he argues, although their existence can
74DRAGONETTI and TOLA, ibid., pp. 145–146.
983.2 Argument against Atomism
be inferred.75 We can already surmise what Vasubandhu thinks of this. In
his auto–commentary to the Ko´ sa, he has gone so far as to disparage the
integral whole (avayavin) theory of the Vai´ ses .ika as “infantile.”76
Although he almost can’t be bothered with a counter–argument,
Vasubandhu expands into a one–or–many reductio and immediately dis-
misses the many case as having already been refuted. As for the case that
phenomenal appearances themselves are integral wholes, Vasubandhu ar-
gues that a real, self–subsisting unity ought to have uniform, non–conﬂicting
properties. He then points out some of the absurdities that result from this
idea. The core of the argument is contained in his axiomatic proposition:
“For a concurrent apprehension and non–apprehension of the same thing
isn’t logical.”77
Here we need to keep in mind that Vasubandhu is speaking of the atom
qua perceptual datum. By deﬁnition, an atomic perceptual datum must
either be given in its entirety or not at all. If it is possible to see only part of
an object (for example, an aspect of a tree), the object cannot be an atomic
datum. But all gross physical phenomena, Vasubandhu points out, are only
ever given in aspect. While we may say that we see a brown table, we will
have to admit that there are parts of the table that we do not see.
Chatterjee conjectures that Vasubandhu is making an argument for the ne-
cessity of phenomenal pluralism to subjective epistemic knowing, as absolute
unity would entail an absolute uniformity of experience without change or
succession.78 Kochumuttom has it that Vasubandhu is attempting to refute
Parmenidean monism.79
While there is something to be said for these points, the following examples
provided by Vasubandhu illustrate that his argument is mainly mereological
in thrust. On the reading being proposed here, after already having argued
against the substantial partless part, Vasubandhu is now demolishing the
idea of the substantial partless whole.
75SINHA, ibid., pp. 199-201.
76ANACKER, ibid., p. 129.
77ANACKER, ibid., p. 170.
78CHATTERJEE, ibid., p. 67.
79KOCHUMUTTOM, ibid., p. 169.
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In the ﬁrst example, Vasubandhu raises the objection that partless wholes
contradict the experiential reality of incremental movement. If the earth, for
instance, were an indivisible unity, it should not be possible to walk, because
the ground would have no parts that could be traversed by the successive
steps. For motion to be possible, there must be distance, which in turn entails
spatial extent and directional parts.
Next, if entities are partless wholes, it should not be possible to grasp
a whole in some parts but not in others. Yet clearly, we are touching the
elephant even if we are only touching its trunk and not its tail.80
Moreover, if it is supposed that partless wholes are differentiated only by
their phenomenal characteristics and not by their spatial location, then it
should not be possible to distinguish horses from elephants, or several horses
from one. A separation of entities could not be accepted since everything
would be spatially indistinct, i.e. occupying the same location.
In the ﬁnal example, which involves microscopic aquatic animals,81
Vasubandhu argues that entities are distinguished by size. Else if phe-
nomenal characteristics were held to be independent of physical size, we
should be able to see micro/-organisms with the naked eye.
The distinction of phenomenal characteristics (i.e. description of sensory
experience in a purely phenomenal language) is in and of itself insufﬁcient
to distinguish unities—non–phenomenal factors such as quantity, distance,
size and time must be brought in.82 Such concepts are not reducible to
phenomenal language.
The phenomenal wholes given to experience have parts, Vasubandhu rea-
sons, and if they are to be substantial, they must necessarily have least
parts.83 But they do not—therefore he concludes that phenomena are insub-
stantial, and that there is no more to a phenomenon than our awareness of
it.
80As noted above, Anacker reads this passage as referring to perceptual “apprehension,” not
to tactile grasping.
81The question of how Vasubandhu was aware of the existence of such organisms 1200 years
before van Leeuwenhoek perfected the microscope will have to remain unanswered.
82SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., p. 166.
83Contra Kapstein: necessarily, that is, to the realist—not to Vasubandhu.
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3.2.5 Against the Causal Theory of Perception
In 16, the argument is against the Sautr¯ antika, who espouses a stripped–
down version of the Vaibh¯ as .ika externalism of mental intentionality. A men-
tal representation is epistemically grounded by the collection of stimulus–
atoms that causally generated it, the Sautr¯ antika wishes to claim. He
is proposing something of the sort that momentary (ks .an . ika) point–like
stimulus–atoms act in aggregate upon the sense bases to causally generate
non–point–like sensations that assemble into representations.
The time–gap argument for representationalism is premised on the idea
that because there can be a delay between an observed event and one’s
observation of it, one actually observes a representation of the event.84
But the time–gap argument only supports representationalism if physical
objects are assumed to exist. If the external object is the probandum of the
argument—as is the case for the Sautr¯ antika strain of realism—it operates
against representationalism instead of conﬁrming it.85
Vasubandhu points out that under a strict presentist account of atoms,
externalism about intentional states breaks down completely. Because Sau-
tr¯ antika doesn’t admit to external temporal continuants, by the time a
mental representation arises, the stimuli that caused it have evanesced. By
consequence, all representations of external objects come to be representa-
tions of absistents—neither do they offer a solid ground of inference about
reality, nor do they require the epistemic grounding that such an inference
might provide.
This line of reasoning echoes a Vaibh¯ as .ika critique of the Sautr¯ antika
representationalism, to the effect that that inference is based on logical
pervasion (vyapti) of the mark of inference and the inferred property. This
pervasion being the ground of inference, it cannot itself be derived from
inference but must be given in perception. However, since the Sautr¯ antika
84MICHAEL HUEMER, Sense-Data. in: EDWARD N. ZALTA, editor, The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2007 hURL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2007/sense-data/i – accessed on July 6, 2008.
85SIDERITS, Buddhism as Philosophy, ibid., p. 169.
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denies direct perception of external objects, they can never be objects of
inference either due to a lack of the necessary ground of inference.86
Since the Sautr¯ antika’s causal theory of perception invalidates his own
thesis while establishing the position of Vasubandhu, the Sautr¯ antika might
as well dispense with his gratuitous metaph´ ysical hypothesis of external
objects. Russell once famously argued that na¨ ıve realism, if true, is false;
therefore it is false. Vasubandhu is driving home an analogous point about
the Sautr¯ antika position.
3.2.6 Resum´ ee of the Argument
If there are no atoms, then ought Mind–Only not to maintain that phenomena
are in principle inﬁnitely divisible? Why is it is taken for granted by his
realist opponents that inﬁnite divisibility is a problem? Leibniz, for example,
believed the idea that atoms mark an end to the subdivision of matter to
be a dangerous error.87 David Lewis and others have speculated that the
hypothesis that physical objects are “atomless gunk” ought not to be ruled
out a priori.88 It is also conceivable that some (but not all) composite objects
have a complete atomic decomposition.
It has been argued by some modern commentators that Vasubandhu’s
demonstration shows not that phenomena are not compounded, but that
they are compounded to an inﬁnite degree, i.e. that phenomena are gunk.89
Following the principle of ex nihilo nihilo ﬁt, since inﬁnitely divisible phenom-
ena lack a compositional base of elemental substances, they are insubstantial
and therefore illusory. Vasubandhu’s line of reasoning may be construed as
an inversion of Epicurus’ principle that indivisible minima are necessary
if macroscopic bodies are not to be mere appearances.90 Since indivisible
minima are logically impossible, Vasubandhu concludes that macroscopic
bodies are in fact no more than appearances.
86SINHA, ibid., p. 59.
87JOHN D. BARROW, The Universe That Discovered Itself. Oxford University Press, 2000,
p. 181.
88See TED SIDER, Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk. Analysis, 53(4) 1993.
89 ´ S¯ ANTARAKS . ITA and MIPHAM, ibid., p. 42.
90PYLE, ibid., p. 9.
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Must phenomena have a compositional base in order to sustain realism?
Or restating the question in broader terms, need a foundationalist realism
entail reductionism and externalism? The Indian realists of Vasubandhu’s
day seemed to think so. Would they even recognize a coherentist, non–
reductionist, internalist epistemology as realism? To hazard a guess, perhaps
they might recognize such a realism as Vij˜ n¯ anav¯ ada!
The argument against atomism requires a number of unstated assump-
tions to function as intended, many of which are quite possibly false. The
notion of physical divisibility, for example, may pose theoretical difﬁculties
to Vasubandhu’s analysis, as it requires a concrete physical operation, as op-
posed to a purely abstract or mental operation. The required energy to split
a composite particle must be supplied by some particle interaction which
physically destroys the original composite particle. This process cannot be
compared to analytic decomposition, as once a composite particle has been
physically split into its component parts, the composite that they were a
part of no longer exists. Therefore, they can no longer be properly considered
parts of that composite.
To give a blanket refutation of atomism, Vasubandhu would have to demon-
strate that, generally speaking, all atomistic mereologies are either logically
inconsistent or empirically useless, but of course his argument accomplishes
no such thing. Also, it does not defeat gunk theory and theories such as
those of modern particle physics involving point–particles with interactional
force ﬁelds, nor does it damage ontologically non–absolute atomisms such
as constitution from sensory minima, attributive atomism, instrumentalist
atomism or logical atomism.
But Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism is nonetheless strong
enough to handily dispatch any realist account which proposes that on-
tologically absolute atoms are metaph´ ysically constitutive of phenomenal
experience. It pulls out the rug from the Vai´ ses .ika claim that their particles
lack proper parts, and beats back the Vaibh¯ as .ika notion of point–particle
sensations that aggregate to form extended sensation–clusters that join with
other clusters to constitute macroscopic phenomena. And, as I will argue in
the following, the Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra viewpoint does not intend to damage onto-
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logically relativist forms of atomism—on the contrary, it is fully compatible
with it.
From the Mind–Only point of view, parts and wholes are conceptual ﬁctions
(vikalpa), yet within within the dream–like epistemological ﬁction of ordinary
experience, they are true.91 For unlike Cincinnatus C., the unfortunate
protagonist of Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading, who is imprisoned and
sentenced to death for the unutterable crime of “gnostic turpitude,” we
generally do not care to entertain the idea that the world we are inhabiting
is an unreal ﬁction (abh¯ uta–parikalpa) generated by the dualizing mind.
During the course of our discussion of the argument against atomism, we
have seen how Vasubandhu parlays the Buddhist’s nominalist skepticism
about part–whole realism into a full–scale assault on the Ding an sich.
Little should we be surprised if the gnostic turpitude that Vasubandhu is so
blatantly inciting reveals itself upon closer examination to be nothing other
than good, solid empiricism.
3.3 Visions of Vij˜ n¯ aptim¯ atra in Empiriocriticist Eyes
Swapping our philosophical horses in midstream, we now pass to an investi-
gation of empiriocriticist views on the ontological status of the atom and the
external object. To be sure, the aim of comparing Mind–Only with empirio-
criticism is not to completely gloss over the differences between the two.
Mach and Avenarius are not subjective idealists,92 and their critique of the
synthetic a priori does not have an equivalent in Mind–Only (though there
is a great deal of category critique to be found).93 The radical presentism
and the strong mystical subtext of Mind–Only are absent in empiriocriticism.
Nevertheless, a search for epistemological common ground won’t take long
to strike paydirt.
91See JAY L. GARFIELD, Reductionism and Fictionalism: Comment on Siderits’ ”Per-
sonal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy”. Online, 2008 hURL: http://www.smith.edu/
philosophy/documents/ReductionismandFictionalism.pdfi – accessed on July
7, 2008, p. 2.
92That is to say, on their own count, they are not—though the charge of subjective idealism
has been put to them by others.
93Matilal considers it to be a lacuna of Indian epistemologies in general that they lack an
elaborated notion of a priori knowledge, see MATILAL, Perception, ibid., p. 31.
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We must be careful not to push the comparison with Mind–Only too far—
Mach attempts to steer clear of the extreme of mentalism (ontological ideal-
ism), whereas Vasubandhu arguably embraces it. But although Vasubandhu
is planted more ﬁrmly in the idealist camp, his anti–atomistic epistemology
is remarkably close to the sensation pluralism of Mach, a passionate critic
of atomism. He is opposed to the Kantian Dinge an sich as well as to the
metaph´ ysical atomism of the physical theory of his day for very much the
same reasons as Vasubandhu rejected the atom and the external object.
Mach attempts to gain the unstable epistemological middle ground be-
tween idealism and realism.94 Sommer points out a small but important
detail about Mach’s position: sensations are not intrinsically subjective, as is
commonly assumed.95 To Mach, the elements of experience (the explananda)
are the epistemically prior raw materials of the explanans, i.e. the con-
struction of subjectivity and objectivity96 as they are given rise to by na¨ ıve
realism.97
In Mach’s view, as opposed to the metaph´ ysical Vaibh¯ as .ika notion of the
aggregate–atom (sam . gh¯ ata–paraman . u), sensation–nuclei are purely correl-
ative conceptual constructs. The atom is a mental shorthand (Gedanken-
symbol) for the covariance of functional relationships between the sensa-
tional elements of different psychophysical spaces, i.e. the space of vision, of
hearing and of tactile sensation.98 The notions of metaph´ ysically absolute
space, time and substance have no place in Mach’s epistemology. Substances
and atoms are higher order “tensorial abstractions.” They are pragmatic
ideas that help us to economically conceptualize the complexes, relations and
connections of sensations.99 In the same vein, Mach maintains that scientiﬁc
94SOMMER, Evidenz im Augenblick, ibid., pp. 77–78.
95MANFRED SOMMER, Husserl und der Fr¨ uhe Positivismus. Vittorio Klostermann, 1985,
p. 81.
96Respectively, the functional interrelations of α β γ, or the “psychic” elements, and A B C
...K L M ..., or the “physical” elements.
97Anticipating evolutionary psychology by a century, Mach views common–sense realism as
a sophisticated adaptation, see MACH, ibid., p. 30.
98MACH, ibid., p. 254.
99MACH, ibid., pp. 268–269.
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explanations, including the natural laws of physics, are merely economical
descriptions of functional relation.100
As Musil observes, Mach does not see any difference in kind between ex-
planation and description, nor does he believe the veridicality of descriptions
to involve any kind of metaphysical correspondence to reality. His theory
of m´ etaphysics and epistemology is grounded in evolutionary psychology.101
Descriptions acquire their truth–value in pragmatic use. Conceptualization
does not stand apart from the process of functional relation, but rather,
participates in it, by assisting the organism in selectively adapting to its
environment.102
Turning to Avenarius, Mach’s philosophical brother–in–arms, we ﬁnd
that he mobilizes a similarly instrumentalist view of atomism, framing the
principle of economy as the cognitive rationale for the atomic concept. This
principle is the cornerstone of Avenarius’ radically empiricist reformulation
of Kantianism, and may be characterized as a philosophical generalization
of the principle of least action in physics. The requirement for underlying
unities that hold experience together is not an a priori in the Kantian sense,
but a matter of descriptive parsimony:
Due to the principle of economy, we have a need to think in
terms of limiting concepts such as the atom, despite that its
existence is not proven or transcendentally established.
Because analytical decomposition satisﬁes the need for compre-
hension, the process of decomposition is mentally continued even
where empirical evidence no longer supplies solid conﬁrmation
but only indicates the direction of analysis. This actually inﬁnite
process of mental analysis can only be brought to a conclusion
by interrupting it at a certain point and declaring it to be com-
pleted by some new idea at a more remote point left in the dark.
100ROBERT MUSIL, Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs und Studien zur Technik
und Psychotechnik. Rohwolt, 1980, pp. 96–101.
101The psychology of Mind–Only is also “evolutionary,” but in a very different way. Concept
formation is accounted for by the karmic determination of present experience through
past actions.
102MUSIL, ibid., pp. 24–25.
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Aside from giving the impression of comprehension, these com-
pleting concepts offer intellectual support from two sides, on the
one hand, by positing that their referent is no longer composite
but simple, thereby putting an end to the mental process of divi-
sion, and on the other hand, by suggesting that the indivisible
thing is immutable, thus pacifying the demand for a continual
change of content. The simple is now the immutable, even though
its accidental connections are subject to absolute change, such
a ﬁctitious terminating idea is embodied in the concept of the
atom, inasmuch as the atom is considered to be unanalyzable and
immutable.103
According to Avenarius, the regressus of decomposition gratiﬁes the de-
mand for ontological closure, i.e. the cognitive need for ﬁxed objects that
are regulated by the structuring concepts of experience. But he is under no
illusion that this procedure can ever truly be brought to to completion or
be made to yield Dinge an sich—rather, it is simply cut off at some point to
produce a conveniently ﬁctitious ontology.
However, Avenarius is concerned that this approach might lead to reduc-
tionism, which he eschews as being an unacceptable reiﬁcation of atomist
instrumentalism: “Thus this so–to–say atomistic individualization of sen-
sations will remain an indispensable aid in creating the impression of com-
prehension with regard to our life of sensations and concepts, but it must
be warned against viewing the world as a kind of kaleidoscope composed of
such mosaic pieces of sensation.”104
Avenarius is justiﬁably suspicious of reductionism. Even if a reductionist
program could be carried out, he would be left holding the bag of meta-
ph´ ysical commitment to phenomenalistic atoms, with all the pitfalls that
this position entails. Like Vasubandhu, he does not believe that there
are atoms given to pre-theoretical, common–sense intuition, or that the
whole of experience naturally fractures into atoms along pre–determined
breaking points. He characterizes the atom as a mere “H¨ ulfsbegriff”—a
103RICHARD AVENARIUS, Philosophie als Denken der Welt gem¨ aß dem Prinzip des kleinsten
Kraftmaßes. Edition Classic Verlag Dr. M¨ uller, 2006, p. 63, my translation.
104AVENARIUS, ibid., p. 64, my translation.
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provisional concept of theory that satisﬁes the pragmatic need for intellectual
comprehension, but he dares not urge a ﬁrm ontological commitment to it,
lest his pure phenomenalism revert back to a pre–critical metaph´ ysics.105
The Avenarian substance–atoms are theoretical constructs, much like
the constitutional elements of Carnap’s Aufbau: “Constitution theory and
transcendental idealism agree that all objects of knowledge are constituted
(in idealistic language, ‘generated by thought’), and that this ultimately
applies to the basic elements of the constitution system.”106
For both Avenarius and Carnap, it is irrelevant as to whether or not
material composition or epistemological constitution are grounded in a
metaph´ ysically absolute ontology. To their point of view, foundational on-
tology is just as much a logical construct as the world that is built up from
it. The similarity to the epistemological idealism of Mind–Only is striking:
“Thus, the thesis of the intentionality of citta becomes displaced in the emerg-
ing Yog¯ ac¯ ara philosophy by an emphasis upon the ‘phenomenalistic’ nature of
objects. Objects are really dharma–constructs and representations (vij˜ n¯ apti),
dependent upon the complex processes of citta for their appearance.”107
The Avenarian empiriocriticism contends that atomism is valuable as a
strictly instrumentalist hypothesis, whereas Mach believes even an instru-
mentalist concept of the atom to be unnecessary to science.108 Avenarius’
rationale for the dichotomy of appearances and things–in–themselves is
also remarkably similar to the Mind–Only doctrine that the dualizing mind
105A detailed discussion of whether or not Avenarius’ phenomenalism gives in to the Sel-
larsian myth of the given will not be possible here. The initial position of Avenarius’
analysis is the “empiriocritical assumption,” which does include (among other things)
the totality of “E–values,” i.e. the contents of phenomenally descriptive propositions. But
while it may appear as if Avenarius’ analysis is proceeding from the “given,” one of the
stated goals of his approach is to work towards an understanding of the precise sense
and extent to which propositional contents may even be assumed as experience to begin
with (see RICHARD AVENARIUS, Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung. Volume II, Georg Olms
Verlag, 2004, p. 1). So, far from simply assuming the epistemic priority of the given,
Avenarius is making this hysteron proteron one of the central objects of his critique.
106CARNAP, Aufbau, ibid., pp. 246–249.
107KING, Asian Philosophy 1998, ibid.
108Viz. Ostwald’s famous attempt to reformulate thermodynamics without the atom (BAR-
ROW, ibid., pp. 183–184), as opposed to Boltzmann, who strongly advocated the atomic
hypothesis.
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(vij˜ n¯ ana) is responsible for the superimposition of the conceptually con-
structed (parikalpita) nature onto the ﬂux of experience:
The development of thought eventually had to reach the point
where it came to awareness that the so–called properties of the
thing were in fact sensations of the sensing subject; thus, the prop-
erties ceased to belong to the thing itself—as their designation
would indicate—they departed their relationship of dependence
from the thing and entered into a more idealistic relationship
with the sensing subject. As a result, a difference had to emerge
between the thing as it was for the sensing subject and the thing
as it was in itself.109
In Mind–Only, the percept is held to be a noema generated by transcen-
dental subjectivity. Thus we ﬁnd the Avenarian “introjection,” or bifurcation
between the strictly private percept and the public object, being carried
to its most radical conclusion. The strategy of Mind–Only for eliminat-
ing introjection is to wholly absorb the objective world into the subjective
perception. The epistemological trajectory that begins with na¨ ıve realism
and progresses through critical realism (where the organizing forms of ex-
perience are constituted by metempirical generative acts of the mind) is
brought to maturity in the view that experience springs entirely from the
transcendental subjectivity.
Mach’s psycho–physical parallelism, which attempts to resolve the Ave-
narian problem of introjection,110 is often cast as a paradigmatic example of
neutral monism.111 But while Avenarius’ sensation monism is an explicit
one, the picture with Mach is slightly more complex. He argues dualism
against monism and vice versa in a M¯ adhyamika–esque play to dialectically
hold the elusive middle ground beyond both extremes.112
Avenarius feels at home with the idea that epistemological construction is
a pragmatic process of evolutionary adaptation to experience. In a metaphor,
109AVENARIUS, Philosophie als Denken der Welt, ibid., p. 58, my translation.
110SOMMER, Husserl und der Fr¨ uhe Positivismus, ibid., pp. 69–70.
111STUBENBERG, ibid.
112SOMMER, Husserl und der Fr¨ uhe Positivismus, ibid., pp. 77–78.
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we build our sandcastles on shifting sand because we have to live somewhere
and have no other building materials at hand. Avenarius argues that the
conceptualizing of change and process requires that we posit ﬁxed nuclei or
absolutes as counterpoints to experiential ﬂux, but regards these nuclei or
ﬁxed points as mere idealizations.113 In this respect, it is not unreasonable
to characterize the Avenarian view as resembling a ontologically relativized
Sautr¯ antika epistemology.
Avenarius’ theory of the atom as an instrumental posit may be directly
compared to Quine’s view: “Positing does not stop with macroscopic physical
objects. Objects at the atomic level and beyond are posited to make the laws
of macroscopic objects, and ultimately the laws of experience, simpler and
more manageable...”114
Though Quine has shed the sensationalist and phenomenalist trappings
of empiriocriticism and early logical empiricism, in other respects, he is still
holding to the course of the via positivistica. The empiriocriticist core of
epistemological instrumentalism and ﬁctionalism shines through, extending
even to his views on physical objects. In a line that might have been taken
straight from Vasubandhu’s playbook, Quine states that “The myth of physi-
cal objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more
efﬁcacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure
into the ﬂux of experience.”115
Admittedly, Quine is not making a direct argument against the transcen-
dental object. But in cutting physical objects down to size as quasi–mythical
mirages conjured by the theory–ladenness of common–sense realism, he is
quite vigorously attacking the foundations of the metaph´ ysical realist belief
in objectivity. And if Quine is any judge, Vasubandhu’s anti–atomism—far
from being an antiquated relic of early medieval Indian philosophy—is of
considerable relevance to contemporary philosophy.
113AVENARIUS, Philosophie als Denken der Welt, ibid., pp. 55–56.
114QUINE, ibid., p. 44.
115QUINE, ibid.
1104 The End of the End of Epistemology
I have a dream.
(Martin Luther King)
A
RE THERE ANY PHILOSOPHICAL or ideo–historical conclusions of
value that we can draw from the narrative sweep presented thus
far? Possibly, our retracing of the evolutionary trajectory of Bud-
dhist epistemology, beginning with phenomenalistic realism and leading to
idealist and skeptical positions of increasing critical reﬁnement and rareﬁ-
cation may may add a mosaic piece or two to our picture of the historical
development of occidental empiricism. To state the matter more boldly, the
idea suggests itself that Buddhism affords to the modern mind the possibility
of re-envisioning empiricism from the ground up, in the cloth of an alternate
history of ideas. Anticipating the grand themes of the Western empiricist
tradition by more than a millenium, the “empiricism of the East” presents
us with a unique opportunity to re-experience our own philosophical genesis
in a new and perhaps more humble light.
Against the realist’s objections, Vasubandhu proposes in 3 that the spatio-
temporal determination of experience is as in a dream. Striking a chord
across centuries and cultures, Mach dismisses the question of whether the
world is real or whether we merely dream it as being devoid of scientiﬁc
meaning. Epistemology is just as much an abstract inquiry into the condi-
tions and possibilities of knowledge as a historical quest for philosophical
beginnings—a trail that may lead us as readily to Mach’s 19th century Vienna
as to the 4th century Purus .apura of Vasubandhu, if we are prepared to follow
it.
However, unlike the quest of Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations to regain
the ground of ﬁrst philosophy, a phenomenological beginning in transcen-
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dental intersubjectivity,1 the journey of Vasubandhu and Mach is more than
anything else a voyage to epistemology’s end. Each in their own way, they
both attempt to recast empirical knowledge in light of its ultimate meaning.
To Mach, the end of epistemology is its pragmatic purpose as the critical voice
of scientiﬁc inquiry. To Vasubandhu, the end is a mystical and soteriological
one—the cessation of innate ignorance (avidya) sought for by “the path of
practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos.”2
4.1 Anti–Cartesian Meditations
Since we have not yet managed to touch upon any of the multifarous critiques
that the Mind–Only standpoint of the Vim . ´ satik¯ a has generated within Indian
philosophy, I will round out the investigation with a brief recapitulation of
some of the more interesting objections. Aside from the fairly predictable
counter–arguments offered by the realist dar´ sanas such as Ny¯ aya–Vai´ ses .ika
and M¯ ım¯ am . s¯ a, we ﬁnd a number of critiques put forth by skeptical schools
of thought such as M¯ adhyamika or by other idealisms, notably Advaita. It is
illuminating to take notice of the fact that in the pre–scientiﬁc Indo–Tibetan
philosophical tradition, the most devastating critiques of Mind–Only are the
skeptical attacks on transcendental subjectivity while the realist defenses of
objectivity are comparatively weak. Ironically, the situation in the West is
exactly the other way around, as it would seem that scientiﬁc progress has
catapulted realism into the pole position.
Advaita The Advaita Ved¯ anta epistemology of ´ Sam . kara may be classi-
ﬁed as a species of absolute monism with realistic tendencies. Although
it quite evidently qualiﬁes as a strong strain of idealism, Advaita insists
on a separation of the subject and object within the domain of phenomenal
experience.
Sinha observes that ´ Sam . kara’s criticism of Mind–Only is not very thor-
ough.3 Strangely, ´ Sam . kara does not offer any direct counter–argument to
1HUSSERL, ibid., pp. 160–161.
2BHIKKHU, Rohitassa Sutta, ibid.
3SINHA, ibid., p. 227.
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the Mind–Only thesis that external objects cannot exist due to the impossi-
bility of atoms,4 despite that he was almost certainly aware of Vasubandhu’s
argument against atomism. This circumstance severely reduces the force of
´ Sam . kara’s defense of objectivity.
The keystone of ´ Sam . kara’s critique is the “phenomenological argument.”
He points out that sensory perception establishes the existence of the exter-
nal world, as we perceive external objects such as a table or a tree.5 This
seems like ´ Sam . kara is attempting a Moorean proof of the external object by
appeal to common-sense evidence.
But what is preventing us from having intentional states directed at some
impossible object, e.g. a “square circle?” Given that it is entirely possible
to think about absistents, the externality of a percept could very well be
a sort of absistent property, such as the “squareness” of a circular patch
of color. From the presence of an external world to intentional awareness,
we cannot deduce that it exists, any more than we ontologically commits
ourselves to the existence of a hare’s horns simply because we are able to
think about them. In a Meinongian sense, it is perfectly reasonable to speak
of the non–externality of a perceived object.
In another argument, ´ Sam . kara attempts to turn the tables on the idealist,
by asking: if one admits consciousness, why not external objects? The Mind–
Only proponent’s assertion of the priority of inner over outer experience
seems arbitrary, he argues.
While it is plausible to admit that one can represent in inner experience (i.e.
dreams or hallucinations) objects that do not actually exist, it is not equally
plausible to admit the converse hypothesis that there exist real objects not
representable in inner experience. The Cittam¯ atrin may therefore argue
that the former simply expresses a familiar empirical fact, whereas the latter
proposes a wildly metaph´ ysical theory—the two cases are very different in
nature and far from being symmetrically interchangeable, as ´ Sam . kara would
suggest.
4SINHA, ibid., p. 230.
5See GUPTA, ibid., p. 85 and ELIOT DEUTSCH, Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Recon-
struction. University of Hawaii Press, 1969, pp. 95–96.
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´ Sam . kara trots out a number of further arguments against Mind–Only,
none of which are especially memorable. He does, however, unfold a cri-
tique of self–reﬂexive awareness (svasamvedana) very much resembling the
M¯ adhyamika argument put forth by Candrak¯ ırti: Just as the light shining
from a lamp can illuminate other objects, but not itself, or the blade of a
sword can only cut other objects, a self–reﬂexive awareness would entail the
absurdity of something acting upon itself. Although ´ Sam . kara’s critique of
the Mind–Only position on objectivity fails to be convincing, his criticisms
of transcendental subjectivity come a great deal closer to striking at the
Achilles heel.
M¯ adhyamika Tsongkhapa contends that while Vasubandhu’s argument
against atomism is valid, it misses the mark. Essence or own–nature (sva-
bh¯ ava) is the category that is in need of refutation, not substance (dravya).
The refutation of atoms fails to knock out this vastly more crucial and elusive
target, because atoms are only superﬁcial cognitive misconceptions generated
by metaph´ ysical doctrines, whereas svabh¯ ava is an innate misconception
deeply entrenched in pre–philosophical common–sense intuition.6
Since the concept of partless simples does not enter into our ordinary
experience, which is after all informed by the pre–philosophical intuitions of
common–sense realism, Tsongkhapa argues that while Vasubandhu’s refu-
tation of atomism is all very well and good, its skeptical force is not strong
enough to damage the object of the M¯ adhyamika critique of substantialism.
In modern terminology, perhaps Tsongkhapa’s distinction of dravya and sva-
bh¯ ava may be read along similar lines to the distinction of the existence and
the independence dimensions of realism. Evidently, he believes the indepen-
dence dimension to be the more challenging target, and the soteriologically
more rewarding one.
We may note that nowhere in the post–Vasubandhu philosophy of Mah¯ a-
y¯ ana are there any novel defenses of atomism to be found (with the possible
exception of the late Sautr¯ antika atomism), nor do we ﬁnd any novel anti–
6JEFFREY HOPKINS, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses
to Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence: I. Boston: University of California Press,
1999, pp. 338–339.
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atomist arguments. This conspicuous absence of further development in the
issue might indicate that Vasubandhu’s victory over atomist realism was
considered by Mah¯ ay¯ anists to be so overwhelming that nothing needed to be
added to it.
In the sixth chapter of the Madhyamak¯ avat¯ ara, Candrak¯ ırti unleashes
a scathing barrage of M¯ adhyamika arguments against the the Mind–Only
position.7 These may be roughly classiﬁed into four main groups: (1) the
refutation of the nonexternality of sense–objects, (2) the failure of mental
potentials to account for sense–experiences, (3) counter–arguments to the
dream theory of experience and the ultimate existence of the mind, and
(4) the refutation of apperception.8 This classic critique of Candrak¯ ırti is one
of the philosophical crown jewels of the Tibetan Sarma traditions. It serves
as a case in point for how the pure criticism of M¯ adhyamika builds on the
Mind–Only position, as the full development of its skeptical force requires
the deployment of a sufﬁciently similar position as an argumentative foil.
While the polemic phraseology of the debate evokes the impression that the
two positions are very remote from each other, on closer examination, the
intimate resemblance of the Mind–Only position to the M¯ adhyamika view is
what actually makes for the power of Candrak¯ ırti’s argument.
In the Tarkajv¯ al¯ a (Blaze of Reasoning), the auto–commentary of his
Madhyamakahr .dayak¯ arik¯ as (Heart Verses of the Middle Way) the M¯ adhya-
mika scholar Bh¯ avaviveka proposes an intriguing argument against the
Mind–Only strategy of accepting self–reﬂexive apperception as a provisional
antidote to substantialism. Bh¯ avaviveka’s objection, which happens not to
be among those presented by Candrak¯ ırti, runs as follows:
If you think that external objects actually do not exist, why con-
sider them part of consciousness? If you think that someone ﬁrst
treats them as part of consciousness, then uses another argument,
other than [the argument] that they are part of consciousness, to
refute [the idea that they are part of consciousness], it would be
better to stay away from the mud and not to touch it than to wash
7CANDRAK¯ IRTI, ibid., pp. 72–84.
8PETER G. FENNER, Candrakirti’s refutation of Buddhist idealism. Philosophy East and
West, 33 1983:3, p. 257–258.
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it away. ...It is as if a certain fool were to leave a clean road and
enter an unclean, muddy river. Others might then ask him, “Why
did you leave the clean road and enter the mud?” If he said, “So
that I can wash it off,” the others would say, “You fool! If you have
to wash it off, you should stay away from the mud and not touch
it in the ﬁrst place.”9
Unpacking this argument along Kantian lines, one may inquire: why pos-
tulate the self–reﬂexive awareness of percepts as an antidote (pratipaks .a)
if one thereby accomplishes no more than to saddle oneself with an un-
necessary a priori commitment to transcendental apperception?10 Kant
acknowledges that although the transcendental apperception expressed in
the proposition “I think” (“Ich denke”) is an empirical intuition, the concept
of “I” fails to be an empirical concept because it is never met with in empirical
experience.11 In this light, the general tendency of the M¯ adhyamika critique
of self–reﬂexive awareness may be outlined as follows: Because the “I” is
functionally equivalent to the transcendentality of apperception, it would be
misleading to claim the possibility of an ego–less transcendental appercep-
tion, as does the Mind–Only.12 And if self–reﬂexive awareness is not held
to be transcendental, then it would have to be an empirical phenomenon
like any other.13 It would be a contingent aspect of representations rather
than the necessary condition of their possibility. But in this case, how can
it be employed as an antidote for the reiﬁcation of empirical phenomena,
9BH¯ AVAVIVEKA, cited in MALCOLM DAVID ECKEL, J˜ n¯ anagarbha’s Commentary on the
Distinction between the Two Truths: An Eighth-Century Handbook of Madhyamaka
Philosophy. State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 18
10Viz. p. 29, footnote no. 87.
11TOBIAS ROSEFELDT, Das Logische Ich: Kant ¨ uber den Gehalt des Begriffs von sich selbst.
Philo, 2000, p. 227.
12Given that the status of self–reﬂexive awareness is one of the major topics of controversy
in Tibetan M¯ adhyamika (see e.g. PAUL WILLIAMS, The Reﬂexive Nature of Awareness.
Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), the cursory reﬂections I am able to offer here cannot really
touch on the underlying complexities of the debate.
13As is more or less the case in CARNAP, Aufbau, ibid., p. 226, where it is pointed out that
the elementary experience (Elementarerlebnis) has the nature of “Lichtenberg conscious-
ness”—the “I” is logically constructed on a higher level of constitution. Vasubandhu
might put it that the “I” is not epistemologically constituted, but rather, mistakenly
retrodicted onto the fabric of experience, to wit, as a “false epitaph.” See also p. 25,
footnote no. 72.
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if the antidote itself is part of the what is being reiﬁed? A reiﬁed antidote
is just what we don’t want. The initial pseudo–problem of objectivity will
have merely been exchanged for another one—the problem of transcendental
subjectivity.
Bh¯ avaviveka’s argument expresses in a nutshell the general thrust
M¯ adhyamika “metacritique” of the Mind–Only epoch´ e of objectivity. As
a case of barking up the wrong philosophical tree, retreating up the episte-
mological ladder into inner experience is a soteriologically useless maneuver.
But perhaps Bh¯ avaviveka’s dismissal is premature—for without an adequate
containment strategy for the metaph´ ysical “virulence” of objectivity, scientiﬁc
realism so resoundingly carries the show that a modern M¯ adhyamika–style
critique of subjectivity14 and essence will never manage to get off the ground.
Reiﬁed absolutes are poison to the M¯ adhyamika view, yet as we will see,
20th century theoretical physics inescapably suggests them.
4.2 The Empire Strikes Back and the Return of the Empiricists
Brieﬂy turning our attention once more to Western philosophy of science,
the meteoric rise to power of Mach-inspired logical empiricism was not
always favorably received. It provoked a backlash among many experimental
scientists, who preferred the more familiar model of critical realism. Planck
may be identiﬁed as an inﬂuential example of this “reactionary” tendency.
He mounted a spirited defense of objectivity and absolutes against the
instrumentalist and relativist tendencies of positivism: “That we do not
create the external world for reasons of convenience, but rather, that it
impresses itself upon us with elementary force is a point which, in our
positivistically inﬂuenced day and age, may not remain an unspoken matter
of course.”15
This statement is an obvious gibe against Mach’s instrumentalist views
on the status of the external world. Planck points out how the progress of
14See CANDRAK¯ IRTI, ibid., p. 85, k¯ arik¯ a 120: “This self [of the transitory composite] is what
the yogi will disprove.”
15MAX PLANCK, Vom Relativen zum Absoluten. in: Vortr¨ age - Reden - Erinnerungen.
Springer-Verlag, 2001, p. 116–117, my translation.
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physical science has enabled absolute values to be established for quantities
that were previously believed to be deﬁnable only as relative differences,
notably energy and entropy.16 In classical mechanics, only energy differences
can be measured, and while energy is a conserved quantity, the idea of an
absolute value of energy has no signiﬁcance within the theory. However,
Einstein’s theory of special relativity ﬁxes an absolute value for the resting
energy of an object (the famous equation E = mc2). Similarly, even though
the descriptive force of classical thermodynamics is only sufﬁcient to account
for entropy differences, the introduction of the quantum hypothesis permits
an absolute value to be derived for the entropy of a system S = k logW
(where W is the number of microstates corresponding to the macrostate of
the system), as W then comes to be discrete.17
As Planck delineates, the development of physical theories proceeds from
the differential to the integral18 and from relative quantities to absolutes.19
The absolutes of Newtonian space and time have been relativized,20 only
to re-establish the absolute on a more fundamental level as the metric of
space–time (the speed of light in vacuum c).21
Planck holds the principle of transcendental objectivity to be the founda-
tion and raison d’ˆ etre of physics. Even though he concedes that physical
theory will never be absolutely complete and certain, he optimistically be-
lieves that it is possible to obtain asymptoptically close knowledge of absolute
reality.22 In sum, Planck’s considerations pose a very serious challenge to
Mach’s empiricism of radical relativity.
An empiricist counter–attack might be organized along two dimensions—
(1) the observational underdetermination and (2) the semantic incomplete-
ness of empirical theories. In (1), the Quine–Duhem thesis can be brought to
16PLANCK, ibid., pp. 110–112.
17See PLANCK, ibid., p. 113.
18PLANCK, ibid., p. 111.
19PLANCK, ibid., p. 114.
20Special relativity agrees with N¯ ag¯ arjuna that absolute motion is incoherent (as according
to Nagarjuna’s Examination of Motion in GARFIELD, The Fundamental Wisdom, ibid.,
pp. 124–135). The Einsteinian theory of motion might seem like great news to the
M¯ adhyamika—until the absolute resting energy of objects is brought into play. Substance
is back with a vengeance, and threatens to crash the M¯ adhyamika’s party for good.
21PLANCK, Vom Relativen zum Absoluten, ibid., p. 116.
22PLANCK, ibid., p. 117.
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bear against the notion that theories can asymptotically approximate reality.
As for (2), G¨ odelian reasoning can be deployed to show that since a theory
cannot internally prove its own consistency, there is no absolute sense in
which it can be said to have a model.
A metatheoretically reﬂecting empiricism will come, on a m´ etaphysical
or epistemological level of reﬂection, to relativize the objectivity of physical
absolutes to the theory they are posited by, just as it relativizes the con-
cepts of analyticity, aprioricity (etc.) to some theoretical or metatheoretical
language.23 The model empiricist may venture that the Planckian critical
realist notion of absolute objectivity is no more intelligible than the idea of a
universal metalanguage or an ultimate level of reﬂection.
4.3 Concluding Reﬂections
On any scale, the charting of a possible course from 4th century Indian
idealism to contemporary philosophy of science would make for an immensely
ambitious undertaking. In an effort to advance through the subject matter
at a reasonable pace, I have largely glossed over many noteworthy and
distinctive features of Vasubandhu’s thought. The Yog¯ ac¯ ara theories of
karma and causality have received especially short shrift. The nature of
the investigation has required a perhaps overly large amount of historical
glossing and hermeneutic circling, necessarily at the expense of rigorous
analytic reconstruction.
Despite that much of the precision inherent in the Buddhist philosophical
terminology of Vasubandhu’s era has been lost in the mists of time, more
effort could and should have been invested in clarifying the technical mean-
ings of terms. By its very nature, comparative philosophy is a hermeneutic
transaction in medias res. To be able to say anything whatsoever, one needs
to keep one’s meanings ﬂuid. Interpretation to a certain extent trades in
suggestive ambiguities. But if meanings are too ﬂuid, one becomes guilty
of ﬁtting the evidence to the theory. The deployment of a semi–formalized
philosophical precision language is really the only answer to this dilemma,
23ESSLER, Unser die Welt, ibid., p. 86.
1194.3 Concluding Reﬂections
though in my defense, such a strongly structured approach would not have
been appropriate to the intended scale of the investigation.
As far as possible, I have tried to compensate my lack of philological
competence in the original languages of Indian philosophy with rational
interpolation. When working with classical texts, this is really the only
conceivable strength a philosopher can play to vis-` a-vis an expert philologist.
Regarding the aims and tasks of the investigation, I believe that I have
taken a sufﬁciently broad and deep cross–section of the subject matter
for me to be able to hope to have extracted an acceptable fraction of the
philosophical import of Vasubandu’s arguments against atomism. Overall,
I think that the goal to strike a balance between a presentation of the
arguments in historical perspective and a demonstration of their relevance
to contemporary epistemology has been accomplished.
SARVA MANGALAM
120Bibliography
Anacker, Stefan, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist
Psychological Doctor. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998.
Anuruddha; Bodhi, Bhikkhu, editor, Abhidhammatthasangaha: A
comprehensive manual of Abhidhamma. BPS Pariyatti Editions, 2000.
Arnold, Dan, Madhyamaka. in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
hURL: http://www.iep.utm.edui – accessed on April 12, 2008.
Asanga, Abhidarmasamuccaya. Asian Humanities Press, 2001.
Audi, Robert, editor, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.
Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Avenarius, Richard, Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung. Volume I, Georg Olms
Verlag, 2004.
Avenarius, Richard, Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung. Volume II, Georg Olms
Verlag, 2004.
Avenarius, Richard, Philosophie als Denken der Welt gem¨ aß dem Prinzip
des kleinsten Kraftmaßes. Edition Classic Verlag Dr. M¨ uller, 2006.
Ayer, A. J., Phenomenalism. in: Philosophical Essays. Macmillan Press,
1954, 125–166.
Ayer, A. J., The Terminology of Sense-Data. in: Philosophical Essays.
Macmillan Press, 1954, 66–104.
Ayer, A. J., Hume. Oxford University Press, 1980.
Barrow, John D., The Universe That Discovered Itself. Oxford University
Press, 2000.
Bastow, David, The Mah¯ a-Vibh¯ as¯ a Arguments for Sarv¯ astiv¯ ada.
Philosophy East and West, 44 1994:3, 489–499.
Becker, Martin, Zum Begriff der Genidentit¨ at - Eine Untersuchung der
Wissenschaftstheoretischen Schriften von Kurt Lewin. Master’s thesis,
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 1998.
121Bibliography
Berzin, Alexander, Basic Features of the Gelug-Chittamatra System.
hURL: http://www.berzinarchives.com/sutra/sutra_level_
5/basic_feat_gelug_chittamatra_1.htmli – accessed on April
11, 2008.
Bhikkhu, Thanissaro, MN 72. Online hURL: http://www.
accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.072.than.htmli –
accessed on June 23, 2008.
Bhikkhu, Thanissaro, Rohitassa Sutta - AN 4.45 (PTS: A ii 47). Online
hURL: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.
1.10.than.htmli – accessed on June 21, 2008.
Bhikkhu, Thanissaro, Ud 1.10 Bahiya Sutta. hURL: http://www.
accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.1.10.than.htmli –
accessed on June 21, 2008.
Bhikkhu, Thanissaro, Vajira Sutta [Please insert “PrerenderUnicode–˝
into preamble] SN 5.10. Online hURL:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn05/sn05.
010.bodh.htmli – accessed on June 21, 2008.
Blumenthal, James, The Ornament of the Middle Way: A study of the
Madhyamaka Thought of Santaraksita. Snow Lion Publications, 2004.
Bostrom, Nick, Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? Philosophical
Quarterly, 53 2003, 243–255.
Brown, Jason, Microgenesis and Buddhism: The Concept of
Momentariness. Philosophy East and West, 49 1999:3, 261–277.
Buescher, John B., Echoes from an Empty Sky - the Origins of the
Buddhist Doctrine of the Two Truths. Snow Lion Publications, 2005.
B¨ aumer, Bettina, Upanishaden: Befreiung zum Sein. Wilhelm Heyne
Verlag, 1994.
Candrak¯ ırti, Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakirti’s
Madhyamakavatara, with commentary by Ju Mipham. Shambhala,
2002.
Carnap, Rudolf, Abriss der Logistik. Julius Springer, 1929.
Carnap, Rudolf, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998.
122Bibliography
Chalmers, David, The Matrix as Metaphysics. hURL:
http://consc.net/papers/matrix.htmli – accessed on May 11,
2008.
Chatterjee, A. K., The Yog¯ ac¯ ara Idealism. Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
Chinchore, Mangala R., Aniccat¯ a/Anityat¯ a - An Analysis of the Buddhist
Opposition to Permanence/Stability and Alternative Foundation to
Ontology and/or Anthropology. Sri Satguru Publications, 1995.
Cohen, Stewart, Justiﬁcation and Truth. Philosophical Studies, 46 1984,
279–296.
Deutsch, Eliot, Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction.
University of Hawaii Press, 1969.
Dicker, Georges, Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. Nous, 42:1 2008, 80–108.
Dragonetti, Carmen and Tola, Fernando, Being as Consciousness. New
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2004.
Durland, K´ arann, Hume’s First Principle, His Missing Shade, and His
Distinctions of Reason. Hume Studies, XXII 1996:1, 105–121.
Eckel, Malcolm David, J˜ n¯ anagarbha’s Commentary on the Distinction
between the Two Truths: An Eighth-Century Handbook of
Madhyamaka Philosophy. State University of New York Press, 1987.
Essler, Wilhelm K., Analytische Philosophie I. Alfred Kr¨ oner Verlag, 1972.
Essler, Wilhelm K.; Preyer, Gerhard, editor, Unser die Welt.
Humanities Online, 2001 hURL:
http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/
2007/4545/pdf/Essler_UDW_ccl.pdfi – accessed on June 26,
2008.
Essler, Wilhelm K., On Absoluteness and Relativity: Modern Philosophy
in Ancient Times. Online, March 2007 hURL:
http://www.vfphil.de/pdf/essler-vortrag-delhi.pdfi –
accessed on July 3, 2008.
Essler, Wilhelm K., Labude, Joachim and Ucsnay, Stefanie, Theorie
und Erfahrung. Alber, 2000.
Essler, Wilhelm K. and Mamat, Ulrich, Die Philosophie des
Buddhismus. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005.
123Bibliography
Fenner, Peter G., Candrakirti’s refutation of Buddhist idealism.
Philosophy East and West, 33 1983:3, 251–261.
Findlay, J. N., Kant and the Transcendental Object. Clarendon Press, 1981.
Fogelin, Robert J., Pyrrhonian Reﬂections on Knowledge and Justiﬁcation.
Oxford University Press, 1994.
Frauwallner, Erich, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. Akademie-Verlag,
1969.
Frauwallner, Erich, Die Entstehung der buddhistischen Systeme. in:
Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in G¨ ottingen I.
Philologisch-Historische Klasse. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971,
115–127.
Frauwallner, Erich; Steinkellner, Ernst and Kidd, Sophie Francis,
editors, Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of
Buddhist Philosophical Systems. State University of New York Press,
1995.
Garﬁeld, Jay L., The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way:
N¯ ag¯ arjuna’s M¯ ulamadhyamakak¯ arik¯ a. Oxford University Press, 1995.
Garﬁeld, Jay L., Vasubandhu’s ’Treatise on the Three Natures’ translated
from the Tibetan edition with a commentary. Asian Philosophy, 6
1997:2, 133–154.
Garﬁeld, Jay L., Western idealism through Indian eyes: A Cittam¯ atra
reading of Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer. Sophia, 31 1998:1,
10–41.
Garﬁeld, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural
Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2001.
Garﬁeld, Jay L., Western Idealism through Indian Eyes: A Cittamatra
Reading of berkeley, Kant, and Schopenhauer. in: Garﬁeld, Jay L.,
editor: Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural
Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2001, 152–169.
Garﬁeld, Jay L., Reductionism and Fictionalism: Comment on Siderits’
”Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy”. Online, 2008 hURL:
http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/documents/
ReductionismandFictionalism.pdfi – accessed on July 7, 2008.
124Bibliography
Goodman, Nelson, Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett Publishing Company,
1978.
Grier, Michelle, Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics. in: Zalta, Edward N.,
editor: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2007 hURL:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/
kant-metaphysics/i – accessed on July 3, 2008.
Grim, Patrick, The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge, and Truth.
MIT Press, 1991.
Grupp, Jeffrey, The R-theory of Time, or Replacement Presentism: The
Buddhist Philosophy of Time. Indian International Journal of
Buddhist Studies, 6 2005, 51–122.
Grupp, Jeffrey, Mereological nihilism: quantum atomism and the
impossibility of material constitution. Axiomathes, 16 2006, 245–386.
Gr¨ unbaum, Adolf, Modern Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes. George Allen
and Unwin, 1968.
Guenther, Herbert V., Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma.
Shambhala Publications, 1976.
Guenther, Herbert V., Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy. in:
Guenther, Herbert V., editor: Tibetan Buddhism in Western
Perspective: Collected Articles of Herbert V. Guenther. Shambhala
Publications, 1977.
Gupta, Bina, Cit Consciousness. Boston: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Guyer, Paul, The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General and the
Refutation of Idealism (A218/B265-A235/B294). in: Mohr, Georg and
Willaschek, Marcus, editors: Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen
Vernunft. Akademie Verlag, 1998.
Harris, Ian Charles, The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yog¯ ac¯ ara in
Indian Mah¯ ay¯ ana Buddhism. E.J. Brill, 1991.
Hermes, Hans, Eine Axiomatisierung der allgemeinen Mechanik. Hirzel,
1938.
Hiriyanna, M., The Essentials of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass,
1995.
125Bibliography
Hoheisel, Claus, Physik und verwandte Wissenschaften in Robert Musils
Roman ’Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften’. (dmoe) Ein Kommentar. Ph.D
thesis, Ruhr-Universit¨ at Bochum, 2003, hURL:
https://eldorado.uni-dortmund.de/dspace/bitstream/
2003/2959/2/hoheisel2.pdfi.
Hopkins, Jeffrey, Meditation on Emptiness. Boston: Wisdom Publications,
1996.
Hopkins, Jeffrey, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism:
Dynamic Responses to Dzong-ka-ba’s The Essence of Eloquence: I.
Boston: University of California Press, 1999.
Hopkins, Jeffrey, Maps of the Profound: Jamyang Shayba’s Great
Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of
Reality. Snow Lion Publications, 2004.
Hopkins, Jeffrey, Absorption in No External World: 170 Issues in Mind
Only Buddhism (Dynamic Responses to Dzong-Ka-Ba’s the Essence of
Eloquence). Snow Lion Publications, 2006.
Hossenfelder, Malte, Kants Konstitutionstheorie und die
Transzendentale Deduktion. Walter de Gruyter, 1978.
Huemer, Michael, Sense-Data. in: Zalta, Edward N., editor: The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2007 hURL: http:
//plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/sense-data/i –
accessed on July 6, 2008.
Huggett, Nick, Zeno’s Paradoxes. in: Zalta, Edward N., editor: The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2006 hURL:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/
paradox-zeno/i – accessed on July 3, 2008.
Husserl, Edmund; Str¨ oker, Elisabeth, editor, Cartesianische
Meditationen: Eine Einleitung in die Ph¨ anomenologie. Felix Meiner
Verlag, 1995.
Ingalls, Daniel H.H., ´ Sam . kara’s Arguments Against the Buddhist.
Philosophy East and West, 3 1954:4, 291–306.
Inwagen, Peter van, Material Beings. Cornell University Press, 1995.
126Bibliography
Jain, L.C. and Patni, G.C., Exact Sciences from Jaina Sources Vol. 2:
Astronomy and Cosmology. Rajasthan Prakrit Bharti Sansthan,
Jaipur; Sitaram Bhartia Institute of Scientiﬁc Research, New Delhi,
1983.
Kalupahana, David J., A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism. Philosophy East
and West, 19 1969:1, 65–67.
Kant, Immanuel; Weischedel, Wilhelm, editor, Kritik der Reinen
Vernunft. Volume 2, Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1980.
Kapstein, Matthew, Mereological Considerations in Vasubandhu’s “Proof
of Idealism”. in: Reason’s Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian
and Tibetan Buddhist Thought. Oxford University Press, 2001.
Karunadasa, Y., Time and Space: The Abhidhamma Perspective -
Professor K. N. Jayatilleke Memorial Lecture 2003. 2003 hURL:
http://www.lankalibrary.com/Bud/time.htmi – accessed on
April 12, 2008.
King, Richard, Early Yogacara and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka
School. Philosophy East & West October 1994.
King, Richard, Vijnaptimatrata and the Abhidharma Context of Early
Yogacara. Asian Philosophy March 1998.
Klein, Anne C., Knowledge and Liberation: Tibetan Buddhist
Epistemology in Support of Transformative Religious Experience.
Snow Lion Publications, 1986.
Klein, Anne C., Knowing, Naming and Negation: A Sourcebook on Tibetan
Sautrantika (Translations in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism). Snow Lion
Publications, 1991.
Kochumuttom, Thomas A., Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New
Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu. New
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989.
Lewin, Kurt, Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie und
Entwicklungsgeschichte. in: M´ etraux, Alexandre, editor:
Werkausgabe. Volume 2, Klett-Cotta, 1983, 47–318.
Lindstrom, Jeff, Imaginations of the Unreal: Modern Interpretations of
Yogacara’s ”Idealism”. 2002 hURL:
127Bibliography
http://individual.utoronto.ca/jlindstrom/coursework/
yogacara_essay_2001_12_19.htmi – accessed on July 10, 2008.
Lusthaus, Dan, The Crux of the Yogacara Project. August 2004 hURL:
http://www.bu.edu/religion/faculty/bios/Lusthaus/
yogacara\%20crux.pdfi – accessed on July 3, 2008.
Mabbett, Ian W., N¯ ag¯ arjuna and Deconstruction. in: Buddhisms and
Deconstructions. Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2006.
Mach, Ernst, Die Analyse der Empﬁndungen und das Verh¨ altnis des
Physischen zum Psychischen. Edition Classic Verlag Dr. M¨ uller, 2006.
Matilal, Bimal K., Error and Truth - Classical Indian Theories. Philosophy
East and West, 31 M¨ arz 1981:2, 215–224.
Matilal, Bimal K., Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of
Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 1986.
McDermott, A. Charlene, The Sautr¯ antika Arguments against the
Traik¯ alyav¯ ada in the Light of the Contemporary Tense Revolution.
Philosophy East and West, 24 1974:2, 193–200.
Mejor, Marek, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako´ sa and the Commentaries
preserved in the Tanjur. Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991.
Murti, T. R. V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the
Madhyamika System. George Allen and Unwin, 1974.
Murzi, Mauro, Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970). in: Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. hURL: http://www.iep.utm.edui – accessed on July 4,
2008.
Musil, Robert, Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs und Studien zur
Technik und Psychotechnik. Rohwolt, 1980.
Nagao, Gadjin M.; Kawamura, Leslie and Nagao, Gadjin M., editors,
M¯ adhyamika and Yog¯ ac¯ ara: A Study of Mah¯ ay¯ ana Philosophies.
SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies, 1991.
Narain, Harsh, The Madhyamika Mind. Motilal Banarsidass, 1997.
Oetke, Claus, ”Ich” und das Ich: Analytische Untersuchungen zur
buddhistisch-brahmanischen Atmankontroverse. Franz Steiner Verlag,
1988.
128Bibliography
Oetke, Claus; Steinkellner, Ernst, editor, Bemerkungen zur
Buddhistischen Doktrin der Momentanheit des Seienden:
Dharmak¯ ırtis Sattv¯ anum¯ ana. Arbeitskreis f¨ ur Tibetische und
Buddhistische Studien, 1993.
Olson, Robert F., Candrak¯ ırti’s Critique of Vij˜ n¯ anav¯ ada. Philosophy East
and West, 24 1977:4, 405–411.
Panikkar, Raimon, Gottes Schweigen. Die Antwort des Buddha f¨ ur unsere
Zeit. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996.
Parﬁt, Derek, Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, 1984.
Pinker, Steven, How The Mind Works. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
1997.
Planck, Max, Scheinprobleme der Wissenschaft. in: Vortr¨ age - Reden -
Erinnerungen. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
Planck, Max, Vom Relativen zum Absoluten. in: Vortr¨ age - Reden -
Erinnerungen. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
Potter, Karl H., editor, Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies: Buddhist
Philosophy 100-350AD. Volume 8, Motilal Banarsidass, 2002.
Powers, John, Wisdom of Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Sutra. Dharma
Publishing, 1995.
Pyle, Andrew, Atomism and its Critics: From Democritus to Newton.
Thoemmes Press, 1997.
Quine, Willard Van Orman, Two Dogmas of Empiricism. in: From a
Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays. Harvard
University Press, 1971, 20–46.
Ricard, Mathieu and Xuan Thuan, Trinh, The Quantum and the Lotus.
Three Rivers Press, 2004.
Rosefeldt, Tobias, Das Logische Ich: Kant ¨ uber den Gehalt des Begriffs
von sich selbst. Philo, 2000.
Rospatt, Alexander von, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. Franz
Steiner Verlag, 1995.
´ S¯ antaraks .ita and Mipham, Jamg¨ on, The Adornment of the Middle Way.
Shambhala Publications, 2005.
129Bibliography
Santina, Peter della, The Philosophy of Mind-Only. in: The Tree of
Enlightenment. Online hURL:
http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/˜dsantina/tree/i – accessed
on April 12, 2008.
Sarao, K. T. S., Vasubandhu. in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2006
hURL: http://www.iep.utm.edu/i – accessed on April 12, 2008.
Schmauke, Stephan, Wohlth¨ atigste Verirrung: Kants kosmologische
Antinomien. Verlag K¨ onigshausen & Neumann, 2002.
Sellars, Wilfrid, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Collections of
Philosophy, 6 1976, 165–181 hURL:
http://www.ditext.com/sellars/kti.htmli – accessed on July
15, 2008.
Sharma, Chandradhar, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Motilal
Banarsidass, 2000.
Sider, Ted, Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk. Analysis, 53(4) 1993,
285–289.
Siderits, Mark, Nagarjuna as anti-realist. Journal of Indian Philosophy,
18 1988, 311–325.
Siderits, Mark, Replies to Garﬁeld, Taber and Arnold. APA Newsletters 6
2006:1.
Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Ashgate
Publishing Limited, 2007.
Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Realism. Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
Sommer, Manfred, Husserl und der Fr¨ uhe Positivismus. Vittorio
Klostermann, 1985.
Sommer, Manfred, Evidenz im Augenblick: Eine Ph¨ anomenologie der
Reinen Empﬁndung. Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001.
Stcherbatsky, Theodor, The Central Conception of Buddhism. New Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1988.
Stubenberg, Leopold, Neutral Monism. in: Zalta, Edward N., editor:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition). 2005
hURL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/
entries/neutral-monism/i – accessed on July 19, 2008.
130Bibliography
Tillemans, Tom J.F., Tibetan philosophy. in: Craig, E., editor: Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge., 1998.
Unger, Peter, I do not Exist. in: MacDonald, G. F., editor: Perception
and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with his Replies to them.
Macmillan Press, 1979.
Unger, Peter, There are no ordinary things. Synthese, 41 1979:2, 117–154.
Varzi, Achille, Spatial Reasoning and Ontology: Parts, Wholes and
Locations. in: Aiello, M., Pratt-Hartmann, I. and Benthem, J.
van, editors: Handbook of Spatial Logics. Springer-Verlag, 2007
hURL:
http://www.columbia.edu/˜av72/papers/Space_2007.pdfi –
accessed on June 28, 2008.– chapter 1.
Vasubandhu, Vimsatika Vijnaptimatratasiddhih. in: Ruben, Walter,
editor: Texte der Indischen Philosophie. Volume 2, Akademie-Verlag,
1956, 366–383.
Von Wright, Georg Henrik, The Tree of Knowledge and Other Essays.
Brill Academic Publishers, 1993.
Wallace, B. Allan, Choosing Reality: A Buddhist View of Physics and the
Mind. Snow Lion Publications, 1996.
Wayman, Alex, The Yog¯ ac¯ ara Idealism. Philosophy East and West, 15 1965,
65–73.
Williams, Michael, Problems of Knowledge. Oxford University Press,
2001.
Williams, Paul, On the Abhidharma ontology. Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 9 1981, 227–257.
Williams, Paul, The Reﬂexive Nature of Awareness. Motilal Banarsidass,
1998.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; McGuinness, Brian and Schulte, Joachim,
editors, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung: kritische Edition =
Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989.
Wolters, Gereon, Mach I, Mach II, Einstein und die Relativit¨ atstheorie:
Eine F¨ alschung und ihre Folgen. Walter de Gruyter, 1987.
131Bibliography
Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of
the Vijnanavada. Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.
Wood, Thomas E., Nagarjunian Disputations: A Philosophical Journey
through an Indian Looking-Glass. University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
Zimmerman, D, Could Extended Objects Be Made Out Of Simple Parts?
An Argument For ”Atomless Gunk”. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 56 1996, 3–29.
Zotz, Volker, Geschichte der buddhistischen Philosophie. Rohwolt, 1996.
Zuse, Konrad, Rechnender Raum. Vieweg, 1969.
132Index of Subjects and Technical Terms
A
a priori, 57, 104, 106
synthetic, 70
absistent, 53, 101, 113
action
at a distance, 97
moral consequence of, 45
anagog´ e, 16, 77
antinomy, 24
anti–realism, 83
anum¯ ana, 54, 59, 63, 64
apeiron, 20
apoha, 37
apophaticism, 20
aporia, 20
apperception
refutation of, 115
ataraxia, 26
atomic lattice, 90
atomism
attributive, 69
epistemic, 31
explanations for, 42
instrumentalist, 103, 106–108
origins of, 39
phenomenalistic, 49, 87, 107
physical, 39, 87
stimulus theory of, 63
B
b¯ ahy¯ artha, 15
Brentano’s thesis, 53
C
category, 64
critique, 58, 104
mistake, 21
Cauchy sequence, 68
cessation, 26, 41, 112
classical
electrodynamics, 89
mechanics, 118
thermodynamics, 118
close–packing, 90
cogito, 24, 26
consciousness
appearance in, 63
crystal analogy, 83
lamp analogy, 114
Lichtenberg, 116
mud analogy, 115
privacy of, 52
constitution, 103, 108
noetic, 75
of experience, 71, 77, 80, 88
133Index of Subjects and Technical Terms
of space, 95
constitution theory, 76, 108
continuants, 61, 101
counterfactuals, 53
D
diagonalization, 24
Ding an sich, 32, 65, 77, 79, 80, 82,
107
displacement argument, 97
dissolution
of conceptual rigidities, 22
of the ego, 34
dualism
Cartesian, 63
E
E = mc2, 118
effective action
causal vectors of, 64
discrete pulses of, 68
inﬁnitive, 47
wet dream example, 8
Elementarerlebnis, 66, 116
elements
α β γ... A B C... K L M..., 34,
105
four fundamental, 50
emergence, 56
empiricism, 13, 15, 24, 26, 28, 57
empiriocritical assumption, 108
empiriocriticism, 14, 15, 17, 27–29,
70, 72, 79, 104, 108, 110
energy, 118
epoch´ e
Cartesian, 23, 29, 77, 79, 85, 88,
117
of subjectivity, 24
phenomenological, 23
positivistic, 20
evolutionary psychology, 106
experience
as in dreams, 7, 8, 11, 111
elements of, 35, 45
factors of, 58
ineffability of, 20, 61
intersubjective, 12
mosaic theory of, 37, 51, 107
of objectivity, 7
priority of inner, 113
projection of consciousness into,
34
psycho–physical complex of, 80
reduction of, 69
sensory core of, 55
stream of, 63, 66
subjective constitution of, 56
externalism, 44, 53, 81, 101
F
False Aspectarianism, 83, 84
ﬁctionalism, 53
ﬁre simile, 19
forest–dwelling seers, 12
foundationalism, 31
G
Gedankensymbol, 105
genidentity, 44
Gestalt, 65, 82
134Index of Subjects and Technical Terms
gnosis, 27
inversion of, 27, 34, 35
gnostic turpitude, 104
gunk, 102, 103
H
hallucination
argument from, 56
doctrine of collective, 12
hell–guardian argument, 9
homeomeria, 54
H¨ ulfsbegriff, 107
hyl´ e, 82
I
illucutionary negation, 17
illusion
argument from, 55
transcendental, 9
immanent temporality, 61
incompleteness, 118
indetermination
hungry ghosts example, 8
inﬁnitesimal, 62, 94, 96
inherence, 37, 41
internalism, 7, 9, 68
introjection, 70, 109
K
Kantian turn, 14, 57
karma, 26, 106, 119
K¨ orperwelt, 35
L
ladder
of views, 28, 29, 117
Wittgenstein’s simile, 21
levels of reﬂection, 7, 23, 119
luminance, 84
M
magnitude
intensive, 50
minimal perceivable, 49
McTaggart argument, 46
mentalism, 105
meontology, 18, 22
mereological
argument, 89
atom, 2
overlap, 92
metalanguage, 119
m´ etaphysics, 57, 75, 106
middle ground
of monism and dualism, 109
of realism and idealism, 23, 77,
105
monism
absolute, 31, 112
neutral, 109
Parmenidean, 99
Moorean proof, 9, 113
motion, 100, 118
mysticism, 27, 28
apophatic, 26
immanence, 27
myth
of physical objects, 110
of the given, 108
135Index of Subjects and Technical Terms
N
negation
apophatic, 25
tetralemmatic, 21
nihilism
M¯ adhyamika, 21
mereological, 41, 85, 86, 91
nirv¯ an . a, 19
noema, 72, 109
no–ownership theory, 36
noumenon, 65, 78
O
ontological relativism, 104
ontology
convenient ﬁction, 107
ultimate, 91
P
paradox
as stylistic device, 16
of metrical extension, 92
paratantra–svabh¯ ava, 73
particle physics, 103
point–particle problem, 89
perception
causal theory of, 54, 58, 68
error–theory of, 54
veil of, 32
perceptual datum, 65, 99
phenomenalism, 6, 14, 15, 23, 25,
27–30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 52,
53, 67
philosophical poetry, 16
physical absolutes, 117, 119
physical objects, 30–33, 35, 38, 70
in disguise, 53
myth of, 110
positivism, 5, 21, 27, 42, 117
Praj˜ n¯ ap¯ aramit¯ a, 22
pratibh¯ asa, 63, 70
pratipaks .a, 29, 116
pratyaks .a, 35, 59, 72
presentism, 58
replacement, 61
principle
of economy, 106
of Epicurus, 102
of falsiﬁcation, 88
of least action, 106
pseudo–problem, 20, 56, 117
psycho–physical parallelism, 109
psychophysics, 42, 83
pure reason
antinomies of, 18
idea of, 78
Q
qualia, 27, 52, 83, 84
“quantifying into”, 52
quantum, 68, 118
quasianalysis, 66
Quine–Duhem thesis, 118
R
raft
Neurath’s simile, 77
´ S¯ akyamuni’s simile, 21
raw feel, 52
realism
136Index of Subjects and Technical Terms
critical, 32, 64, 109
deconstruction of, 30
direct, 57, 72
existence dimension of, 31
metaph´ ysical, 7, 80
modal, 48
physical, 52
representational, 32
reality
absolute, 32, 118
criterion of, 47
mystical, 21
of human existence, 24
transcendent, 27
reality problem, 55
receptacle, 89, 92, 94
regressus, 88, 107
regulative, 8
of sensory intuition, 26
relation
external, 94
functional, 26
relativity theory, 90, 118
renormalization, 89
res extensa, 63
S
S = k logW, 118
sarvam asti, 44
Scheinproblem, 21
sensibilia, 33, 35, 48, 49, 53, 98
shadow terminator, 97
shape, 39, 51, 55, 57, 61, 62, 89–91,
95
silence
about absolutes, 18
metaph´ ysical, 20, 21
of the Buddha, 17, 22
skepticism
Cartesian, 13
solipsism, 11, 12, 85
space
absolute, 49, 105
as absence of obstruction, 49
as relation of substances, 94
Carnap scheme, 94
Euclidean, 90
exotic, 95
limit–concepts of, 94
Newtonian, 118
´ s¯ unyat¯ a, 20, 22, 24
svabh¯ ava, 114
svalaks .an . a, 66
svasamvedana, 64, 114
T
telepathy, 11
temporal
eliminativism, 47
time
critique of, 38
modal theory of, 48
motion picture analogy, 44
time–gap argument, 101
transcendental
apperception, 25, 64, 116
ego, 23, 25
idealism, 82, 108
137Index of Subjects and Technical Terms
illusionism, 9, 88
object, 77
objectivity, 10, 15, 32, 71
reasoning, 63, 88
transcending gnosis, 11
True Aspectarianism, 82, 84, 88
U
underdetermination, 118
V
via negativa, 24, 28
via positivistica, 28
vikalpa, 58, 65, 91
vy¯ apti, 101
W
world
distinction of ego and, 34
inner covering outer, 63
like a dream, 11
limits of, 25
path to the end of, 35
138Index of Personal Names
A
Anacker, Stefan, 3, 6, 44, 73, 86,
100
Anaximander, 20
Aristotle, 93
Augustine, 53
Avenarius, Richard, 14, 15, 27, 70,
106, 107, 109
Ayer, A.J., 49, 50, 53
B
B¯ ahya D¯ arucirya, 33, 34
Belden, Ngawang, 63
Berkeley, George, 15, 23, 73
Bh¯ avaviveka, 115, 116
Boltzmann, Ludwig, 108
Bouwsma, O. K., 88
Brentano, Franz, 83
Buddhadeva, 45, 46
Bu–ston, 3
C
Candrak¯ ırti, 115
Carnap, Rudolf, 23, 27, 55, 66, 68,
76, 94, 108
Chatterjee, A. K., 31, 38, 58, 66, 67,
86
D
della Santina, Peter, 58
Democritus, 39
Dharmak¯ ırti, 37, 66, 67, 69, 72
Dharmap¯ ala, 72
Dharma´ sr¯ ı, 3, 43, 44
Dharmatr¯ ata, 3, 45, 46, 51
Dign¯ aga, 66, 69
D¯ ıpak¯ ara, 51
E
Einstein, Albert, 90, 118
Epicurus, 64, 102
Essler, W. K., 7, 11
F
Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 42
Frauwallner, Erich, 4, 5, 38, 46, 48,
86
G
Garﬁeld, Jay L., 61
Ghos .aka, 45, 46
G¨ odel, Kurt, 119
Goodman, Nelson, 66
Grupp, Jeffrey, 38, 61, 66
Guenther, Herbert V., 13, 38
139Index of Personal Names
H
Hume, David, 24, 25, 38, 48, 49
Husserl, Edmund, 12, 23, 25, 34,
61, 111
J
James, William, 26, 61
Johnson, Samuel, 9
K
Kan .ada, 39
Kant, Immanuel, 10, 14, 18, 21, 26,
38, 68, 82, 93, 94
Kapstein, Matthew, 36, 37, 86, 95,
100
King, Martin Luther, 111
Kochumuttom, Thomas, 6, 29, 73,
77–79, 86, 99
L
Lamotte, ´ Etienne, 2
Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van, 100
Leibniz, Gottfried, 102
Lewis, David, 102
Lichtenberg, Georg, 25, 26, 116
Locke, John, 64
Lusthaus, Dan, 6, 73–77
M
Mach, Ernst, 9, 11, 14, 25–27, 38,
55, 71, 85, 108, 111
Mah¯ av¯ ıra, 42
Matilal, B. K., 14, 36, 38, 50, 54, 62,
80, 86, 104
Mauthner, Fritz, 26
McTaggart, J. M. E., 46
Meinong, Alexius, 53
Mipham, Ju, 80, 84
Musil, Robert, 106
N
Nabokov, Vladimir, 104
Nagao, Gadjin M., 4, 76, 80
N¯ ag¯ arjuna, 61, 118
N¯ agasena, 36
Neurath, Otto, 77
O
Oetke, Claus, 36, 67, 69
Ostwald, Wilhelm, 108
P
Panikkar, Raimon, 20
Param¯ artha, 3
Parﬁt, Derek, 24
Parmenides, 99
Pinker, Steven, 83
Planck, Max, 117–119
Plato, 36
Popper, Karl, 88
Prior, A. N., 52
Q
Quine, W. V. O., 69, 110
R
Rorty, Richard, 15
Russell, Bertrand, 102
S
´ S¯ akyamuni, 14, 17–21, 24, 33
´ Sam . kara, 112–114
Sa˙ nghabhadra, 3, 4, 43, 50
140Index of Personal Names
´ S¯ antaraks .ita, 28, 80, 84
Schmithausen, Lambert, 86
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 14
Schr¨ odinger, Erwin, 1
Sellars, Wilfrid, 61, 108
Siderits, Mark, 15, 21, 22, 36, 86,
96
Sinha, Jadunath, 53, 112
Stcherbatsky, Theodor, 38
Sthiramati, 72
T
Tsongkhapa, 81, 84, 114
V
Vasumitra, 45, 46, 48
V¯ atsy¯ ayana, 40
von Rospatt, Alexander, 38, 59, 60
W
Wayman, Alex, 6, 73, 74
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 21, 30
Y
Ya´ somitra, 48, 54
Z
Zeno, 92, 93
Zuse, Konrad, 95
141Appendix
Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache
Kapitel 1 Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt das Argument gegen den Ato-
mismus aus den Vim . ´ satik¯ a Vij˜ naptim¯ atrat¯ asiddhi (Zwanzig Versen des
Nur-Geistes),1 einer erkenntnistheoretischen Abhandlung des sp¨ atantiken
indischen Philosophen Vasubandhu. Unter Atomismus wird hierbei durchge-
hend die Lehre vom Aufbau der Welt aus kleinsten, nicht weiter zerlegbaren
Wirklichkeitsbestandteilen verstanden, wie sie im Altertum in verschiedent-
licher Form von griechischen wie auch von indischen Weltanschauungslehren
vertreten wurde.
Das Argument Vasubandhus ber¨ uhrt insbesondere die atomistischen Leh-
ren der Vaibh¯ as .ika- und Sautr¯ antika-Schulen der fr¨ uhbuddhistischen Scho-
lastik. Daher wird zun¨ achst ein Abriss der Erkenntnistheorien dieser beiden
Schulen des Abhidharma gegeben, wobei besonderes Augenmerk auf die
kritische Entwicklungslinie ihrer Kategorienlehren in Bezug auf Raum,
Zeit und Substanz gelegt wird. Durch diese vorbereitende Darlegung wer-
den sowohl die philosophischen Hintergr¨ unde und Voraussetzungen der
Argumentation Vasubandhus aufgedeckt als auch die vorzunehmende In-
terpretation seiner anti-atomistischen Wirklichkeitsauffassung im Lich-
te der empiriokritizistischen ¨ Uberwindung des Dings an sich untermau-
ert. Die so gewonnene Sichtweise wird schließlich als Ausgangspunkt f¨ ur
transzendentalphilosophische Betrachtungen im Sinne der buddhistischen
Erkenntnistheorie genutzt, wie etwa f¨ ur ¨ Uberlegungen ¨ uber den Status der
transzendentalen Apperzeption, die Konstitution von Erfahrungserkenntnis
und die Aussagekraft skeptischer Argumente.
In der Einleitung werden zun¨ achst einige Bemerkungen zur Person, zur
Lebensgeschichte und zum philosophischen Schaffen Vasubandhus gemacht.
1Im Folgenden als Vim . ´ satik¯ a zitiert.
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Es folgt anschließend ein Res¨ umee der erkenntnistheoretisch relevanten
Themen der Vim . ´ satik¯ a, in dem Vasubandhus stark idealistisch eingef¨ arbter
Außenweltskeptizismus in Grundz¨ ugen sichtbar gemacht wird. Die Haupt-
these Vasubandhus, die er gleich zu Anfang der Vim . ´ satik¯ a aufstellt und im
Verlauf der Abhandlung gegen realistische Einw¨ ande zu verteidigen sucht,
ist das Prinzip der Traumartigkeit der Erfahrungserkenntnis. Damit soll
im Wesentlichen gesagt werden, dass – trotz des gegenteiligen Anscheins –
in der Erfahrung nirgends die Erkenntnis eines erkenntnisunabh¨ angigen
Gegenstands m¨ oglich ist. Vasubandhu stellt insbesondere die Erkenntnis-
m¨ oglichkeit einer metaphysisch gegebenen objektiven Außenwelt in Abrede
und schl¨ agt vor, dass eine intersubjektive Konstitution der Erfahrungs-
mannigfaltigkeit an dessen Stelle treten solle.
Auf die im Res¨ umee herausgestellten Ergebnisse aufbauend l¨ asst sich
nun begr¨ unden, weshalb eine n¨ ahere Betrachtung der Argumente gegen
den Atomismus von geistesgeschichtlichem und erkenntnistheoretischem
Interesse ist. Ferner wird die zu verwendende hermeneutische Methode
der Untersuchung – der interkulturelle Vergleich zum kritischen Realis-
mus Kants und dem Empiriokritizismus seiner Nachfolger Avenarius und
Mach – eingef¨ uhrt. Durch den Vergleich sollen Bezugspunkte zur modernen
Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftsphilosophie geschaffen und die philo-
sophische Relevanz der Ideen Vasubandhus klarer zur Geltung gebracht
werden. Es werden dabei allerdings auch die methodischen Probleme eines
solchen Deutungsansatzes ber¨ ucksichtigt.
Um die Analyse der Atomismusargumente mit einer hermeneutischen
Hintergrundstruktur zu unterf¨ uttern, wird ein erster Br¨ uckenschlag zwi-
schen der buddhistischen und der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie gewagt.
Das Schweigen des Buddhas Gautama ´ S¯ akyamuni zu den vierzehn metaphy-
sischen Fragen wird zur Mach’schen Auffassung des Scheinproblems in Be-
zug gesetzt. Am so gedeuteten Mittelpunktereignis des Buddha-Schweigens
wird die Hypothese abgelesen, dass der buddhistischen Erkenntnislehre
empiristische und erkenntniskritische Momente zu Grunde liegen. Ganz
nach Fac ¸on des logischen Empirismus wird im Zuge des Reﬂektierens
¨ uber die Bedingungen und M¨ oglichkeiten von Erfahrungserkenntnis Ein-
sicht dar¨ uber gewonnen, dass ¨ uber alles jenseits der Erkenntnisgrenzen
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Liegende geschwiegen werden muss. Es wird die These entwickelt, dass
das Buddha-Schweigen in seinem positivistischen Deutungssinn mit einer
Urteilsenthaltung ¨ uber das transzendental Objektive einhergeht, also unter
die philosophische Figur der
”
Cartesischen epoch´ e“ gefasst werden kann.
Der erkenntnistheoretische H¨ ohengewinn eines die Reﬂektion von Bedin-
gung und M¨ oglichkeit von Erfahrung erlaubenden Standpunktes geht mit
einem Abwurf metaphysischen Ballasts einher, bzw. ist nur auf solchem
cartesisch-skeptischen Wege zu erlangen.
Allerdings ist dabei noch zu ber¨ ucksichtigen, dass das Hauptmoment der
buddhistischen Soteriologie in ihrer Lehre vom Nicht-Selbst (anatman) und
von der Leerheit der Erfahrungselemente liegt. Auch hier sind Parallelen
zu einschl¨ agigen empiristischen Anschauungen (etwa zur B¨ undeltheorie der
Person) gegeben. In seiner mah¯ ay¯ anistischen Bl¨ ute entwickelt sich der der
Leerheitsbegriff jedoch zu einer negativen Mystik und verl¨ asst damit das
Terrain der Erkenntnistheorie. Die reine via negativa ist nun neben der
als g¨ ultig erachteten positivistischen Deutung die tiefere und eigentlichere
Auslegungsm¨ oglichkeit des Buddha-Schweigens, und l¨ asst sich philosophisch
gesehen mit einer epoch´ e der transzendentalen Subjektivit¨ at in Deckung
bringen.
¨ Uber ein positivistisches Schweigen kann auf h¨ oherer Reﬂektionsstufe
noch nachgedacht und gesprochen werden, w¨ ahrend sich das negativ-
mystische Schweigen jeder M¨ oglichkeit eines reﬂektierenden Zugangs ent-
zieht. Die epoch´ e des Objekts wird aber dadurch nicht hinf¨ allig – sie gewinnt
dadurch im Gegenteil ihren rechten Sinn als Prop¨ adeutik. Im Kontext der
mah¯ ay¯ anistischen Erl¨ osungslehre wird das vermeintlich absolut existieren-
de Erkenntnisobjekt der Alltagserfahrung (wie auch die Erkenntnis selbst
und letztlich auch jedes Reﬂektieren ¨ uber Bedingung und M¨ oglichkeit von
Erkenntnis) als instrumentell aufgefasst. Ziel und Ende von Erkenntnis, wie
auch das eigentliche Wesen von Erfahrung, sind mystisch und ungreifbar.
Die in den Vim . ´ satik¯ a von Vasubandhu entfaltete idealistische Erkenntnis-
theorie ist demnach von einem negativ-mystischen Letztsinn geleitet. Dieser
Gesichtspunkt muss bei der Deutung seines rational-argumentativen Vor-
gehens in ebensolchem Maße wie die philosophischen Hintergr¨ unde der
abhidharmischen Scholastik Ber¨ ucksichtigung ﬁnden. Obgleich in Grund-
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z¨ ugen vorhanden, kommt das mystische Moment bei Mach ungleich weniger
deutlich zum Vorschein als bei Vasubandhu. Als positivistisch denkender
Naturwissenschaftler begn¨ ugt er sich damit, den antimetaphysischen Stand-
punkt zu gewinnen. Von hier aus soll Physik auf eine Beschreibung des
Funktionszusammenhangs der Empﬁndungen reduziert werden k¨ onnen.
Dieser Mach’sche Ph¨ anomenalismus entspricht aber gerade jenem fr¨ uh-
buddhistischen Boden, der durch den Realismus der buddhistischen Scho-
lastik verloren gegangen war und dessen Zur¨ uckgewinn von Vasubandhu
verteidigt wird.
Kapitel 2 Solche weitgreifende Thesen verlangen nat¨ urlich nach einer aus-
f¨ uhrlicheren Begr¨ undung, die im Rahmen einer Begriffskl¨ arung erfolgt.
Die Kernbegriffe Realismus, Ph¨ anomenalismus und Nominalismus wer-
den n¨ aher ausgeleuchtet. Der Br¨ uckenschlag von der buddhistischen zu
einer radikal-empiristischen Erkenntnistheorie wird anhand einer Betrach-
tung ausgew¨ ahlter fr¨ uhbuddhistischer Lehrreden weiter vorangetrieben, die
Parallelisierung zur Ideenwelt Machs erh¨ artet.
Die noch n¨ aher durchzuf¨ uhrende Darstellung vom Aufstieg und Fall des
buddhistischen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus wird angerissen: Im Zuge einer
fortschreitenden Zeitkritik wandelt sich innerhalb der Abhidharma-Schulen
die Auffassung vom Objekt. Wo sich in der Vaibh¯ as .ika-Schule das außen-
weltlich Objektive progressiv als begriffliche Beif¨ ugung zum letztlich sei-
enden Empﬁndungsmosaik konstituiert, wird es bei den Sautr¯ antika in
regressiver Weise gewonnen, d.h. als apriorisch zu denkender, letztlich sei-
ender Kausalgrund von Empﬁndung (die nurmehr als in bloß begrifﬂich-
beigef¨ ugter Weise seiend gilt) gesetzt. Diese philosophische Bewegung soll
nun anhand modellhafter Rekonstruktionen der Erkenntnistheorien der Vai-
bh¯ as .ika- und der Sautr¯ antika-Schulen eine weitere Untersuchung erfahren.
Zun¨ achst werden jedoch die historischen Urspr¨ unge des indischen Atomis-
mus in der nicht-buddhistischen Vai´ ses .ika-Schule gesucht und die Atom-
theorie dieser Schule in Grundz¨ ugen skizziert – sowohl um eine Verst¨ andnis-
grundlage f¨ ur die im Folgenden nachzuzeichnenden Entwicklungen der
buddhistischen Schulen an die Hand zu geben als auch um die zentrale
Kontrastﬁgur f¨ ur Vasubandhus anti-atomistische Argumentation aufzu-
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stellen. Der Einﬂuss der realistischen Vai´ ses .ika-Metaphysik stellt einen
m¨ oglichen Grund f¨ ur die Entfaltung atomistischer Lehren innerhalb der ur-
spr¨ unglich nicht-atomistischen Erkenntnistheorie des Buddhismus dar, aber
es sind auch Herleitungen aus ph¨ anomenalistischen oder nominalistischen
Gesichtspunkten denkbar.
Im Atomismus der Vaibh¯ as .ika-Schule sind realistische, ph¨ anomenalistische
und nominalistische Einﬂ¨ usse in mehr oder minder starkem Ausmaße zur
Auspr¨ agung gekommen. Lehrmeinung des Vaibh¯ as .ika ist eine zweigliedrige
Wahrnehmungstheorie. Demnach entsteht Erkenntnis im unmittelba-
ren Kontakt der Bewusstseinsmomente zu den Empﬁndungsatomen, die
als letztlich seiende Substanzen im absoluten Raum aufgefasst werden.
Diese Atomlehre ist im Rahmen enzyklop¨ adischer Systematisierungen
des Abhidharma dargestellt worden und teilt sich anhand dessen in drei
Entwicklungsphasen auf. Die dritte, abschließende Stufe dieser Entwicklung
ist in Vasubandhus Abhidharmako´ sa sowie im Ny¯ ay¯ anus¯ ara, der Replik
seines Lehrers und Kontrahenten Sa˙ nghabhadra, gegeben.
Die Vaibh¯ as .ikas vertraten eine Lehre von der Existenz in Vergangenheit,
Gegenwart und Zukunft, und entwickelten vier Zeittheorien. Diese Theorien
sowie ihre Kritiken werden etwas ausf¨ uhrlicher dargestellt, wobei Parallelen
zur modernen westlichen Philosophie gezogen werden, etwa zur Zeitkritik
McTaggarts. Es wird eine Rekonstruktion der Zeittheorie des Vasumitra
vorgenommen, welche versucht, Zeitlichkeit als Modus von Aktualit¨ at und
Existenz in Vergangenheit und Zukunft mit einem modalen Realismus zu
fassen.
Die Theorie der Vaibh¯ as .ika von den Empﬁndungsatomen wird ausgef¨ uhrt
und mit dem Hume’schen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus verglichen. Es folgt eine
kritische Betrachtung der dargestellten Lehren, die zum Standpunkt der
fr¨ uhen Sautr¯ antika-Schule ¨ uberleitet.
Die Anschauungen der Sautr¯ antikas zeichnen sich gegen¨ uber den Theo-
rien der Vaibh¯ as .ikas im Wesentlichen durch zwei Neuerungen aus – den
Repr¨ asentationalismus sowie die Lehre von der Momentanheit des Seien-
den. Darunter wird der Ineinsfall von Zeitlichkeit und Kausalfunktion mit
dem Wesen des Seienden verstanden. Da die Sautr¯ antika sogar den augen-
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blicklichen zeitlichen Bestand ablehnen, entsteht damit eine Auffassung von
Atomen als augenblicklich-ﬂusshafte Reizimpulse.
Die Sautr¯ antika vertreten eine Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis –
eine wahrheitsgem¨ aße Empﬁndung ist demnach eine solche, die mit ihrer
letztlich seienden, augenblicklich-ﬂusshaften Reizgrundlage ¨ ubereinstimmt.
Die Reizatome werden den Kant’schen Dingen an sich gegen¨ ubergestellt und
dieser Vergleich wird problematisiert. Die Sautr¯ antika-Lehre der irrealen
Wahrnehmungssynthese durch begrifﬂiche Einbildungskraft wird beleuchtet,
um den Unterscheid zum Synthesebegriff Kants zu unterstreichen.
Die Atomlehre der sp¨ aten Sautr¯ antika-Phase, in der nur noch von logisch
partikularen Augenblicklichkeitspunkten die Rede ist, wird im Ansatz vorge-
stellt und mit dem Elementarerlebnis Carnaps verglichen. Die Theorie der
Augenblicklichkeitspunkte ist nicht von der Atomkritik Vasubandhus betrof-
fen, da sie sich von der Vorstellung der Substanzhaftigkeit und r¨ aumlichen
Ausdehnung des Atoms gel¨ ost hat.
Es folgt eine Zusammenfassung und kritische W¨ urdigung der Erkenntnis-
theorie der Sautr¯ antika-Schule. Es werden Unstimmigkeiten an ihrer re-
pr¨ asentationalistischen Erkenntnistheorie aufgezeigt, die auf die Notwen-
digkeit einer g¨ anzlichen Aufgabe des außenweltlichen Objekts (wie dies von
der Nur-Geist-Schule schließlich vollzogen wird) hindeuten.
Kapitel 3 Die idealistische Lesart der Nur-Geist-Lehre wird zu Anfang
programmatisch in den Vordergrund gestellt. Die Betrachtung geht zu ei-
ner Unterscheidung der wichtigsten historischen Entwicklungslinien der
Nur-Geist-Schule ¨ uber. Als n¨ achstes wird die revisionistische Linie der mo-
dernen Rezeptionsgeschichte im Groben dargestellt. Es folgt eine n¨ ahere
Erl¨ auterung der drei einﬂussreichsten revisionistischen Lesarten. Diese
deuten die Erkenntnistheorie der Nur-Geist-Schule im Wesentlichen als
ph¨ anomenologische Spielart des kritischen Realismus. Die Stellungnahme
zu diesen Lesarten arbeitet die eigene Interpretationslinie klarer heraus
und untermauert diese.
Anschließend wird die traditionelle Interpretation der Nur-Geist-Lehre
vorgestellt. Die in der tibetischen Doxographie ¨ ubliche Unterscheidung der
Wahr- und Falschaspektler-Lesarten wird eingef¨ uhrt und im Ansatz phi-
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losophisch rekonstruiert. Die Wahraspektler-Lesart wird als
”
realistische“,
die Falschaspektler-Lesart als
”
antirealistische“ Deklination des Nur-Geist-
Standpunktes umschrieben.
Nachdem der Interpretationsraum aufgespannt wurde, wird das Argument
gegen den Atomismus schematisch umrissen. Weil sich die Angriffslinie der
Zeitkritik am Atombegriff im Sautr¯ antika ersch¨ opft hat, versucht Vasub-
andhu nun, das Atom und damit den Substanzbegriff auf dem Wege der
Raumkritik g¨ anzlich zu eliminieren. Vasubandhu vertritt die These, dass
Atome weder in der Erfahrung selbst noch als ihre materiellen Konstitutions-
elemente gegeben sind. Die realistische Gegenposition stellt sich in den drei
Atomtheorien der Vai´ ses .ika-, der Vaibh¯ as .ika- und der Sautr¯ antika-Schulen
dar. Die Argumentation verl¨ auft apagogisch, da die Position Vasubandhus
eine epoch´ e ist und deshalb nur die realistische Gegenposition einen Nach-
weis schuldet. Gelingt dieser nicht, ist damit der Standpunkt Vasubandhus
erwiesen.
Der Realist habe laut Vasubandhu drei M¨ oglichkeiten, das außenweltliche
Objekt nachzuweisen: als einheitliches Ganzes, als loser Atomhaufen oder
als zusammenh¨ angendes Atomkonglomerat. Wird wie in den letzten beiden
F¨ allen des Trilemmas eine Atomtheorie angenommen, sind abermals zwei
F¨ alle zu unterscheiden: das Substanzatom als r¨ aumlich ausgedehntes Teil-
chen oder als ausdehnungsloser Punkt. Vasubandhu wird nun zeigen, dass
beide F¨ alle unm¨ oglich sind, womit nur noch der Fall des außenweltlichen
Objekts als einheitliches Ganzes zu widerlegen bleibt.
Der Fall des Atoms als r¨ aumlich ausgedehntes Teilchen wird mit einer
mereologisch ausgerichteten Beweisf¨ uhrung behandelt. Wesentlicher Aspekt
der Argumentation ist die implizite Annahme, dass die r¨ aumliche Verbin-
dung und Anordnung von Atomen nur mit mereotopologischen Mitteln
darstellbar sind, Ontologie sich jedoch auf den rein mereologischen Anteil
beschr¨ anken muss. Topologische Eigenschaften sind als begriffliche Ein-
bildungen bei der Betrachtung des letztlich Seienden außer Acht zu lassen.
Damit f¨ uhrt Vasubandhu eine von der Sache her analoge Argumentation zur
Antithese der zweiten Antinomie der reinen Vernunft bei Kant – er erweist,
dass alles, was einen Raum einnimmt, zusammengesetzt ist.
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Gegen das punktf¨ ormige Atom tr¨ agt Vasubandhu ebenfalls vernichtende
Einw¨ ande vor, etwa dass sich solche Atome nur ber¨ uhren k¨ onnen, wenn
sie den gleichen Raumort einnehmen. Ausgedehnte K¨ orper, die aus solchen
Atomen zusammengesetzt sind, fallen auf Punktgr¨ oße zusammen. Des Wei-
teren sind ph¨ anomenal wahrnehmbare Eigenschaften wie Verdr¨ angung oder
Schattenwurf nur unter Zugrundelegung einer r¨ aumlichen Ausdehnung des
Atoms konstituierbar. Vasubandhu geht daraufhin zur Betrachtung des Falls
¨ uber, dass das außenweltliche Objekt als einheitliches Ganzes gegeben sei.
Er f¨ uhrt hierzu eine Reihe von Gegenbeispielen an, die wieder in ¨ Ahnlich-
keit zum Kant’schen Standpunkt zeigen sollen, dass echte Einheiten in der
Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeit nirgends vorzuﬁnden sind.
Im n¨ achsten Argument wird die kausale Wahrnehmungstheorie der Sau-
tr¯ antika abgehandelt. Vasubandhu weist darauf hin, dass eine Kausa-
lit¨ atsbeziehung nur zwischen aufeinanderfolgenden Momenten m¨ oglich ist.
Weil der Anhaltspunkt einer Wahrnehmung zu dem Zeitpunkt, als dar-
aus ein Wahrnehmungsobjekt entsteht, bereits entschwunden ist, kann
die Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis nicht aufrecht erhalten werden.
Damit ist dann auch die Notwendigkeit einer apriorisch zu denkenden außen-
weltlichen Reizgrundlage hinf¨ allig geworden.
Atomtheorien, die als im Vasubandhu’schen Sinne widerlegt gelten d¨ urfen,
sind solche, die von der erkenntnisunabh¨ angigen Existenz unteilbarer, letzt-
lich seiender Substanzen im absoluten Raum ausgehen. Atomismen, die
sich nicht auf einen solchen Substanzbegriff festlegen, bleiben von seiner
Argumentation unber¨ uhrt, ebenso logische und instrumentelle Atomismen
sowie realistische Standpunkte, die von einer unendlichen Teilbarkeit des
Stofflichen ausgehen.
Den Vergleichsfaden zur empiriokritizistischen Erkenntnistheorie wieder
aufgreifend kann der Standpunkt Vasubandhus nun anhand des Mach’schen
Antiatomismus neu ausbuchstabiert werden. Mach und Avenarius f¨ uhren
wissenschaftliche Erkl¨ arung auf Beschreibung, Ontologie auf das Prinzip
der Denk¨ okonomie zur¨ uck. In der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie ger¨ at das
Atom zum bloßen Gedankensymbol, bei Avenarius ist es ein aus Zweck-
m¨ aßigkeitsgr¨ unden gew¨ ahlter Grenzbegriff. F¨ ur die Empiriokritizisten ist
die bewusstseinsunabh¨ angige Gegenst¨ andlichkeit des Erkenntnisobjekts
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genau wie f¨ ur Vasubandhu eine Fiktion. ¨ Ahnliche Standpunkte ﬁnden sich
bei Carnap und sogar bei Quine, so dass der Idealismus Vasubandhus vom
Grundsatz her keineswegs als g¨ anzlich veraltet gelten kann.
Kapitel 4 Die vorangegangenen Er¨ orterungen legen nahe, die Vasuband-
hu’sche Sicht als einen Empirismus in fremdem Gewande zu deuten. Der
durchgef¨ uhrte Perspektivwechsel zur buddhistischen Erkenntnistheorie ver-
schafft dem abendl¨ andischen Philosophierenden einen neuartigen Ausblick
auf seine eigene empiristische Denktradition. Die Suche nach Anfangs-
gr¨ unden und Sinn von Erkenntnis gestaltet sich gleichermaßen im Abstrak-
ten als erkenntnistheoretische Reﬂektion wie auch im Konkreten als geistes-
geschichtliche Reise zu den ost-westlichen Urquellen der Erkenntnistheorie.
Um weitere Perspektiven der erfolgten Analyse zu er¨ offnen, wird die Kritik
an der Nur-Geist-Sichtweise vonseiten der Advaita Ved¯ anta- und M¯ adhya-
mika-Schulen angerissen. Die Nur-Geist-Lehre dient dabei als notwendige
Gegenﬁgur f¨ ur die volle Entfaltung des metakritischen Skeptizismus der
M¯ adhyamikas, der sich den Angriff auf die transzendentale Subjektivit¨ at
zum Programm macht. Andererseits geht der M¯ adhyamika in seiner De-
struktion der Objektivit¨ atskritik der Nur-Geist-Schule deutlich zu weit. Es
wird die These aufgestellt, dass Kritik am Objektivit¨ atsbegriff Bedingung der
M¨ oglichkeit einer Subjektivit¨ atskritik ist. Hat man n¨ amlich keine Mittel zur
Hand, sich des absoluten Charakters gewisser physikalischer Grundbegriffe
zu erwehren, ist jeder Ansatz einer Wesenslosigkeitsmystik im Sinne des
M¯ adhyamika im Keime erstickt.
Planck bringt auf den Punkt, wie aufgrund theoretischer Fortschritte
(beispielsweise der speziellen Relativit¨ atstheorie und der Quantenhypothe-
se) entgegen den fr¨ uhpositivistischen Ansichten Machs tats¨ achlich auf die
Absolutwertigkeit u.a. von Energie und Entropie geschlossen werden kann.
Die Mach’schen Prinzipien der Relativit¨ at physikalischer Begriffe und der
Instrumentalit¨ at der Außenwelthypothese seien durch die gezeigte Bewe-
gung vom Relativen zum Absoluten entkr¨ aftet. Der Empirismus ﬁndet jedoch
in der metatheoretischen Reﬂektion einen Ausweg. Durch absolutwertige
Begriffe ist einerseits ein wissenschaftlicher Bodengewinn gegeben, anderer-
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seits kommt man aus erkenntnistheoretischen Gr¨ unden nicht umhin, diese
Absolutheit wieder in Bezug auf Theorie und Reﬂektionsstufe zu relativieren.
Abschließend folgt eine kurze Selbstbeurteilung des Geleisteten im Hin-
blick auf die Aufgabenstellung der Arbeit und den bearbeiteten Stoff.
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